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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Competitiveness: the key to success 
Competitiveness of firms is crucial for their success 
in the market. Competitiveness of countries is crucial 
for their performance in terms of wealth creation. 
This report is about the competitiveness of the EU. 
The report is divided into two parts. Chapters 1, 2 
and 3 present a general assessment of Europe's 
competitive performance, the main problems 
encountered and some of the explanatory factors 
behind these problems. The second part focuses on 
the strengths and weaknesses of the European 
manufacturing sector and compares its sectoral 
specialisation with that of the USA and of Japan. 
The first part of the report is directed towards the 
general reader. The second part analyses trends in 
sectors and industries and their underlying forces. 
The problem: lag in wealth and 
employment creation 
Europe lags behind both the USA (33%) and Japan 
(13%) in its standard of living, as measured by GDP 
per capita in purchasing power parities of 1997. In 
the past decade GDP growth averaged 2.5% p.a. in 
both Europe and the USA. In Europe this was 
primarily achieved by a combination of high growth 
of labour productivity with low growth of 
employment. The USA had low productivity growth 
and high employment growth. 
In Europe labour productivity (GDP per person 
employed) is still nearly one fifth lower than in the 
USA, although Europe has been progressively 
catching up on the USA (see Fig. 1 ). 
The substitution of capital for labour explains almost 
half of Europe's increase in labour productivity. For 
the USA this substitution effect is of limited 
relevance (see Fig. 2). 
The speed of capital labour substitution depends 
importantly on the change in the relative price of 
labour (wages compared to the user cost of capital). 
There is evidence that the relative price of labour rose 
faster in Europe than in the USA. 
Fig. 1: Labour productivity (USA=100) 
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Fig. 2: Labour productivity, avarage annual 
change, 1985-1995 
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Source: OECD, EUROSTAT; IFO calculations. 
Europe's inability to create new jobs is resulting in 
a widening gap in employment rates (ratio between 
the total number of persons employed and the 
inhabitants of working age) compared to the USA and 
Japan (see Fig. 3). This is one of the main reasons 
behind the lower standard of living in Europe 
compared to the USA. 
Europe's low job creation capability has several 
explanations. An important one is Europe's inability 
to move quickly into new, promising sectors. Where 
the USA has created jobs in technically advanced 
industries and transformed itself into a service 
economy, Europe is lagging behind (see Fig. 4). 02  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
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Higher costs of basic services and 
labour 
The costs of basic services, such as energy, 
transportation and communication are of great 
importance in staying competitive. Despite the Single 
Market Programme and its positive effects on 
competition and liberalisation, Europe still has more 
restrictions and distortions of competition in these 
service industries than the USA. The negative effect 
of these inadequate institutional conditions is 
illustrated by the higher prices which industrial users 
have to pay (see Fig. 5). 
Employment growth in % per annum 
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Fig. 4: Value added (GDP) and employment by 
broad sector, 1995 
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However, Europe's employment performance was 
weaker in all sectors between 1985 and 1995. This 
suggests that Europe's problems lie in the general 
environment for doing business rather than in the 
weak performance of individual branches of the 
economy. 
Fig. 5: Comparison of prices of important 
services (industrial users), USA=100 
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Prices for industrial users including taxes at 1996 PPPs. 
Source: OECD, energy prices and taxes, Paris 1997 and 
Telecommunication Outlook 1997; IFO calculations 
Wages and average nominal labour costs rose faster in 
Europe than in the USA during the 1980s, before 
increasing more or less in parallel during the 1990s. 
The greater increase in labour productivity only went 
some way towards mitigating the rise in labour costs 
so that unit labour costs still increased faster than 
those of the USA during this period (see Fig. 6). 
Measured in domestic currency, the relationship 
between nominal unit labour cost in Europe and the 
USA only stabilised after 1993. 
Poor performance of innovation systems 
Improving the performance of national innovation 
systems is also important for competitiveness. 
Commercially relevant innovation can be measured 
in different ways including the expenditure by 
business on R&D and international patenting. On 
both of these measures, Europe is lagging behind the 
USA and Japan (see Fig. 7). EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I 03 
Fig. 6: Nominal unit labour costs in 
manufacturing; ratio EU over USA (1980=100) 
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Fig. 7: Business R&D ratio 
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Relatively little patenting is undertaken by public 
institutions. Since in Europe, particularly amongst 
southern Member States, there is greater reliance on 
publicly funded R&D than in the USA and Japan, 
this constitutes a cause for concern. Explanations can 
be found in a number of areas. In certain countries, 
the inventor and not the public institution to which a 
researcher is attached holds the patent (Austria, 
Denmark, Germany and Sweden). This diminishes 
the incentive for such institutions to develop 
commercially relevant technology. 
In Europe, compared with the USA, commercially 
relevant research is concentrated in non-university 
research institutions with the corollary of a greater 
separation between pure and applied research. This 
is significant because public institutions tend to 
concentrate on those fields of commercially relevant 
technology for which fundamental research is most 
important, especially biological and genetic 
technology (see Table 1). The breakdown by industry 
sector of public R&D institutions reflects this fact. 
The most important sectors are chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals, medical, optical and control and 
measurement instruments. 
Table 1: Allocation of R&D output (EU, USA, 
Japan altogether) by field of technology 
Cross-section technology 
Information and 
Communication 
Biological & Genetic 
Technology 
Environmental Technology 
All fields 
Inventions
3 in % filed 
Universities 
16.3 
79.1 
4.6 
100 
Research 
institutions 
34.3 
55.0 
10.7 
100 
by 
Industry 
76.8 
11.7 
11.5 
100 
a With origin in EU, USA or Japan, applied for patent in at least two 
countries between 1991 and 1996 
Source: EPIDOS, IFO Patent Statistics. 
Lack of adequate risk capital 
Most jobs are created by a small minority of high 
growth firms, often technology oriented. In the USA, 
3% of firms accounted for 80% of job growth 
between 1991 and 1995. The competitive position of 
these firms is partly determined by the availability of 
a wide range of efficiently priced financial services. 
SMEs face problems in their access to financial 
resources. Compared to large enterprises they are 
restricted in their access to capital markets and 
institutions. Being very dependent on financial debt 
their relationships to banks are of particular 
importance. In addition, in specific areas particularly 
relevant for high growth firms, the framework for 
financing SMEs is less well developed than in the 
USA. This is especially true for business start-ups 
and the expansion of companies having entered new 
business activities. As a result, Europe has been 
slower than the USA in movine into the services 04 I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
market, especially business services, information, 
communication and media. 
One of the reasons why Europe lags in high growth 
business start-ups is the lack of adequate risk capital. 
Compared to the USA, the European venture capital 
market is less likely to channel funds into companies 
involved in the seeding (research and development) 
stage or in the start-up stage. In 1997 this group of 
firms accounted for 29% of new investments in the 
USA while in Europe this was only 15% (see Fig. 8). 
Fig. 8: Venture capital - stage distribution of 
investment, Europe and USA, 1997 
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investments (about ECU 4.8 billion) are excluded for Europe to make 
data comparable with the USA. 
Source: EVCA 1998 Yearbook and NVCA 1997 Annual Report: 
adjustments by Bannock Consulting. 
Furthermore, venture capital in Europe is less 
associated with new technology-based firms 
compared to the USA. These firms are responsible 
for much of the development of the semiconductor, 
minicomputer, software and biotechnology industries. 
This is a key deficit in funding start-up and promoting 
rapid technological and sectoral change. 
Behind the relative inadequacy of risk capital finance 
for high growth firms lies a lack of development of 
both demand and supply for risk capital. In order to 
diversify risk adequately, a large number of suitable 
projects in which to invest needs to be available. At 
the same time large, liquid markets with high degree 
of transparency and standards of disclosure are also 
required to encourage investors to participate. 
Competitive strengths and weaknesses 
of European manufacturing 
The purpose of the second part of the report is to 
identify strengths and weaknesses in competitive 
performance by looking at the current patterns and 
changes in the structure of the European 
manufacturing. 
Following a similar pattern to that set for the 
economy as a whole, European manufacturing 
matched, between 1989 and 1996, both the USA and 
Japan in terms of nominal growth in value added, but 
performed worse in terms of employment. 
With the share of the manufacturing sector in total 
GDP amounting to 20.6%, the EU is positioned 
between Japan (24.7%) and the USA (18.0%). 
Overall performance of manufacturing industry 
The overall performance of the manufacturing 
industry can be summarised as follows. 
Given the lags of European manufacturing in terms 
of aggregate labour productivity, modest growth 
performance and rapidly declining employment, the 
sectoral analysis indicates neither overspecialisation 
in low productivity industries nor a lack of 
technological competence and manufacturing skills. 
Compared to the USA, structural differences arise 
primarily from poor performance in creating lead-
time in the fast moving markets, where competitive 
advantage is based on intangible investment in 
research and marketing. Since first mover advantages 
create substantial benefits in terms of growth and 
employment, the USA seems to have a greater ability 
to benefit from the particularly high growth dynamics 
in these industries. 
External balances are not a constraint 
Global competition: As a natural consequence of 
faster growth in other areas, notably in the dynamic 
Asian countries, the combined market share of the 
EU, Japan and the USA has declined. However, their 
overall trade balance is positive and increasing (see 
Table 2). 
This implies that the global integration of world 
markets and the increasing competition with low 
wage economies may have reduced employment 
opportunities in specific industries, but not 
contributed directly to the overall decline in European 
manufacturing employment. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I 05 
Table 2: EU manufacturing in a globalised world 
EU 
Japan 
USA 
Share in value 
added 
<in%) 
1989 1996 
32.5 32.9 
25.7 25.6 
41.9 41.6 
Value added 
growth 
(p.a., in%) 
1989/96 
2.7 
2.5 
2.4 
Share in world 
market 
(in%) 
1989 1996 
27.0 26.9 
19.2 14.5 
20.2 18.8 
Trade balance 
(in ECU billion) 
1989 1996 
28.1 130.2 
121.7 107.4 
-125.1 -146.4 
Share in value added: EU+Japan+USA = 100. Share in the world market 
(market share): exports as a percentage of world imports. 
Source: DEBA, COMPET; WIFO calculations. 
Favourable external balances: External balances are 
currently not constraining European performance. 
The EU enjoys larger world market shares for its 
manufacturing exports than Japan or the USA. 
Despite increasing competition from emerging 
economies, the European market shares remained 
stable between 1989 and 1996. In contrast, both 
Japanese and US exports lost market shares in world 
imports. The EU's trade balance for manufacturing 
goods is positive and increasing. 
European quality mark up: The European trade 
surplus is generated by a quality premium in the 
sense that exports are more highly valued than 
imports. This quality premium arises primarily from 
trade with countries other than Japan and the USA, 
e.g. in Central and Eastern Europe. As a consequence 
of Japanese specialisation in the export of goods from 
high unit value industries, the unit value of European 
imports from Japan is twice as large as that of exports 
to Japan. Comparing bilateral trade flows with the 
USA, the number of industries in which Europe has 
higher or lower export unit values is roughly equal. 
Productivity 
Gaps in labour productivity: Labour productivity of 
European manufacturing is significantly lower than 
that of Japan and the USA. The exact magnitude at 
the industry level is blurred by measurement 
problems, which stem in part from the interface 
between manufacturing and industry services. 
Differences in industrial structure do not affect the 
European productivity gap in manufacturing. 
Modest catching up in productivity: Labour 
productivity in the EU is rising faster than in the 
USA. Given the large initial gap, catching up is 
progressing slowly. In past years, about one third of 
European productivity growth was due to structural 
change towards industries with higher productivity. 
This trend was supported by the simultaneous 
decline in employment shares in low productivity 
industries, e.g. in the clothing sector, as well as by 
growing shares of high productivity industries, such 
as pharmaceuticals. Although productivity growth is, 
for the most part, still affected by general factors that 
apply equally across industries, catching up relative to 
the USA would not have been possible without 
structural change. 
Patterns of specialisation 
Technological competence and skills: The EU proves 
its considerable technological competence and skills 
in mainstream manufacturing and the research-
intensive industries outside the information 
technologies (see Table 3). The EU is most 
competitive in the sectors of machinery, vehicles and 
chemicals, which together create a trade surplus 
larger than the overall surplus of the EU. 
Lags in fast moving, dynamic markets: European 
manufacturing compares poorly in the fastest moving 
markets, characterised either by recent technological 
upturns, as in the case of ICT-related research-
intensive industries, or by rapidly changing consumer 
tastes. Compared to the USA, the low shares in total 
value added of research and advertising intensive 
industries reveal shortcomings in innovation and 
marketing strategies in these most dynamic markets. 
Table 3: Competitive performance by type of 
Industry 
Share in world market Value added shares in the triad 
EU Japan USA EU Japan USA 
1989 1996 1989 1996 1989 1996 1989 1996 1989 1996 1989 1996 
in % 
Labour 
intensive 28.0 25.6 11.5 9.4 10.4 9.8 35.0 35.4 28.3 28.1 36.7 36.5 
Capilal 
intensive 21.7 22.7 115 11.7 19.3 19.3 34.9 31.8 28.0 29.6 37.1 38.6 
Advertising 
intensive 28.6 26.3 5.8 3.6 16.4 15.4 30.1 32.1 22.8 22.7 47.1 45.2 
Research 
intensive 22.8 24.3 317 20.5 25.7 22.1 29.7 29.8 24.0 23.2 46.3 46.9 
Mainstream 
manufacturing 40.0 37.4 23.1 17.6 21.3 21.0 34.0 34.1 27.6 27.6 38.3 38.4 
Total 
manufacturing 27.0 26.9 19.2 14.5 20.2 18.8 32.5 32.9 25.7 25.6 41.9 41 6 
Market share: Exports as a percentage of world imports. 
Source: DEBA, COMEXT, COMPET; WIFO calculations. 
European restructuring by multinational activity: 
European manufacturing is characterised by a 
significant increase in intra-EU multinational 
investment. This type of investment provides an 
important impetus for the ongoing restructuring of 
European manufacturing, especially in the industries 
relying largely on intangible firm-specific assets like 
innovation and marketin«. 06  I EX  ECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Required tailor-made policy 
Four policy messages follow from the analysis of this 
report: 
Elimination of institutional and regulator}' barriers: 
Weaknesses were identified in some dynamic 
markets, characterised by product differentiation, 
marketing and innovation. The fast moving 
environment of these markets requires flexibility in 
entrepreneurial response. A prime policy target 
therefore is the elimination of institutional and 
regulatory barriers to the creative and flexible 
management of change. Such rigidities can be found 
in financial, labour and product markets, in particular 
in basic services, as well as in the highly disparate 
nature of European innovation systems. 
mature products. The EU needs to continuously invest 
in quality and to shift to new products at earlier stages 
of the product cycle. Economic policy in the EU has 
to promote, therefore, innovation, adaptability and the 
upgrading of human capital. 
Sectoral analysis does not suggest any vertical 
targeting of individual industries by subsidies or 
strategic trade arrangements. In particular, two 
arguments support horizontal as opposed to vertical 
policies: (i) The policy of 'picking winners' generates 
opportunity costs relative to private market-based 
solutions, (ii) In addition, the analysis revealed that 
lower European labour productivity does not stem 
from structural weaknesses in the sense of being less 
specialised in high productivity industries than the 
USA. 
Continuous upgrading of European industry: Unit 
labour costs in the EU are higher than in the USA, 
and - by a much wider margin - higher than in 
developing and transition countries. Low wage 
economies may successfully compete on price and 
may retain a presence in markets of homogenous and 
Diffusion of best practice: A high degree of disparity 
within the EU was found to exist for example with 
regard to labour productivity. This underlines the 
importance of policies directed at the diffusion of 
best practices within the EU both in business and in 
policy. Part One 
The European economy CHAPTER il  09 
Chapter 1 
Macroeconomic performance 
An economy is competitive if its population can enjoy 
high standards of living and high rates of employment 
while maintaining a sustainable external position. 
Standards of living, measured by income per capita, 
remain on average in the 15-member EU well below 
those in the USA and in Japan. 
The main factor behind this poor performance of the 
EU is the low growth of employment. EU Member 
States have succeeded over the years in raising their 
labour productivity at higher rates than in the USA. 
They have never matched, however, the record of the 
USA in employment creation. Compared to Japan, up 
until recently, they performed worse both in terms of 
productivity and of employment growth. Japanese 
productivity growth has lost pace in the nineties. 
The poor employment creation record of the EU is 
related to a bias in favour of more capital intensive 
techniques and away from certain labour intensive 
sectors. Regulations and institutions in product, 
capital and labour markets are likely to have 
contributed to this bias. 
1. Europe's competitive position 
Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is the main 
yardstick of living standards. In 1997, the GDP per 
capita in the EU still lagged well behind that of the 
USA and Japan. On average, a citizen of the EU 
enjoyed an income roughly one third lower than in the 
USA and one seventh lower than in Japan (see Fig. 
1.1). 
In terms of growth, throughout most of the seventies 
and eighties, European economies have done well 
relatively to the USA. Over that period, GDP per 
capita in West European countries converged to USA 
levels. Japan did even better. Starting in the sixties 
well below West European levels, its average income 
was in the early nineties some 10% higher than in the 
EU 15 (excluding East Germany). Since the early 
nineties, however, GDP per capita in both the EU and 
Japan has regressed relatively to the USA (see Fig. 
1.2). 
Fig 1.1: GDP per capita, 1997 
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In 1997 PPPs. Purchasing power parities (PPPs) are used for the 
comparison, because it is living standards that are analysed here. The 
level of real income in a country depends not only on the performance 
of the international sector of the economy, but also on the domestic 
sector. 
Source: OECD; IFO calculations. 
It may be argued that GDP per capita is the main but 
not the only indicator of a region's standard of living. 
The amount of leisure time, the level of social security 
and the degree to which the natural environment is 
protected also affect the welfare of the population. 
Environmental protection is also important in the 
context of the sustainability of GDP growth. 
Fig 1.2: GDP per capita (USA = 100) 
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Source: OECD, German Statistical Office; IFO calculations. 10  CHAPTER 1 
Europe fares relatively better when some of these 
additional indicators are taken into consideration. For 
example, weekly working hours are shorter and 
employees have more holidays than in the USA and in 
Japan (see Table 1.1). Indeed, a significant part of the 
productivity increase in recent decades has been used 
to provide more leisure time to the employed 
population. At today's labour productivity, the extra 
leisure time in Europe compared to the USA is 
estimated to amount to 6% of total GDP. 
Table 1.1: Leisure time 
Standard 1996 for workers 
in manufacturing 
Country/ 
Region 
Weekly 
Working hours 
Number of days 
Holidays Public holidays 
EU 15 
Japan 
USA 
38.6 
40 
40 
27.7 
18 
12 
EU 15 = Average of standards of Member States, 
10.1 
13 
11 
employment weights. 
Source: Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft, OECD; IFO calculations. 
On the basis of some indicators, the EU also appears 
to be polluting the environment considerably less 
than the USA, both per head of the population (see 
Table 1.2) and in terms of emissions per unit of GDP 
(a measure of the environmental efficiency of 
production)
1 . Japan outperforms the EU in the area of 
SOx and NOx emissions. The environment efficiency 
of production depends both on industry structures and 
on the mix of energy sources and technologies used. 
2. Factors behind the lower European 
standard of living 
The European gap in GDP per capita may be due to 
lower labour productivity per hour worked, shorter 
working time per employee, a lower employment-
population ratio, or a smaller share of the population 
of working age (see Fig. 1.3). 
Fig 1.3: Decomposition of GDP per capita 
GDP 
per person employed 
1 
GDP 
per hour worked 
1 GDP per capita 
1 
Hours worked per 
person employed 
Employment/ 
population ratio 
1 
Working age population/ 
total population ratio 
Employment 
rate 
Source: European Commission. 
The extent to which these various components 
contributed to the lower level of European and 
Japanese GDP per capita compared to the USA is 
examined next in Figure 1.4. 
Labour productivity relates to the business sector and 
is calculated as the ratio of GDP (at factor cost, 
constant prices) to the number of hours worked. For 
the calculation of hours worked, data is needed on the 
amount of part-time employment, the number of 
holidays and the daily working time. Internationally 
comparable data on these variables are currently only 
available up to 1995. 
Table 1.2: Environmental pollution 
Country/ Emissions 1995 per capita 
Region Tonnes of CO
2 Kg of SO* kg of NOx 
EU 15 
Japan 
USA 
8.9 
9.2 
19.9 
31.3 
7.2 
63.1 
32.7 
11.1 
75.1 
Source: OECD; IFO calculations. 
These more positive aspects of the European 
economic system should not obscure, however, that at 
present a large part of the EU economy heavily under-
utilises its capacity to produce and grow. A better 
macroeconomic performance would permit the 
European economies to pursue their social and 
environmental objectives more effectively. 
As a comprehensive set of indicators of environmental 
pollution for international comparisons is not yet available, 
the approach focuses on emissions which are of 
transnational importance and imply the danger of global 
warming and changes in climate. 
Fig 1.4: Factors explaining the gap in GDP per 
capita compared to the USA 
q 
ra 
a 
EU15 
1 Labour productivity (per hour) 
□ Employment rate 
Japan 
Π Working time (per person employed) 
□ Share of population at working age 
GDP at PPPs. 
Source: OECD, EUROSTAT; IFO calculations. 
The major factors explaining Europe's lower per 
capita GDP as compared to the USA are the lower 
employment rate and, to lesser extent, the lower 
labour productivity. CHAPTER 1 I 11 
The employment rate is defined as the ratio of the 
total number of persons employed to the number of 
inhabitants of working age (15-64). Figure 1.4 also 
reveals that differences in working time between the 
EU and the USA play a less significant role than what 
one would have expected on the basis of Table 1.1. 
The larger proportion of part-time workers in the 
USA in part counterbalances the impact of shorter 
working time of full-time employees in Europe. 
Finally, it is worth noticing that the age composition 
of the population is currently in Europe's favour. 
Japan has a labour productivity that is well below that 
of both the EU and the USA. The very low 
productivity in agriculture and services accounts for 
much of shortfall of the Japanese economy. On the 
other hand, it has an employment rate that is even 
higher than that of the USA. As a result, GDP per 
capita in Japan remains above that of the EU. Working 
time and the share of active population to the total 
population also work in Japan's favour. 
The static Figure 1.4 does not tell the full story. Over 
the period 1985-1995 the contribution to GDP growth 
of rises in labour productivity and in labour input 
(total hours worked) has been rather different in the 
three areas considered (see Fig. 1.5). 
Fig 1.5: Growth in labour input, productivity and 
GDP, 1985-1995 (% p.a.) 
Total number of Labour productivity GDP Growth 
hours worked (per hour) 
Labour productivity as volume of GDP at factor cost divided by labour 
input in hours. 
Source: OECD, EUROSTAT; IFO calculations. 
The European GDP growth of 2.5% p.a. was achieved 
by strong growth in labour productivity combined 
with low growth of the labour input. The rise of total 
hours worked has been close to zero. The same is true 
of Japan. Instead, the same GDP growth as in Europe 
was accompanied in the USA by a very significant 
rise of total labour input. Labour productivity in the 
USA has risen much slower. 
3. Jobless growth: a constant feature 
of the European economy 
In various degrees, 'jobless growth' has been a 
constant feature of the West European economies. It 
has recently appeared to be a characteristic also of the 
Japanese economy. 
Over the last thirty years, labour productivity (GDP 
per person employed) in the current EU Member 
States has continued to rise faster than in the USA 
(see Fig. 1.6). Up until the early nineties, labour 
productivity in Japan rose even faster than in the EU. 
Fig 1.6: Labour productivity 
(annual percentage growth) 
1961-73 1974-85 1986-90  1991-97 
EU ■ JP ■ USA 
Source: European Commission. 
The faster growth of productivity in the EU and Japan 
has allowed them to converge towards but not yet 
reach the US productivity levels (see Fig. 1.7). 
Fig 1.7: Labour Productivity (USA=100) 
EU Japan 
Source: European Commission. 
When turning to employment, the picture is radically 
different. The growth of numbers employed has 
constantly been lower in the EU than in the USA and 
in Japan. This was not only true in the turbulent phase 12  CHAPTER 1 
of oil price shocks or during the fight against inflation 
in the seventies and early eighties. In the following 
decade of relatively high price stability, the European 
economy has continued to perform worse than either 
the American or the Japanese economy. Apart from 
fluctuations induced by the business cycle, the 
employment ratio in Europe has been stagnating at 
best. Compared to that of Japan and the USA, it has 
showed clear signs of divergence (see Fig. 1.8). 
Fig 1.8: Employment growth and rates of 
employment 
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Source: OECD; IFO calculations. 
Not only growth of numbers employed has been low 
in the EU but also, contrary to the recent USA 
experience, hours worked per person have fallen (see 
Fig. 1.9). In Japan the growth of employed people and 
the reduction of hours worked per person have 
cancelled each other out during the period 1985-1995. 
The net result has been no change in the total labour 
input. 
There are two important aspects of the EU economy 
that help explain this jobless growth, at least in the 
more recent times. First, the EU has been relatively 
less specialised than the USA in services. Almost the 
entire net new job creation in the USA has been in this 
sector (see next section). 
Fig 1.9: Development in employment and 
labour input, 1985-1995 (% p.a.) 
Number 
employed 
Hours worked per 
person employed 
Labour input in 
hours worked 
EU  JP  USA 
Source: OECD, EUROSTAT; IFO calculations. 
Second, productivity growth in the EU has tended to 
be accompanied by capital deepening much more 
than in the USA. Gains in labour productivity are the 
result of both total factor productivity growth and of' 
capital/labour substitution. Growth of total factor 
productivity is the amount by which output increases 
as the result of improvements in methods of 
production, technology and organisation for a given 
amount of inputs. When an economy is in a state of 
full employment, capital/labour substitution permits 
faster growth than the underlying rate of increase in 
the labour force and technical progress would allow. 
If the same economy is functioning with spare 
employment capacity, however, capital-labour 
substitution may have undesirable job destroying 
effects. 
In the EU, capital/labour substitution explains nearly 
half of the increase in labour productivity, whereas in 
the USA it has contributed only marginally to labour 
productivity growth (see Fig. 1.10). In Japan, it 
explains almost two thirds. 
Fig 1.10: Labour productivity, average annual 
change, 1985-1995 
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Source: OECD, EUROSTAT; IFO calculations. 
The speed of capital labour substitution depends 
importantly on the change in the relative price of 
labour (wages compared to the user cost of capital). CHAPTER 1 I 13 
There is evidence that the relative price of labour rose 
faster in Europe than in the USA. Wages increased 
more than the prices of machinery and equipment (see 
Fig. 1.11). Real interest rates did not differ much 
between Europe and the USA in the last decade. The 
US tax reform in the second half of the eighties 
entailed disincentives for fixed capital formation. 
Fig 1.11: Ratio of wages to prices of machinery and 
equipment 
EU Japan USA 
Source: OECD; IFO calculations. 
4. Growth and employment in market 
services and manufacturing 
The trend towards services has dominated the pattern 
of sectoral change for over two. three decades. Behind 
this trend is not only a higher income elasticity of the 
demand for services. Technical progress in the 
collection, storage, transmission and retrieval of 
information has reduced the costs of information and 
communication. Information services have become 
the centre of economic growth. These forces are 
fundamentally changing the organisation of 
production of goods and services and the way of life 
of society. Bearing in mind the importance of the 
trend towards services, the speed of adjustment of the 
sectoral structure of the European economy becomes 
an issue of competitiveness. The growth of 
productivity and of living standards is directly linked 
to the ability of the European economic and social 
system to encourage and manage this structural 
change. 
A breakdown of production (value added at factor 
costs) and employment by broad sectors shows that 
the USA is a large step ahead on the way to the 
service society. The shares of both agriculture and 
industry in production and total employment are 
lower than in Europe (see Fig. 1.12). 
Fig. 1.12: Value added (GDP) and employment by 
broad sector, 1995 
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Source: EUROSTAT, US Department of Commerce; IFO calculations. 
The difference in the share of industry also reflects 
different traditions in organising production. 
Industrial enterprises in Europe used to integrate 
service functions like catering, transport, accountancy 
and consultancy and have more recently discovered 
the advantages of outsourcing in this area. In the USA 
these services have been outsourced earlier and to a 
far greater extent to independent service companies. 
As a late mover in the service-based economy, Europe 
is now in the process of catching up. Over the period 
1985-1995, value added in market services has grown 
faster in Europe than in the USA. Employment in 
market services is, however, still growing more slowly 
in the EU compared to the USA (see Fig. 1.13). 
Fig 1.13: Change of production and employment, 
1985-1995 (% p.a.) 
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Source: EUROSTAT, US Department of Commerce; IFO calculations. 14  CHAPTER 1 
Though the developments in the service sector have 
clearly dominated employment growth in both the 
USA and the EU, the underlying problems of the EU 
economy are not limited to that sector. The USA 
economy has not lost jobs in any of the macro-sectors. 
In Europe, both agriculture and manufacturing have 
shed labour. 
eighties. Despite the Single Market Programme and 
its positive effects on competition and liberalisation, 
Europe still has more restrictions on and distortions of 
competition in these service industries. Privatisation 
has just begun. Delayed privatisation and 
liberalisation are reflected in the higher prices that 
industrial users have to pay (see Fig. 1.14). 
The pattern of development of the European 
manufacturing sector has been similar to that of the 
economy as a whole. Labour productivity rose faster 
but employment performance has been poorer than in 
the USA. As part 2 of this report shows, the European 
industry diminished its presence in low productivity 
sectors and increasingly concentrated on high 
productivity ones. This shift did not always have 
positive effects on employment. Instead, productivity 
growth in the USA did not depend on changes in the 
sectoral specialisation. Moreover, the European 
industry has trailed that of the USA in the 
development of some high growth research based 
sectors, such as ICT, that had positive spillovers to 
market services and, hence, to employment. 
5. Costs of basic services and of labour 
The adoption of more capital intensive techniques by 
European enterprises and their choice not to enter 
some of the more labour intensive sectors are both 
likely to be the result of the same underlying factors. 
In the product markets, especially those of services 
and public utilities, firms in Europe face important 
entry barriers. In the labour market, regulations and 
costs may induce firms to shy away from some labour 
intensive activities. In the capital market, a system 
biased towards stability of financial flows has tended 
to favour incumbents against new entrants and mature 
sectors against new areas of development. 
The European innovation system and the role and 
functioning of capital markets are the subject matter 
of the two following chapters. 
Prices of basic services 
The total cost of business is determined to a 
significant extent by the prices paid for essential 
services like energy, transportation and to a 
decreasing extent communication. In the past these 
service industries were dominated by public 
enterprises and were subject to regulation restricting 
market access and the degree of international 
competition. This normally implies higher prices than 
under competitive conditions. In the USA these services 
were already liberalised in the late seventies or early 
Fig 1.14: Comparison of prices of important services 
(industrial users), USA=100 
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Prices for industrial users including taxes at 1996 PPPs. 
Source: OECD, Energy prices and taxes, Paris 1997 and 
Telecommunication Outlook 1997; IFO calculations 
As a rule, the prices of the selected services are higher 
in the EU than in the USA. This is especially true of 
energy, whether for heating, processing or 
transportation. Electricity, the main energy source for 
automation and handling, is also more costly for 
business in Europe. Compared to Japan, only natural 
gas is cheaper in Europe. 
In the case of heavy and light fuel oil and automotive 
diesel oil, the higher price levels in Europe also reflect 
significantly higher tax rates on energy for business 
use in Europe. Natural gas and electricity are no 
longer taxed in most EU countries. 
It is interesting to note that the liberalisation of 
telecommunication services for European business, 
which resulted in considerable price cuts
2, brought 
telephone charges for business down to US levels as 
early as 1996. The price of leased lines has also 
declined to US levels. This price is not only important 
for data communication by large and medium-sized 
companies. 
Pending liberalisation also exercised pressure on prices in 
those countries where de jure a monopoly of the national 
public telecommunication operator (PTC)) still exists. For 
details see OECD, Telecommunication outlook 1997, Paris 
1997, pp. 99-101. CHAPTER 1 I 15 
It also determines the market entry chances for 
resellers of telecommunication services. Only the cost 
of Internet access, which is also important for SMEs, 
is considerably higher in Europe. This mainly reflects 
the fact that in the USA the cost of local calls is 
determined on a flat rate basis as part of the basic 
service. 
Within the EU, costs tend to rise from North to South, 
both for energy services and for telecommunication 
services. Only Ireland constitutes an exception to this 
pattern. The higher costs for business in Southern 
European countries often reflect greater delays in the 
liberalisation of service markets. 
Compared to US industry, European business also has 
to cope with higher costs for other services. A 
McKinsey study
3, comparing productivity in Germany 
and France with US levels, showed European costs to 
be 10 to 20% higher in the provision of software 
services and construction services due to lower 
productivity. 
Labour cost 
Fig 1.15: Manufacturing industry: EU versus 
USA. Nominal unit labour costs 
(indexed ratio EU over USA) 
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Source: European Commission. 
In the case of industries subject to international 
competition, the development of unit labour costs in 
manufacturing industry may be used as an indicator of 
the cost position. Wages and average nominal labour 
costs rose faster in Europe than in the USA during the 
1980s, before increasing more or less in parallel 
during the 1990s. The greater increase in labour 
productivity only went some way towards mitigating 
the rise in labour costs so that unit labour costs still 
increased faster than those of the USA during this 
period (see Fig. 1.15). Measured in domestic 
currency, the relationship between nominal unit 
labour cost in Europe and the USA only stabilised 
after 1993. 
Changes in nominal unit labour costs have been 
swamped by developments in exchange rates. In 
1980, the dollar was at a historical low compared to 
the ECU, implying a favourable position in the cost 
competitiveness of US industry. Throughout the 
period 1987-1997 the ratio of unit labour costs 
measured in dollars was near or above that prevailing 
in 1980. The pressure to rationalise and to cut costs by 
restructuring and closing down unprofitable activities 
was high. 
McKinsey Global Institute: Removing barriers to growth 
and employment in France and Germany, Frankfurt, Paris, 
Washington, 1997. CHAPTER 2 I 17 
Chapter 2 
Technology and innovation 
Successful R&D is crucial in the development and 
marketing of new products and services, as well as of 
more cost-efficient methods of production and 
distribution. 
Knowledge creation is still the only option for 
producers in countries with high wage costs to stay 
competitive, although globalisation facilitates 
technology transfer to low-wage countries. The rise of 
Japan and other East Asian countries to Western 
standards of living attests the fact that imitation and 
improvement of detail can be a successful strategy. 
The efficiency of the transmission mechanism 
between knowledge generation and growth depends 
on the degree and reliability of intellectual property 
protection. 
The ratio of the expenditure for research and 
development (R&D) to GDP is a first yardstick for 
measuring technological knowledge input and for 
comparing Europe to the USA and Japan. In each of 
the three regions the R&D ratio has lowered since 
1990 and R&D expenditures in Europe, in spite of 
good scientific output, still lag behind those in the 
USA and Japan (see Fig. 2.1). 
Compared to the mid-eighties, the gap in this 
indicator between Europe and the USA has remained 
fairly constant and has slightly widened vis-à-vis 
Japan, despite the decline observed there in the 
nineties. This gap is not only the result of a 
pronounced North / South differential in R&D efforts 
within the Union. Germany, France and the UK also 
spent significantly less on R&D than the USA and 
Japan in the period 1994-1996. 
The decline in R&D relative to GDP in Europe and 
Japan in the nineties is essentially attributable to 
weaker efforts by business (see Table 2.1), but 
cyclical factors may also partly explain this fact. In 
the USA, the share of business R&D has remained 
fairly constant in the nineties (about 72%). 
Although not all output from R&D is subject to 
patenting, the number of patent applications may be 
regarded as a rough measure of R&D output of 
economic relevance. In order to capture innovation 
with the greater potential for business, it is worth 
looking at the distribution of applications for global 
patents by region of origin (see Fig. 2.2)'. 
Fig 2.1: Business R&D ratio 
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Table 2.1: R&D of business 
Country/region 
Share of total R&D 
expenditures by business 
1990-1992 1994-1996 
EU 15 63.2 
USA 72.1 
Japan 74.7 
1995 and 1996 provisional 
60.6 
71.8 
71.1 
Source: EUROSTAT COMPET database, OECD; IFO estimates. 
1 This indicator measures R&D results expected to pass the 
tests for technical novelty and degree of innovativeness 
used by the European, American and Japanese patent 
offices. These inventions are economically relevant not 
only because patents secure and exclusive right for 
production and marketing, but also because they imply 
relatively high application costs. Hence, this investment is 
justified only if the expected economic returns of 
worldwide property rights (global patent) are high. For 
further details on measuring R&D output (see Box 4,1 ). 18  CHAPTER 2 
Fig 2.2: Global patents by region of origin ' 
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R&D output measured by this indicator shows that 
US inventions per capita were higher than those in 
Europe and continued to increase despite the decline 
in R&D expenditures relative to GDP. The decline in 
patenting by Japan after 1990 reflects financial 
difficulties experienced by Japanese companies since 
the early nineties, although Japanese invention 
activity has still remained at a higher level than in the 
USA. 
National innovation systems are specialised. To 
achieve and maintain successful performance it is 
necessary to move into segments promising a rich 
potential for growth and job creation. Parts 3 and 4 of 
this chapter therefore discuss Europe's performance 
in information and communication technology and 
biotechnology. These are two areas with major growth 
potential and with pronounced effects on economic 
and social structures. 
1. Role and types of national 
innovation systems 
Current literature on innovation emphasises the 
importance of national systems of innovation in 
explaining differences in the volume of innovation 
and the different paths that innovation may take. The 
main actors in a national innovation system (NIS) are 
firms, public and private research organisations, and 
government and other public institutions. These actors 
are influenced by a variety of factors: the financial 
system and corporate governance, legal and regulatory 
frameworks, the level of education and skills, the 
degree of labour mobility, industrial relations and 
prevailing management practices
2. Figure 2.3 shows 
the main components of and interconnections within 
NIS
1. The efficiency of NIS generally depends on 
interactions and the interface between various actors 
and the working of the system as a whole. This 
section focuses on one particular part of the 
knowledge generation side of the total system: the 
public research infrastructure (the higher education 
sector, other publicly funded research bodies). 
In the EU, internationally relevant R&D output per 
capita stagnated during the nineties and there are 
scarce signs of an upturn. This mirrors the decline in 
R&D efforts of business. The gap vis-à-vis the USA 
is widening, although the American innovation motor 
has also lost some steam. Japan is undergoing an even 
more pronounced decline than Europe, but still has a 
higher level of R&D input and output than Europe. 
Country specific differences in innovation activities 
can be explained by differences in national systems of 
innovation. The publicly funded R&D infrastructure 
plays a key role in these systems. The first part of this 
chapter looks at the similarities and differences in the 
organisation of the public scientific base between 
Europe, Japan and the USA, and its role in knowledge 
generation. Part 2 takes up the issue of the 
economically relevant R&D output of public research 
institutions and asks how the efficiency of public 
research institutions could be improved in terms of 
economically usable output. 
The institutional profiles vary between countries 
depending on the governance regime of enterprises, 
the organisation of the university sector and the level 
and orientation of government-funded research. In 
contrast to most European countries, the US 
university sector includes numerous research 
institutes (e.g. federally funded R&D centres, 
FFRDCs) carrying out the same type of R&D 
activities as specialised R&D research centres in 
Europe. Due to the weaker R&D performance of the 
business sector in southern European countries, the 
public research institutions must play a relatively 
large role in R&D. To improve the link between 
publicly funded knowledge production and private 
industry all countries have created special transfer 
institutions. 
Some of these factors are analysed in other chapters of this 
report. 
See OECD, Technology, Productivity and Joh Creation -
Best Policy Practices, Paris, 1998. CHAPTER 2  19 
Fig 2.3: Elements of national innovation systems 
located in Research and Technology Organisations 
(RTO). 
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The public part of the innovation system consists of a 
variety of institutions (see Table 2.2). Universities and 
technical colleges represent in some sense the 
cornerstone of NISs, with responsibility for providing 
higher education and performing basic research. 
However, links to applications are growing, and the 
borderline between science and technology in frontier 
areas of research is becoming increasingly blurred. 
Whereas in the USA 100 research universities out of 
a total of 3000 universities and colleges constitute the 
backbone of basic research. Europe relies more 
heavily on non-university research. There are large 
differences between universities, both nationally and 
internationally: the research activities and objectives 
of universities like Stanford or MIT. and the 
substantial applied R&D effort of US state 
universities, often far more closely resemble the big 
science institutions in Europe than the research 
profiles of European universities. Japan lacks a strong 
public infrastructure for basic research. The R&D 
systems of the larger EU countries (France. Germany, 
Italy and UK) cover, as in the USA and Japan, the full 
range of publicly funded research institutions. In the 
smaller FU countries, there are only few big research 
centres (partly financed by the EU) alongside the 
higher education sector. The main R&D efforts are 
The diversity of European systems has both strengths 
and weaknesses. On the one hand, it presents an 
opportunity to exploit the specialisation, 
complementarities and synergies of national research 
efforts. On the other hand, it involves the risk of 
aiming limited resources at too many national 
institutions with similar functions and objectives 
across the countries. A way of overcoming the 
disadvantages of fragmented national innovation 
systems has still to be developed. 
Table 2.2: Public research institutions 
Types 
Institutions in the 
higher education sector 
Big national science 
networks 
Specialised government 
research establishments 
Other non-university research 
institutions: 
• Research and 
technology 
organisations (RTO) 
• Institutions for applied 
research 
• Laboratories 
Examples 
Universities, 
Technical Colleges 
National Centre for Scientific 
Research (E), Centre National de la 
Recherche Scientifique (F), 
National Research Centres (D) 
Centre for Energy Research (NL), 
National Agency for New 
Technologies, Energy and 
Environment (1), Department of 
Energy Laboratories (USA) 
Certified Research and Technology 
Organisations (DK), 
TNO (NL), 
Fraunhofer Society (D) 
Source: IFO Institute. 
In Europe, the amount of GDP spent on different 
R&D agents (higher education sector, non-university 
research institutions, and business sector) varies 
greatly between northern and southern countries. As 
the R&D/GDP ratio declines, the relative weight of 
publicly financed research institutions in terms of 
researchers and funds increases (see Fig. 2.4). 
In most countries the business sector (industry) 
accounts for at least 50% of total expenditure, except 
in Spain. Greece and Portugal. Differences in 
business R&D explain the differentials within Europe. 
Greece. Austria, Portugal and Spain allocate more 
than 30% of their R&D expenditure to the higher 
education sector. The highest level of R&D 
expenditure in the non-university sector occurs in 
Greece, Portugal and France. France is the only 
country where R&D spending in the non-university 
sector is greater than expenditures for the higher 
education sector. 20 I CHAPTER 2 
Fig 2.4: R&D expenditures in % of GDP by country 
and research institution 
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'Industry' includes the private non-profit sector. 
Source: OECD, Main Science and Technology Indicators (1997/2). 
The transfer of knowledge from the public research 
institutions (universities, big science institutes) to 
industry is especially difficult because of differences 
in orientation, researcher motivation, and institutional 
culture. That is why many countries established 
specific bridging institutions to link public R&D 
establishments more closely to industry. In the 
Netherlands a number of intermediary organisations 
like the Dutch Innovation Centres and the Regional 
Development Agencies assist in the transfer of 
knowledge generated in the public infrastructure to 
the private sector. The UK technology transfer system 
consists of various intermediaries, including 
institutions which are directly or indirectly associated 
with the flow of technology and transfers like the 
Business Support Organisations. Although there are 
more than 1000 bridging institutions in Germany, an 
evaluation of this system showed that the most 
successful way to bring together R&D generators and 
R&D users is still direct contact between researchers 
of R&D institutions and industry
4. The USA have 
had a similar experience. Technology transfer may be 
initiated ex ante by funding joint research projects or 
ex post by helping with the exploitation of existing 
knowledge. 
2. Efficiency of public research 
institutions 
In the era of globalisation, national innovation systems 
may have lost some of their importance. New and 
cheaper information and communication technologies 
and improved regulation of intellectual property rights 
have facilitated and improved both the transparency 
of technological developments and international 
technology access and transfer. On the other hand, 
there are studies showing that the home base provided 
by public R&D institutions is still very important for 
innovation, especially for small and medium-sized 
enterprises. Furthermore, budget constraints are 
forcing governments in many industrialised countries 
to increase accountability as well as effectiveness and 
efficiency of government supported research. 
Measuring the efficiency of public research institutions 
is a difficult task (see Box 2.1). Taking patent activity 
as the yardstick, the share of public R&D institutions 
in total patent activity is low in all regions covered 
(see Table 2.3). 
Table 2.3: Importance of public institutions for 
economic relevant R&D output 
Share in % of all inventions
 
a
 
filed for patent 1991-1996 by 
Non-university 
Country/region Universities research Total public 
institutions 
EU 
USA 
Japan 
a Patents applied for in 
Japan 
0.7 2.1 2.8 
3.5 1.5 5.0 
0.1 0.2 0.3 
at least two countries with origin in USA, EU or 
Source: EPIDOS, IFO Patent Statistics. 
Corresponding to the bigger role of research 
universities in the USA and non-university research 
institutions in Europe, the contribution to patentable 
R&D output of US universities is higher than that of 
European universities. 
Within Europe, there are considerable differences 
between countries in the number of inventions per 
researcher (see Fig. 2.5). The differences do not, 
however, mirror differences in the 'productivity' of 
public institutions concerning economically relevant 
R&D output. Rather, they reflect, on the one hand, 
national differences in the 'patent regimes' for 
universities and other public research institutions. In 
some countries patents can only be owned by 
individual researchers, in others by the universities, in 
still others by the state. On the other hand, the impact 
of special organisations for the exploitation of R&D 
results can be observed. 
M. Reinhard, H. Schmalholz, Technologietransfer in 
Deutschland: Stand und Reformbedarf, Berlin-München, 
Duncker & Humblot, 1996. CHAPTER 2 I 21 
Box 2.1: Possibilities of and limits to measuring R&D output of R&D institutions 
As there is no simple measure of the volume and quality of R&D institutions' output, proxy indicators have 
been developed. They rely on: 
• Bibliometric data (publication counts; citation analysis; co-citation analysis; co-ordination and 
bibliographic coupling); 
• Peer review and other systems; 
• Measures of esteem (invited papers at international conferences; short-term migration; secondment 
or visiting researchers; honours or professional status indicators). 
These approaches have proven useful for the evaluation of the scientific performance of researchers and 
institutions, but are less applicable to measuring economically relevant R&D output. For this purpose 
other indicators are used: 
• Patent data (patent counts; patent citation analysis), 
• Number of spin-off companies, 
• Innovation counts, 
• Innovation surveys. 
Patent counting is a well-established approach for measuring economically relevant R&D output. Output 
is measured by counting R&D results which have passed (or are expected to pass) the screening of patent 
offices for technical novelty and degree of innovativeness. This measurement approach guarantees a 
minimum quality standard. It cannot, however, cover innovations, which do not enjoy intellectual property 
protection under patent laws (e.g. software, purely organisational changes). For the analysis here all 
patent applications worldwide were taken into account (about half a million inventions for which patents 
were applied in at least two countries between 1991 and 1996). 
To measure the patentable R&D output of public institutions the applications from universities and 
research institutions were identified and aggregated by country of origin. Information from several 
handbooks or from reports on national innovation systems was used to decide on the status (private or 
public) of individual research centres and laboratories. 
A major problem of this approach is that the number of patents of public R&D institutions does not 
necessarily cover all their economically relevant R&D output, as patent filings which arise as a result of 
a privately funded project of a public R&D institution are generally registered and paid for by the industrial 
partner. In addition, due to country-specific regulation of intellectual property rights, the ability of public 
research institutions to file for patents may be constrained. The performance of R&D institutions may also 
be affected by their science base, because patent affinity differs by fields of science. Statistical analysis 
shows that rates of patenting are high in certain research areas, such as pharmaceutical research. But 
scientific fields with lower rates of patenting, such as engineering, need not necessarily have a lower 
technology transfer potential. This is why this has to be taken into account when comparing R&D 
institutions across fields of technology. This also applies to country ranking, as countries specialise in 
different fields of technology. 
The relatively low patent/researcher ratio in Austria, 
Denmark, Germany and Sweden is due to the fact that 
in these countries intellectual property generally 
belongs to the inventor (if he is a faculty member of 
the university). Consequently, by law the universities 
have few possibilities of developing their own patent 
and licensing programmes. The situation is different 
for British universities which, because of their legal 
structure, can almost be managed as economic 
entities. A specific utilisation organisation, the British 
Technology Group, holds patents on behalf of 
universities and generates an income of approximately 
£ 15 million p.a. purely from licenses for university 
research, which implies a high value of the knowledge 
produced. Such industrially relevant knowledge is 
concentrated in particular fields, such as 
pharmaceuticals, metallurgy, and engineering. But 
this should not obscure the fact that where returns are 
identifiable, they seem to be high. 
In France, a similar situation can be seen. At the 
beginning of the 1990s a specific utilisation 
organisation was established, called France Innovation 
Scientifique et Transfer (FIST). In Germany a pilot 
project is still running to improve the patent assisted 
marketing of university inventions. 22 I CHAPTER 2 
Fig 2.5: Patentable inventions per researcher in 
public R&D institutions 
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a With origin in USA, EU or Japan, applied for patent in at least two 
countries between 1991 and 1996. 
Source: OECD, Main Science and Technology Indicators (1997/2), 
EPIDOS, IFO Patent Statistics. 
In general, publicly funded R&D establishments play a 
subordinate role for R&D output of economic 
relevance. But they can be spearheads for the 
development of new technological paradigms. This is 
also indicated by the allocation of R&D output of 
public R&D institutions by today's major cross-section 
technologies (see Table 2.4). Publicly funded research 
institutions, especially universities, focus on biological 
and genetic technology whereas industry concentrates 
on ICT innovations. This is also true if the EU, the 
USA and Japan are considered separately. US 
Table 2.4: Allocation of R&D output 
(EU, USA, Japan altogether) by field of technology 
Cross-section technology 
Information and 
Communication 
Biological and Genetic 
Technology 
Environmental Technology 
All fields 
Inventions
3 in % filed by 
Universities 
16.3 
79.1 
4.6 
100 
Research 
institutions 
34.3 
55.0 
10.7 
100 
Industry 
76.8 
11.7 
11.5 
100 
a With origin in EU, USA or Japan, applied for patent in at least two 
countries between 1991 and 1996. 
Source: EPIDOS, IFO Patent Statistics. 
universities have the strongest focus on biotechnology. 
This corresponds to the state of development of the 
science base. In the young biosciences, the commercial 
exploitation of scientific breakthroughs has just begun. 
In information and communication technology, the 
basic scientific breakthroughs already occurred in part 
in the first half of the 20
t
h century. This technology 
has now reached the stage of general application and 
improvements to detail have come to dominate. As a 
result, it has become principally the domain of 
industry and of less interest to scientific institutes. 
Technologies for environmental protection, where 
application of 'old' knowledge from different 
scientific branches to new problems prevails, are also 
unattractive for public R&D institutions. 
As non-university research institutions are often 
closer to application of scientific knowledge than 
universities, it is no surprise that their patentable 
R&D output has an allocation that is closer to industry 
(see Table 2.4). The allocation of inventions of public 
R&D institutions by field of technology relevant to 
certain industries also differs considerably from the 
allocation of inventions by private business (see Fig. 
2.6). The pronounced concentration of public 
research institutions on technologies relevant to 
chemistry mirrors the orientation of their patentable 
R&D output on biotechnology. This technology is 
especially important for pharmaceuticals. The 
commitment of public R&D to health issues is 
reflected in the disproportionately high share of 
inventions relevant to the manufacture of medical, 
optical, and control and measurement instruments. 
Fig 2.6: Allocation of R&D output of private 
enterprises and public institutions by industry 
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A closer look at the allocation of R&D output of 
public institutions by industry in Europe and in the 
USA reveals interesting differences. The well-known 
European diversity and R&D programmes for special 
industries has led to a greater diversity in R&D output 
of public institutions in Europe (see Fig. 2.7). CHAPTER 2 I 23 
Fig 2.7: Industrial focus of public R&D institutions in EU 
and USA
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In order to show differences in emphasis, Figure 2.7 
compares the ratio of the number of inventions of 
public R&D institutions to business inventions by 
industry with the corresponding ratio for all inventions 
in the different regions. The approach controls both 
for differences in the size of technology fields 
(industries) and differences in the propensity to patent 
of public R&D performers. Values above 100 indicate 
a special focus of public institutions in the region on 
this field of technology, relative to industry. 
A common feature of public institutions in Europe 
and in the USA is their R&D output has greater 
importance for the stream of inventions in chemicals, 
and medical and optical instruments. Another 
common characteristic concerns the fact that they 
contribute little to the technological advance in 
machinery, motor cars and railway vehicles. US 
public R&D output is, however, far more focused on 
the 'domain' of patentable public R&D output, e.g. 
chemicals. Perhaps associated with European 
programmes promoting R&D in aerospace, 
information technologies and 'new materials', 
European public R&D institutions focus more than 
US institutions on new solutions in the aerospace 
industry, in the production of communication 
equipment and TVs and in the glass and ceramics 
industry. 
The last paragraph showed that national innovation 
systems specialise in different areas of technology. 
The specialisation is grounded on their specific 
knowledge base. To achieve and maintain a successful 
country performance it is necessary to move into 
segments with high growth potential. How did the 
innovation systems perform in Europe, Japan and the 
USA with regard to the two key technologies leading 
into the next decade: information and communication 
technology and biotechnology? 
3. Information and communication 
technology 
Information and communication technology (ICT) is 
viewed as a pervasive technology with a major impact 
on business and society. Its diffusion is expected to 
generate a new paradigm in the organisation of 
production and work (decentralising, home-working, 
customising), new and/or cheaper distribution 
channels and a bundle of new or better information-
based services. The diffusion of digital information 
and communication technologies has entered a new 
phase
5. Digital processing, communication, storage 
and retrieval of all kinds of information (images, 
sound, voice, text and data) has become possible 
without the need for any transformation between the 
different states of information. New networking 
technologies and software produce a significant 
expansion of communication capacity. Increased 
capacity and the deregulation of the communication 
markets result in big reductions of communication 
costs The digitalisation of communication is the key 
to knitting together the isles of automation of the past. 
It is the missing link for the electronic integration of 
the spheres of business and private households and for 
unleashing the full potential of ICT for the 
improvement of productivity in industry and services. 
Because of its pervasiveness and its potentially 
revolutionary effects on productivity, production and 
demand structures, it will change patterns of living, 
lifestyles of people and political systems around the 
world. The technology is viewed as the driving force 
of the transition to the post-industrial era and 
therefore as essential for competitiveness. 
Both in terms of demand and production, ICT has been 
growing rapidly in recent years. ICT markets are 
subject to growing globalisation, and growth in ICT 
demand has also picked up in Europe. Prime movers 
include the Internet, the development of electronic 
commerce, and especially, the liberalisation of 
telecommunication services. Many national and supra-
national campaigns to make users aware of the major 
5 The diffusion of ICT already started in the fifties with the 
use of mainframe computers in business and of TV sets in 
private households. The seventies saw the entry of 
computing in the factories (industrial robots, automated 
transport systems) and in distributive services (automated 
storage system). The triumph of the personal computer 
(PC) in the eighties made the automation of office work 
possible and laid the foundations for new services for 
consumer and business. Mobile phones considerably 
improved the accessibility and voice communication for 
individuals. The nineties are seeing the digitalisation of 
communication of images, sound, voice, text and data. 24 I CHAPTER 2 
cultural change help to develop and expand markets. 
The European ICT industry is still quite a way behind 
their American and Japanese counterparts. Europe 
has, however, a relatively strong position in the 
production of telecommunication equipment and also 
in measuring, checking and controlling equipment. 
American suppliers dominate the software market for 
standardised office applications. 
In 1997 the worldwide ICT market had an estimated 
volume of ECU 1225 billion. Taking hardware and 
software together, the size of the computer or IT based 
market equals the communication market (see Fig. 
2.8). The hardware market for computers, office 
equipment and data communication hardware is three 
times greater than the market for telecommunication 
equipment. But the market for telecommunication 
services is larger than the combined markets for 
computer services (support, operations management, 
consulting and implementation) and software products 
(package software and especially designed software). 
The market directly affected by the diffusion of ICT 
technologies is even larger and comprises, in addition, 
audio-visual equipment and media services (films. 
TV and music production, and publishing houses). 
Together with the software services, the latter form the 
so-called copyright industries because their business 
is crucially dependent on copyright regulations. The 
competitive framework of these industries will be 
fundamentally changed by the rise of electronic 
commerce via the Internet. At more than ECU 150 
billion, the world market for audio-visual equipment 
is larger than the market for telecommunication 
equipment but smaller than the market for computer 
hardware. Due to definition problems and severe gaps 
in the statistical coverage of production and 
international trade,
6 the size of the markets for media 
services cannot be determined even roughly. 
In ICT industries goods and services are becoming 
increasingly closely related. Developed countries are 
moving towards an information society with new 
solutions and needs in many activities and 
corresponding market segmentation (entertainment, 
training and education, electronic commerce, 
communication). ICT markets are also subject to 
growing globalisation, as companies seek the most 
cost-effective structures, trade barriers remain 
relatively low, and demand for ICT products and 
services is of a universal nature. Both in terms of 
For details see OECD, Working party on the Information 
Economy: Measuring electronic commerce: International 
trade in software, DSTI/ICCP(98)3/FinaI, Paris, 1998, p.7 ff. 
demand and production, ICT in the more narrow 
definition has been growing at a fast pace in the last 
few years (see Fig. 2.9). 
Fig 2.8: Worldwide ICT markets by product, 1997 
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Rg 2.9: Development of ICT industries, 1994-1997 
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The superior growth performance of the American 
ICT industries reflects a successful restructuring in 
response to the challenges posed by the diffusion of 
PCs, client-server networks within firms (partly 
substituting for mainframe computing) and the 
Internet (creating a potential for new IT services). 
In the USA the restructuring of ICT industries 
started at the beginning of the 1990s (e.g. IBM and 
Digital Equipment Corporation). Restructuring was CHAPTER 2 I 25 
accompanied by massive job losses in the USA and the 
elimination of 'old champions' from the market. But at 
the same time, dynamic new companies gained 
important positions (Microsoft, Compaq, Sun, Cisco 
etc.). ICT now ranks as the top industry in the USA. 
ICT accounted for 6.1 % of GDP in 1996 against 5.4% 
in 1990, most of this additional growth being in 
services (software). 
With 4.3 million jobs ICT firms are the single largest 
manufacturing employers, with about 10% of the 
manufacturing workforce. After a net job decline 
between 1990 and 1994, nearly half a million jobs 
were created by these industries in 1995 and 1996, 
pushing up demand for highly skilled workers and, 
accordingly, their salaries. In the USA, the emergence 
of new service companies and restructuring made the 
industry stronger, eventually leading to better 
employment prospects. 
The same restructuring phenomenon is now apparent 
in Europe. The impact of these measures is sometimes 
taken as a sign of declining competitiveness, whereas 
in fact it is part of a process that might eventually 
strengthen the whole industry and provide a base for 
new job creation. European industry still trails its 
American or Japanese counterparts. As with 
employment, the shares of the European ICT firms in 
total EU. US and Japanese output remain below the 
corresponding manufacturing industry averages (see 
Table 2.5). 
Table 2.5: European position in ICT 
Production 1996  Share of total production of 
EU, USA, Japan (%) 
Nace Manufacturers of  EU  USA  JP 
3210 Electronic components 9.7 
3000 Office equip., computer 23.4 
3220 Telecommunication eq. 33.6 
3230 Audio and video 25.1 
3325 Measuring, control eq. 34.2 
Electronic industries 22.8 
Total manufacturing 39.2 
41.6 
39.2 
28.2 
7.3 
46.8 
34.8 
33.8 
48.7 
37.4 
38.3 
67.6 
19.0 
42.3 
27.0 
3325= 3320 + 3230 
Source: DEBA; IFO calculations. 
There are pronounced differences within the 
electronics industry. Europe has a relatively strong 
position in the production of telecommunication 
equipment and of measuring, checking and controlling 
equipment. The latter is the heart of automation in 
processing and assembling industries. During the 
1990s, European industry has already improved its 
position in semiconductors and telecommunication 
equipment and has maintained its position in consumer 
electronics. The Japanese software industry is now in a 
less favourable position than its European counterpart. 
After being depressed by the European recession of 
1992/93, ICT demand growth picked up again (see 
Fig. 2.10). General business conditions for the near 
future are favourable in Europe, in particular with the 
prospect of increasing economic convergence. ICT-
specific growth factors include the adoption of the 
Internet Protocol (IP) and of new Internet facilities, the 
development of electronic commerce, the liberalisation 
of telecommunication services, national and supra-
national campaigns to make users aware of the cultural 
change, and last but not least, the introduction of the 
Euro and the problem of the Millennium bug. 
Thus in Europe, ICT market prospects are good: 
according to EITO, in the period 1997-1999 overall 
ICT spending is expected to grow at annual rates of 
around 8%. Trends are significantly different for the 
telecommunications and information technology (IT) 
sectors. The growing use of telecommunication 
networks (the volume measured in terms of time or 
quantity of information transported) will be partially 
balanced by declining tariffs. IT market growth in 
value terms is expected to remain buoyant, as demand 
for software and IT services is gaining strength. 
Fig 2.10: Growth of ICT markets 
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Source: EITO 1998. 
European markets lag behind those of other regions 
because: 
i) EU companies often regarded ICT as a cost element 
and not as a key factor in improving competitiveness, 
streamlining business or promoting innovation. 
ii) Compared to the USA or Japan, the take-up of 
ICT by individual EU consumers is slow, with the 
exception of the Nordic countries and some other 
bigger countries (see Table 2.6). 26  CHAPTER 2 
iii) The fact that telecommunication liberalisation is 
taking place in Europe at an uneven pace acts as a 
brake on growth. The success of the GSM standard 
shows the importance of promoting an adequate 
regulatory framework. 
The rapid ICT diffusion in Nordic countries reflects 
tax incentives to boost demand: incentives have been 
offered to employees in Sweden, Denmark and the 
Netherlands for the acquisition of modern personal 
computers, sometimes with exceptional success. 
ICT industrial structures in Europe have been slow to 
adjust to new challenges, speedy adjustment having 
been the key to success in the USA. Outsourcing, 
developing networks of competitive component 
suppliers and cross-national production networks are 
the strategies that paid off on vast ICT global markets. 
The dynamic growth of new entrants into the market 
(particularly SMEs) has also been better in the USA 
than in Europe. 
Table 2.6: Possession of modern ICT equipment 
Country/ region 
USA 
Japan 
EU 15 
UK 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
Spain 
Finland 
Sweden 
Denmark 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Ireland 
BLEU 
Portugal 
Greece 
Per 1000 inhabitants in 1996 
Up-to-date 
PCs
3 
259 
141 
113 
145 
149 
105 
59 
52 
157 
227 
223 
177 
130 
54 
103 
45 
27 
Internet 
hosts 
31 
4 
7 
10 
7 
3 
2 
2 
59 
22 
15 
14 
10 
6 
5 
2 
1 
a Stock of PCs acquired between 1994 and 1996. 
Mobile 
phones 
165 
143 
84 
116 
67 
43 
112 
76 
292 
282 
265 
66 
75 
74 
50 
67 
49 
Cable 
TV 
239 
26 
95 
29 
217 
39 
0 
48 
161 
200 
187 
382 
108 
145 
357 
11 
0 
Source: EITO 1998, OECD; IFO calculations. 
Finally, EU industries have difficulties competing on 
price because of the high level of labour costs. 
Seeking excellence in quality could be a solution, as has 
recently been done in GSM mobile telephones and 
For example, the Wall Street Journal of 18 March 1998 
reports that following a tax cut offered to the members of a 
Swedish trade union (LOO) for modern equipment to 
improve their skills, Hewlett-Packard's Swedish desktop PC 
sales were more than four times higher in the fourth quarter 
of 1997 than they were in the corresponding period of 1996. 
digital satellite TV. Development of adequate software 
is a key factor for the future because the role of 
software in conferring competitiveness and providing 
added value in ICT industries is extremely important. 
4. Biotechnology: Europe keeps pace 
Biotechnology is 'the application of scientific and 
engineering principles to the processing of materials 
by biological agents' (OECD). Biotechnology is a 
young and promising sector with great potential for 
improving Europe's standard of living (through 
reduced pollution, better use of natural resources and 
improved healthcare) and also for raising productivity 
in a wide range of industries: healthcare, agriculture, 
food and drink, chemicals and environment. Together, 
these industries represent about 9% of the EU's gross 
value added and 8% of its employment. 
The industry has reached a more mature stage in the 
USA than in Europe (see Table 2.7), but Europe's 
performance has been improving recently. Thus, the 
number of specialised biotech companies in Europe 
has increased from 580 in 1995 to 700 in 1996. 
According to the European Association of 
Bioindustries, the value of products and services using 
biotechnology in Europe could reach 250 billion and 
affect more than 3 million jobs by 2005, against ECU 
40 billion
8 and 300-400 000 jobs in 1995. 
Table 2.7: Key biotechnology indicators 
Indicator  Europe  USA 
Turnover (ECU million) 
R&D expenditures (ECU million) 
Number of companies 
Publicly quoted companies 
Number of employees 
1 700 
1 500 
700 
50 
27 500 
11 700 
6 300 
1 300 
300 
118 000 
Source: Ernst & Young 1997. 
Biotechnology remains close to basic science. This is 
not only because biotech companies are often located 
near universities with strong bioscience departments 
or adequate scientific research centres. It is also 
reflected in the relatively high share of universities, 
public research institutes, foundations and 
government organisations contributing to patentable 
product innovation in the EU and the USA: 23% and 
38% of patentable inventions, respectively, originated 
in such institutions between 1990 and 1995. 
Human Healthcare: ECU 8 billion; Agriculture: ECU 5 
billion; Food and Drink: ECU 17 billion; Environment: 
ECU I billion (total: ECU 40 billion). CHAPTER 2 I 27 
As the industry directly transforms scientific progress 
into processes and products, the success of companies 
crucially depends on their R&D results and on their 
ownership of industrial property rights. Taking into 
account the size and stage of development of the US 
market, the American industry has the largest share of 
R&D output for which a patent is sought, but Europe 
ranks second, well ahead of Japan (see Fig. 2.11). 
Success stories in Europe include the Danish 
company Novo Nordisk which holds the record for 
biotechnology patents in the 1990s. 
countries more, in particular the USA. The analysis of 
the European innovation system and of the efficiency 
of the public research institutions shows a great 
potential for creating new technologies. In order to 
promote growth and create knowledge intensive jobs 
it would be necessary to mobilise this potential by 
changing or improving the regulatory framework in 
some European countries. 
A survey of companies by the European Association 
of Bioindustries
9 shows that the three most important 
external factors which influence investment decisions 
are the scale of market opportunity, the effectiveness 
of patent protection and the regulatory framework 
(pressure from competitors having the same ranking as 
the latter). A positive attitude toward entrepreneurship 
is a key to success in this sector. The survey pointed 
in particular to the availability of equity capital, 
regulations on the use of biotechnology, intellectual 
property protection, fiscal policies and the provision 
of adequate skills. In general, there seems to be 
greater awareness of the growth potential of 
biotechnology in the USA than in Europe. 
Fig 2.11: Biotechnology invention activity 
Inventions for which international patent applications 
have been made (EU, USA, JP) by country of origin 
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The results of the survey mentioned above indicate 
that the configuration of national innovation systems 
has a decisive influence on the generation of 
knowledge and the diffusion of technology. Different 
regulations within the innovation system favour some 
Benchmarking the Competitiveness of Biotechnology in 
Europe, June 1997 CHAPTER 3 I 29 
Chapter 3 
Access to finance for European SMEs: 
a potential for growth and job creation 
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) are 
extremely important for our economies, and not only 
because of their number. On the one hand, the intrinsic 
flexibility of most of them plays a major role in 
smoothing the ups and downs of the business cycle'. 
On the other hand, a very dynamic minority of SMEs 
represents a fundamental source of dynamism for the 
economy. These firms are widely considered as the 
driving force for high growth and stable job creation. 
SMEs usually have much more restricted access to 
financial markets than Large Enterprises (LEs). This is 
particularly true in Europe because, although progress 
is being made towards having efficient risk-capital 
markets, the current situation represents a major 
shortcoming, especially for high-growth SMEs. 
Shortage of finance for these SMEs often blocks their 
growth as well as their capacity to create jobs, which 
represents a major loss for the whole European 
economy. It is therefore crucial for Europe to unlock 
such an unexploited potential through an increased 
availability of appropriate finance and, in particular, 
of risk capital. 
1. SMEs: a potential for job creation 
In Europe, SMEs account for 99.8% of the total 
number of companies and for about 2/3 of total 
employment (see Table 3.1 ). 
Table 3.1: Enterprises distributed by number of 
employees, EU, 1996 
Number 
(1000) 
Employees 
(1000) 
very small 
(0-9) 
17285 
37000 
93.0% 
33.2% 
SMEs 
Small 
(10-49) 
1105 
21110 
5.9% 
18.9% 
Medium 
(50-249) 
165 
15070 
0.9% 
13.5% 
LEs 
(250+) 
35 
38220 
0.2% 
34.3% 
The population of SMEs lacks homogeneity in terms 
of technology orientation, prospects of growth, 
expected long-run returns and, last but not least, 
capacity to create jobs. 
A small share of SMEs heavily contributes to job and 
wealth creation. These small (at least for a while after 
their creation), high-growth firms are usually 
technology-based (TBFs, for Technology-Based Firms, 
from now on). The big difference between young 
TBFs and other SMEs is, by definition, in how much 
they grow. Their difference with respect to LEs is in 
how they grow: LEs mainly grow by mergers and 
their contribution to net economic growth tends to be 
lower than for TBFs. 
The impact of these high-growth TBFs on employment 
creation has been impressive in the USA. Between 
1991 and 1995, 3% of firms (so-called 'gazelles' for 
their size and dynamism) accounted for 80% of job 
growth: 6 million new jobs out of the additional 7.7 
million
2. Further, the 5500 firms quoted in NASDAQ 
have created 16% of all new jobs in the USA in the 
first half of the nineties. 
Actually, SMEs not only create, but also destroy jobs 
faster than larger firms do. They grow faster when 
they succeed but only about half of them survive their 
first five years. Nevertheless, the net flow of jobs 
created by SMEs remains positive. 
This is especially true for TBFs which, according to 
several studies reported in an OECD survey
3, have 
higher than average survival rates. In addition, these 
high-tech, high-growth firms tend to create more stable 
(and highly qualified) jobs. They also generate positive 
technological spillovers and other positive externalities 
benefiting consumers as well as other producers. 
Source: ENSR (European Network for SME Research). 
Dorothée Rivaud-Danset, Comparisons between the 
financial structure of the SME versus large enterprises 
within the framework of the BACH database, 1DHE, June 
1998. 
Cognetics. Who's Creating Jobs, 1995. 
OECD, Technology. Productivity and Job Creation: Best 
Policy Practices, 1998. 30 I CHAPTER 3 
2. Access to finance for SMEs 
Access to finance is a crucial issue for SMEs, even 
more than for LEs. This is mainly because SMEs are 
more subject than LEs to suffer some finance 
shortage: they have a narrower range of possibilities 
of external finance and in most cases they do not have 
enough own (or intra-group) funds to finance, for 
instance, innovative projects. 
The necessity to finance the development of 
innovative, capital-intensive projects is exactly what 
makes external finance even more important for TBFs 
than for other SMEs, whose prime need may only be 
that for working capital (for instance, stocks). 
Profitability 
Profitability represents a broad indicator of a firm's 
self-financing capabilities
4. 
Over the period 1986-1995
5, European SMEs 
recorded a systematically lower net profit ratio (i.e. 
the ratio of net profit on net turnover) than LEs (2.1 % 
against 2.6%, see Fig. 3.1). This is however no 
surprise, since such a gap in performance traditionally 
increases during a period of expansion, as after 1993, 
and decreases during stagnation phases. 
The performance of SMEs in the USA was better than 
that of European SMEs and, after a period of relative 
convergence during the late eighties, the gap in terms 
of net profitability has now become wider than ever. 
Since 1993, economic expansion has helped firms to 
improve their profitability and, ceteris paribus, their 
self-financing capabilities. In addition, financial 
markets liberalisation has contributed to widen the 
range of external financial resources available to 
European firms. 
This trend has been particularly true for LEs, which 
have displayed a significant trend towards debt 
reduction. On the contrary, European SMEs still show 
a persistent structural dependence on debt, especially 
on bank debt, considerably higher than for larger 
European firms. 
Fig 3.1: Net profit ratio, EU-11, 
1986-95, average 
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Indebtedness 
LEs have considerably reduced their indebtedness 
towards financial institutions, which dropped from 
22.5% in 1986 to 10.8% in 1995 (see Fig. 3.2)
6. 
Fig 3.2: Indebtness to financial institutions, 
EU-9, 1986-1995 
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Source: DGII, BACH. 
A better access of LEs to alternative sources of 
finance, such as capital markets (both national and 
international) has been the main driver of this trend. 
On the contrary, the stability of SMEs' financial 
indebtedness reflects the limited or even absence of 
access to most of the possibilities open to LEs. 
Internal finance available for investment also depends on 
firm's policy in the distribution of profits to stakeholders. 
Financial situation of European enterprises, European 
Economy, No. 7 (Supplement A), July 1997. 
Bank loans represent the major source of external 
finance for the vast majority of SMEs that have grown 
enough to satisfy traditional bank creditworthiness 
Part of the drop observed in 1987 is due to the inclusion of 
German data. CHAPTER 3 I 31 
criteria and to service the debt. These SMEs, as the 
traditional theory on small businesses suggests, 
consider alternative sources such as equity finance, 
only once internal sources and debt finance have been 
exhausted. Only 10% of European SMEs surveyed in 
1996 were financed by external equity, while 49% had 
long-term loans, and 54% had overdrafts
7. 
SMEs and banks 
After the change in the bank-lending attitude of 
European LEs, SMEs have become the foundation of 
the customer base of European banks. 
The relationship banks-SMEs is often very closely 
knitted, following the bank-centred tradition of most 
European financial systems. This type of relationship 
fits well for many established SMEs, which simply 
need a 'financial safety net' to face unexpected 
negative contingencies and seize sudden upturns in 
demand. High indebtedness, eventually with a 
predominant short-term maturity, and a low level of 
own resources may not be much of a problem for these 
SMEs. In fact, their focus is rather on the continuity 
of the flow of such (short-term) loans or, at least, on 
prompt availability. 
However, there are several points that are sensitive in 
this relationship, especially as far as TBFs are 
involved. A recent round table of bankers and SMEs 
representatives
8 highlighted the different viewpoints. 
The SME representatives believe that banks charge too 
much. This point is supported by a study of the Bank 
of England
9, which reports the existence in the UK of 
considerable differentials in loan rates by size classes 
of firms, with no evidence of any decreasing trend. 
Another study
1
0 of some European countries (Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy and Spain) uses the apparent 
interest rate to estimate the risk premium supported 
by SMEs with respect to LEs. The study reports 
higher differentials (2-3%) for small firms than for 
medium-size firms (0-1 %). 
Another point raised by SMEs is that banks 
concentrate too much on risks and not enough on both 
10 
Grant Thornton Business Survey. 1996. 
The Second Round Table of Bankers and SMEs. Final 
Report, DG XXIII of the EU Commission, February 1997. 
Bank of England, Finance for Small Firms. Fifth Report, 
Manor Park Press Ltd., Eastbourne. January 1998. 
Dorothée Rivaud-Danset, Comparisons between the 
financial structure of the SME versus large enterprises 
within the framework of the BACH database, IDHE. June 
1998, p. 37. 
the qualities of the entrepreneur and the future 
prospects for his business. This excessively risk-averse 
approach often drives banks to require unreasonably 
high collateral. 
Banks feel that the main problem is how to conduct an 
effective and efficient relationship management policy. 
They argue that attention should be focused away from 
cost reduction towards client service with the ultimate 
goal of improving the quality of the relationship and 
the variety of services on offer. 
This debate is far from coming to an end. It is 
nevertheless clear that banks can play a twofold role. 
They can keep on playing the usual role of financial 
safety net through a preferential, long-lasting 
relationship with established SMEs, which operate in 
mature sectors. But they have also the capability to 
play a new role, as far as they accept to adopt a more 
sophisticated approach to risk and secure a better 
provision of reasonably priced finance to promising 
TBFs. 
3. High-growth SMEs: the role of 
risk-capital finance 
Bank credit may be less important as a source of 
finance for TBFs, contrary to other SMEs. 
For instance, apart from cost considerations, TBFs 
often find it difficult to provide the collateral that 
banks require for balancing TBFs' higher perceived 
risk. Since TBFs' assets are mainly intangible, access 
to bank lending in those cases relies exclusively on 
the owner's capacity to provide adequate collateral 
through his private wealth. 
Risk capital (see Box 3.1) seems to be a more proper 
source of long-term funding for start-up and 
development of TBFs, whose internal resources are 
usually very limited with respect to planned 
investments. These firms are a minority of SMEs. as 
revealed by two UK surveys. A first survey reports 
that only 3% of external finance to small businesses in 
1996 was in the form of equity", while a second 
survey reveals that only 1/3 of small businesses was 
prepared to take this form of financing into 
consideration
12. Nonetheless. TBFs are a very 
important minority because of their dynamism and 
growth potential. 
12 
ESRC Cambridge Centre for business Research. The 
changing state of British enterprise. 1996. 
BCC (British Chambers of Commerce). Small Firms 
Survey, no. 24 (Finance). July 1997. 32 I CHAPTER 3 
Box 3.1: Risk capital 
'Risk capital' stands for equity financing to firms 
in the early growth stages of their lifecycle 
(namely, seed, start up and development). Buyout 
financing is often included, as far as Europe is 
concerned. 
Risk capital encompasses both private equity 
investment and capital raised through secondary 
capital markets. 
'Private equity' stands for investment in stakes of 
companies not listed on public stock markets. 
They can be separated in the following categories: 
'(formal) venture capital', i.e. stakes subscribed 
by either close-end funds ('venture capital funds') 
or other companies ('corporate venture capital"), 
and 'informal venture capital', i.e. stakes 
subscribed by individual investors (the so-called 
'Business Angels'). 
'Second-tier stock exchanges' are mainly 
specialised in SMEs and high-growth companies. A 
non-previously listed company can start floating, 
eventually through an 'initial public offering' (IPO). 
In this way a company sells shares that are traded 
on the market for the first time and allows venture 
capitalists to dispose of the capital invested 
('exit). A listed company can raise additional 
equity capital by issuing shares to existing 
shareholders ('rights issue') or new investors 
('cash offer"). 
The securities traded on public stock markets 
(either second-tier or primary) are 'public 
equities '. 
A favourable context 
European risk-capital markets are experiencing an 
upturn that, unlike previous boom-and-bust phases of 
the latest decade, looks more durable than ever. 
From its creation until July 1998, EASDAQ (see Box 
3.2) registered ECU 1.7 billion raised by firms through 
IPOs. Similarly, by November 1997, the Euro-NM 
network raised about ECU 880 million. 
In addition, private equity markets have also shown an 
encouraging rise in activity, although with wide cross-
country variance 
13 
In 1996, the cumulated stock of funds raised by 
venture capital companies amounted to ECU 58.7 
billion, more than double with respect to 1990 (see 
Fig. 3.3). The flow of new raised funds more than 
doubled in a decade: from ECU 2.8 billion in 1987 to 
ECU 6.7 billion in 1996. 
The most developed venture capital market is in the 
UK. It accounts for more than 40% of European total, 
both in stock and flows. The Dutch market presented 
the most outstanding development between 1992 and 
1996, reaching a level of new raised funds in 1996 
(ECU 1.4 billion) second only to the UK. In 1997, that 
market did not maintain the same pace of development 
and Germany, with ECU 1.3 billion new funds (with an 
increase of 85% with respect to 1996), replaced the 
Netherlands at the second place. France is the second 
largest venture capital market in Europe for cumulated 
funds, dominated by closed-end funds (in 1996 there 
were 123 funds with total assets amounting to ECU 
1.717 billion). 
Fig 3.3: Venture capital - cumulative stock of 
funds raised, EU, 1990-1996 
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Source: EVCA. 
13  Due to the weakness of available data on informal venture 
capital, most studies concentrate on formal venture capital. 
Some surveys broadly estimate that informal venture 
capital ranges between 4 and 8 times the amount of formal 
venture capital. Namely, 4 times for the UK, 4.15 times for 
the Netherlands, 7.44 times for Denmark and 7.73 times 
for the US (see Innovation finance in Europe. A pilot 
project in benchmarking, Bannock Consulting, 1998). CHAPTER 3 I 33 
Box 3.2: Secondary stock exchanges 
EASDAQ (European Association of Securities 
Dealers Automated Quotation System) is a pan-
European quote-driven market modelled on 
NASDAQ (National Association of Securities 
Dealers Automated Quotation System). It started 
operations in September 1996 and targets 
medium-sized high-growth firms with an average 
market capitalisation of ECU 432 million. 
Euro-NM, another pan-European market network of 
four national secondary markets (Paris, Brussels, 
Amsterdam and Frankfurt) targets European start-
up TBFs. It was set up between February 1996 
(Paris) and March 1997 (Frankfurt). 
These two stock markets reflect two simultaneous 
trends that have been recently evident in Europe: 
the creation of a pan-European second-tier capital 
market (the EASDAQ) and a growing co-operation 
between some existing national stock markets 
(giving rise to the Euro-NM). They represent two 
facets of the same choice to operate on a Europe-
wide basis. This is a reasonable answer to the 
necessity of achieving a higher level of activity in 
view of making Europe an attractive market for risk 
capital. 
Characteristics of European risk-capital market 
Two major stylised facts characterise the European 
risk-capital market, as compared to the USA. First, 
different patterns of investment, less oriented towards 
the early stages of high-tech firms. Secondly, the 
relatively smaller level of activity (i.e. smaller listing 
and lower trade volumes) of secondary markets. 
Data on the stage distribution of venture capital 
investment show that, as compared to the USA, 
European venture capitalists are more oriented towards 
investing in later stages of businesses, namely in the 
financing the expansion of an existing company. In 
1997, venture capital channelled in the USA towards 
businesses in their early stages has been 4.3 times as 
much as in Europe, while for later stages it has been 
'only' 1.9 times more (see Fig. 3.4). 
This different investment pattern is even amplified 
when looking at the two phases of the early stage: 
'seed' investment (i.e. financing the research to develop 
the initial idea) and the following 'start-up' investment 
(i.e. financing the product development and the initial 
marketing, before obtaining positive profits). In 1996, 
the USA provided 7.5 times more seed stage capital 
(see Table 3.2). 
The UK AIM (Alternative Investment Market, 
London) differs from EASDAQ and Euro-NM under 
several aspects. This national (and not pan-
European) stock market has a much more sizeable 
listing (but not a correspondingly higher 
capitalisation) and targets companies from a 
wider cross-section of businesses, ranging from 
TBFs to companies from more mature sectors. 
Nevertheless, TBFs account for more than 20% of 
the market. 
These markets, with the exception of EASDAQ, are 
all complementary to primary markets. They are 
mainly intended to facilitate the transition of the 
most successful firms towards main capital 
market and, thus, will never experience a huge 
growth. The single authorities in charge of both 
markets have no interest in fostering competition. 
This is a major difference with respect to NASDAQ, 
which is an independent competitor to a main 
market. Many companies listed there are no 
longer SMEs, although they began that way, and 
are not willing to be listed on the main stock 
exchange. EASDAQ is also independently managed 
but 25 years younger than NASDAQ, which is 
certainly one reason for the much smaller listing. 
Fig 3.4: Venture capital - stage distribution of 
investment, Europe and USA, 1997 
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Source: EVCA 1998 Yearbook and NVCA 1997 Annual Report: 
adjustments by Bannock Consulting. 34 I CHAPTER 3 
Table 3.2: Venture capital - investment 
distribution in early stage, Europe and USA, 1996 
EU-14 USA USA/ 
(ECU million) (ECU million) EU-14 
Seed 
Start up and other 
early stage 
67 
751 
Total 818 
EU-14: EU except Luxembourg. 
504 
2967 
3471 
7.5 
3.6 
4.2 
Source: EVCA, Venture Economics; adjustments by Bannock Consulting 
A major reason for these different stage distributions 
probably lies in rates of return. In 1996, for instance, 
the internal rate of return of European venture capital 
funds focussed on early-stage investment was much 
lower (5.7%) than for other types of venture funds 
(see Fig. 3.5), as well as for early-stage investments in 
the USA (14.2%)
14. This may derive from the lack of 
risk assessment skills and/or sophisticated financial 
intermediaries, from a higher rate of failure 
(eventually related to a lack of finance) and from a 
lack of information. All this might also depend on a 
general lack of networking among high-tech SMEs, 
research centres and financial circles. 
investments made in 1996 (see Fig. 3.6). In the same 
year in the USA, the computer software sector alone 
attracted 26.6% of the total. 
These different patterns signal unfavourable conditions 
for early stage and technology-related investments in 
Europe, which definitely represent a key shortcoming 
for the promotion of rapid technological change, 
economic growth and job creation. 
The second stylised fact is that the level of activity of 
European secondary stock markets (see Box 3.2) is 
still deemed insufficient, especially when compared 
to the USA (see Table 3.3). 
Additional anecdotal evidence of an existing gap 
comes from the observation that European demand 
and supply of risk capital sometimes meet each other 
on NASDAQ. About hundred European SMEs are 
listed at NASDAQ and a number of major European 
institutional investors operating on NASDAQ tend to 
concentrate their investment on those European 
companies. 
Fig 3.6: Venture capital - Investment distribution 
by sector, EU and USA, 1996 
Fig 3.5: Rates of return on investment by 
venture capital funds, EU, 1996 
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Differences in the sector distribution of venture 
capital investments are consistent with that picture. In 
Europe, venture capitalists tend to target more mature 
sectors (consumer products, industrial equipment and 
machinery) while high-tech sectors (biotechnology, 
communications, computers and other electronics-
related products) account for only 16% of total 
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Table 3.3: Secondary stock exchanges 
Date 
started 
Listed 
Market 
capitalisation 
(ECU billion) 
Date of 
reference 
EASDAQ 
Euro-NM 
AIM 
NASDAQ 
9/1996 
2/96-3/97 
6/1995 
1971 
38 
57 
308 
5393 
16.37 
5.34 
8.51 
1870.75 
7/1998 
11/1997 
12/1997 
5/1998 
Source: AIM, EASDAQ, Euro-NM, NASDAQ. 
The relationship between the two aforementioned 
stylised facts goes through the strict interconnection 
between the two parts of the risk-capital market: 
private equities and secondary stock markets (see Box 
3.1). 
Private equities require an effective exit route, which 
is usually provided by the secondary stock market. A 
thin stock market (i.e. with insufficient listings and 
traded volumes) tends to deter venture capitalists, at 
least because they might have difficulties in disposing 
of their investment in a reasonable delay. Without an 
effective exit route, even when they invest, they are 
not ready to support the high risk implicit in early-
stage investment for high-tech projects. This is an 
explanation for the difference in investment patterns 
between Europe and USA, in addition to differentials 
in rates of return. 
This is one facet of the relationship between the two 
stylised facts. The other one is that a stock market 
requires a 'supply of firms' suitable and willing to be 
listed. But the lack of venture capital (or even the low 
risk propensity of investors) is likely to limit the 
emergence of new candidates for listing and, in the 
end, the development of the stock market. 
Taken together, the two stylised facts reflect the 
reason why the development of risk-capital markets in 
Europe is still not satisfactory: there is not enough 
risk capital and, even that smaller amount, is not 
channelled towards high-growth projects to which it 
should naturally be devoted. 
On the other hand, the circularity of the relationship 
reveals that building an efficient risk-capital market is 
a matter of simultaneously developing (or even 
creating) a set of mutually dependent entities as well 
as the reciprocal trust that each one will fulfil its task 
whenever called upon. This process takes time, for 
instance to achieve sufficiently high standards of 
disclosure and transparency, and it will last longer the 
more (institutional, regulatory, etc.) barriers there are 
and the less (public and private) effort is devoted in 
removing them. 
In addition, developing an efficient risk-capital market 
is a matter of supply of risk capital as well as of 
demand. Demand for risk capital comes from firms 
with specific financial needs, mainly due to their 
orientation towards growth and innovation. Supply of 
risk capital comes from individuals, institutional 
investors (e.g. pension funds) as well as other firms. 
4. Remaining barriers 
A number of remaining obstacles slows down the 
transition towards an appropriate provision (supply) 
and use (demand) of risk capital. A European 
benchmarking study on the financing of innovation
1
5 
and a report by the EU Commission
1
6 provide some 
guidance in the identification of these remaining 
barriers. 
On the demand side, the legal and regulatory 
environment represents a first obstacle
17. In many 
European countries, the administrative procedures for 
setting up and registering a new company are 
burdensome and expensive. 
A second barrier comes from the fragmentation of 
European financial markets. On the most restrictive 
definition, the EU still counts 33 stock exchanges and 
18 controlling organisms. From listed firms' 
viewpoint, this brings about different accounting 
standards, disclosure requirements, as well as 
company law and tax regimes. This often makes 
cross-border capital raising initiatives more difficult 
than they already are, especially for SMEs, and in the 
end negatively affect risk-capital demand. 
Finally, many European tax systems have been 
deemed not to be conducive to company creation. For 
instance, a more favourable tax treatment of R&D 
expenditure is likely to favour high-tech start-ups and, 
thus, demand of risk capital. 
On the supply side, a major obstacle is the persistent 
shortage of risk-assessment skills (see Box 3.3). The 
presence of sophisticated investors, capable to evaluate 
high-risk (and high-tech) projects, depends on the 
attractiveness of the market. The level of activity of 
European markets just starts justifying such an interest. 
15 
16 
17 
Innovation finance in Europe. A pilot project in 
benchmarking. Bannock Consulting. 1998. 
Risk Capital: A Key to Job Creation in the European 
Union. Communication of the EL! Commission. April 1998. 
The elimination ol' unnecessary administrative burden is 
one major objective of the Report of the Business 
Environment Simplification Task force. BEST. 1998. 36  CHAPTER 3 
Banks would have the potential to provide such skills, 
but the European bank-centred financial tradition 
justified banks' inertia. Only recently, under growing 
competitive pressure, have banks started to move in 
this direction. Creating these skills requires time for 
both sophisticated investors and banks. The late start 
of Europe is one major reason for the present shortage. 
The regulatory framework represents an obstacle also 
on the supply side. In particular, the constraints to 
investment in risk capital by pension funds are much 
tighter in Europe than in the USA. In Europe (with the 
notable exception of UK and Netherlands) 'asset 
restriction' (i.e. restriction to the extent of investment 
in non-quoted companies) is generally imposed. 
Box 3.3: Limiting the risk of high-risk projects 
A new project contains an element of intrinsic 
risk because expected results of research may 
not be attained and marketing of products may 
come out to be unsuccessful. 
From investor's viewpoint, this technological and 
commercial risk becomes less relevant, the lower 
the share of each project in the whole investment 
portfolio. In fact, as traditional risk-diversification 
arguments suggest, investing in high-risk projects 
may become a safe activity as far as the overall 
investment is spread over a sufficiently wide 
range of investment opportunities with 
independent risks. 
This is why it is important that investors have the 
choice among a wide range of (uncorrelated) 
deals available. 
In addition, trade volumes are also relevant. 
Higher market liquidity tends to drive down the 
volatility of share prices as well as to prevent 
investors' fear of being unable to sell their 
shares because of low demand. 
differentiation arguments (see Box 3.3), and it is 
likely to considerably increase the provision of risk 
capital. 
Finally, tax treatment in Europe, as compared to the 
USA, is less conducive to risk-capital supply. Some of 
the major items concerned are preferential tax 
treatment of capital gains and tax incentives to 
promote schemes of equity pay (and/or of employee 
ownership). 
Risk capital would therefore benefit from a high 
degree of skill available in the market (i.e. 
sophistication in the assessment, management 
and monitoring of risk), high standards of 
information disclosure by firms, high levels of 
activity and transparency of markets. 
In the USA, on the contrary, no explicit constraint is 
imposed other than a generic 'prudent man rule' (i.e. 
the legitimate expectation that fund managers will 
behave as careful professionals). Lifting the 
constraints on European pension funds would be a 
sensible choice, on grounds of traditional portfolio Part Two 
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Chapter 4 
Competitiveness and sectoral development: 
building the links 
The purpose of the second part of the report is to 
identify strengths and weaknesses in competitive 
performance by looking at the current patterns and 
changes in the structure of European manufacturing. 
The analysis is based upon the assumption that 
competitiveness, structural development and standard 
of living are strongly interlinked phenomena. Within 
this context, the term 'structural' refers exclusively to 
the distribution of production across sectors and 
industries.' 
After presenting evidence of the differences in the 
specialisation patterns within the EU, the subsequent 
chapters (a) investigate the impact of structural 
development on growth and employment potentials; 
(b) provide basic referential data on European 
competitive performance relative to Japan and the 
USA; and (c) try to identify underlying forces and 
broad patterns in the strategic behaviour of firms by 
applying a new industry typology. The results will be 
interpreted in the context of economic predictions on 
structure and specialisation in a high wage economy. 
1. Outline of the analysis 
The second part of the report is organised as follows: 
1. Competitiveness and sectoral development -
building the links: The introductory chapter 
describes international specialisation patterns in 
industrial production. Theories on growth, 
international trade and investment as well as 
industrial organisation are screened for relevant 
hypotheses. In this way. a broad analytical 
framework for structural analysis can be 
developed. 
2. Sectoral growth, employment and productivity: 
The focus of Chapter 5 is on internal performance 
- i.e. the sectoral contributions to growth in 
income, employment and consumption. After 
summarising the major trends and growth patterns 
at the sectoral level, the relationship between 
Throughout the analysis higher aggregated levels 
corresponding to NACE 2-digits will be referred to as 
'sectors', while the term 'industry' will be used for lower 
aggregations corresponding to NACE 3-digits. 
economic growth and employment at the industry 
level is tested. This reveals significant differences 
between the EU, Japan and the USA. These 
differences extend to the sources of growth in labour 
productivity: shifts in the sectoral composition 
of output appear to have a substantial impact in 
Europe and Japan, but not in the USA. 
3. European industries in world markets: Chapter 6 
examines the EU's position in the global 
marketplace, with particular emphasis on 
international market shares and trade balances. 
Comparisons with Japan and the USA provide 
benchmarks for evaluating relative strengths and 
weaknesses. The specific nature of trade data 
allows a distinction to be made between 
competition based purely on prices and 
competition based primarily on quality and 
product differentiation. For example, the data 
reveal that the EU enjoys a considerable quality 
premium in its trade relationship. 
4. Industrial specialisation and performance: To 
improve the economic relevance of sectoral 
analysis, a new typology of industries is created, 
based on typical factor input combinations and 
using statistical cluster techniques. The analysis 
illustrates that the EU is locked into rather 
traditional industries, characterised by high levels 
of labour input and physical capital. The EU is 
lagging behind the USA in the fastest moving 
markets, in which competition is characterised by 
investment in intangible assets, such as marketing 
and innovation. 
5. Global investment and multinational firms: In 
addition to growing trade, foreign direct 
investment and multinational activity are the 
primary driving forces of global economic 
integration. At the same time, casual evidence 
based on observations in large multinational firms 
suggests a tendency towards reducing 
diversification and a return to core businesses. 
Drawing on a unique data set, Chapter 8 examines 
these trends in more detail. A pronounced increase 
in intra-EU multinational activity is identified but 40 I CHAPTER 4 
the tendency to revert to the core business turns 
out to be weaker than expected. Furthermore, 
foreign direct investments are found to be driven 
mainly by the objectives of market access and 
exploitation of knowledge-based assets. 
6. Competitive strengths and weaknesses of 
European manufacturing - Summary and 
conclusions: The second part of the report 
presents a range of perspectives on and 
approaches to the analysis of structural 
development and competitive performance. The 
final summary attempts to draw a number of 
distinct lines of argument together and to give a 
short and concise assessment of the major 
strengths and weaknesses of European industry. 
The general policy implications are sketched and 
support an overall emphasis on horizontal 
measures fostering productivity and growth, 
rather than on sectoral targeting. 
Table 4.1: Sectoral shares in manufacturing 
value added 1995 in % 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 
Textiles, Clothing & Leather 
Wood, Pulp & Paper 
Publishing & Printing 
Refined Petroleum 
Chemicals 
Rubber, Plastic Products 
Non-metalic Mineral Products 
Basic Metals 
Fabricated Metal 
Machinery, Other Fab. Metal 
Office Machinery 
Electrical Machinery 
Radio, TV & Communication 
Precision Instruments 
Motor Vehicles 
Other Transport 
Other Manufacturing 
EU 
11.60 
5.38 
5.10 
5.00 
3.11 
11.45 
4.59 
4.57 
4.74 
6.97 
10.92 
1.53 
5.47 
3.09 
2.51 
8.57 
2.50 
2.90 
Japan 
9.83 
4.12 
4.54 
6.18 
1.49 
10.94 
5.07 
4.50 
5.08 
6.69 
11.71 
2.66 
5.13 
7.78 
1.91 
8.16 
1.93 
2.26 
USA 
11.90 
4.38 
6.26 
7.33 
1.55 
12.70 
4.39 
2.62 
3.85 
5.50 
9.04 
2.55 
3.15 
6.09 
4.84 
7.07 
3.79 
2.96 
Total 
11.23 
4.63 
5.40 
6.25 
2.04 
11.80 
4.65 
3.78 
4.48 
6.31 
10.40 
2.25 
4.46 
5.59 
3.26 
7.86 
2.85 
2.75 
Source: DEBA; WIFO calculations. 
2. The international division of labour 
Reflecting the Ricardian notion of comparative 
advantage, absolute advantages across all industries 
are neither achievable nor desirable for an economy. In 
each location, certain industries must be more efficient 
than others in the use of productive resources. The 
international division of labour and foreign trade then 
creates mutual benefits from the distinct patterns of 
industrial specialisation. On this basis, a broad 
description of the international division of labour is 
provided as a general background. 
The global division of labour: EU, Japan and USA 
The specialisation patterns of the EU, Japan and the 
USA exhibit a high degree of similarity at the more 
aggregate sectoral levels but reveal considerable 
differences when further disaggregated into 
individual industries. This is in line with trade theory, 
which predicts that developed nations will eventually 
switch from specialisation governed by exogenous 
endowments to specialisation governed by 
differentiated firm strategies, enabling first mover 
advantages and the formation of industrial clusters. 
With the notable exception of radio, TV and 
communication equipment, where in 1995 shares in 
the EU (3%) Jagged considerably behind those in the 
USA (6%) and in Japan (8%), the distribution of 
shares 'm total value added measured at the sectoral 
level is relatively wen (see Table 4.1 ). 
However, a higher degree of differentiation in the 
composition of output emerges when individual 
industries are examined. Relative specialisation in 
production is measured by the ratio of a specific 
industry's value added in the share of a particular 
country's total manufacturing relative to the same ratio 
which the EU, Japan and the USA are taken together 
(see Fig. 4.1 ). The following examples demonstrate the 
diversity that typically emerges within sectors: 
• In the electronics sector, the EU has the greatest 
degree of specialisation relative to Japan and the 
USA, in the production of wire and cable and 
electrical apparatus. Japan shows a clear profile of 
specialisation in electronic consumer goods, for 
example audio-visual apparatus, watches and 
clocks, as well as electronic components. The USA 
has its greatest strength in advanced applications 
of information and communication technologies 
(ICTs) such as medical equipment, precision 
instruments and optical instruments. 
• With regard to transportation vehicles, the EU is 
most specialised in the manufacture of railway and 
motor vehicles. Compared to the total of the three 
economic areas, Japan has its highest shares of 
value added in motorcycles and bicycles, as well as 
in motor vehicle parts. The USA is most specialised 
in aircraft and spacecraft. 
• Within textiles and clothing, the EU is most 
specialised in textile fibres and the processing of' CHAPTER 4 I 41 
leather and fur, while Japan specialises in the 
finishing of textiles and in knitted and crocheted 
fabrics. The USA appears to be markedly 
specialised only in textile articles. 
Fig. 4.1: Industries with top shares in value added 
relative to the total of EU-Japan-USA 1995 
EU 
Ceramic tiles & flags 
Construction materials 
Leather clothes 
Recorded media 
Steam generators 
Footwear 
Dressing of leather 
Textile fibres 
Railway vehicles 
Knitted & crocheted articles 
Isolated wire & cable 
Articles of fur 
Cement, lime & plaster 
Luggage, handbags, etc. 
Motor vehicles 
USA 
Aircraft & spacecraft 
Grain mill products 
Medical equipment 
Sports goods 
Electronic components 
Precisions instruments 
Agro-chemical products 
Tobacco products 
Optical instruments 
Bodies for motor vehicles 
Weapons & ammunition 
Made-up textile articles 
Other mineral products 
Pulp, paper & paperboard 
Cutlery, tools & hardware 
JAPAN 
Motorcycles & bicycles 
Fish & fish products 
Processing of stone 
Musical instruments 
Knitted fabrics 
Audio-visual apparatus 
Watches & clocks 
Other wood & cork products 
Domestic appliances 
Parts for motor vehicles 
Electrical equipment 
Structural metal products 
Electronic components 
Accumulators & batteries 
Finishing of textiles 
Source: DEBA; WIFO calculations. 
Specialisation within the EU 
the specialisation in the manufacture of ships and 
boats in Denmark and the UK. 
Besides these examples, the specialisation patterns 
observed strongly indicate the existence of location-
specific pools of technological knowledge and 
marketing skills, and, accordingly, of cluster dynamics, 
generated and magnified by the interplay of historical 
circumstances, entrepreneurial achievements and 
locational advantages
2. Particular examples may be 
the high share of food processing and games and toys in 
Denmark; agro-chemical products, food processing, 
and aircraft and spacecraft in the UK; power 
generation or typical marketing industries, such as 
sports goods, detergents, cleaning agents and perfumes 
in France; communication technologies in both 
Sweden and Finland; consumer electronics in the 
Netherlands; and various types of electrical and 
mechanical machinery in Germany. Finally, Ireland is 
a special case, since its top 5 industries (with the 
highest relative shares in value added) strongly reflect 
the 'youth' of such products as office machinery and 
recorded media, the production of which was recently 
located there through an inflow of foreign direct 
investment. 
3. Competitive performance and 
industrial structure 
Specialisation and differentiated patterns of industrial 
production reflect what economic theory suggests 
will appear, given open markets and free trade on the 
one hand, and an uneven distribution of comparative 
advantage or economies of scale on the other. 
Most of the following analysis will treat Europe as one 
single economic area. It is, nevertheless, worthwhile 
considering the broad patterns of specialisation across 
the Member States as these show some interesting 
features. Listing the top 5 industries with the highest 
shares in value added relative to the EU total reveals 
some pronounced country specific advantages and 
particular success stories of industrial locations within 
the EU (see Fig. 4.2). For example, in interpreting the 
patterns, different endowments of natural resources 
can easily be recognised as the underlying causes of 
the high share of saw milling, planing and 
impregnation of wood, pulp and paper in Sweden and 
Finland, articles of wood and cork in Portugal, and fish 
products in Denmark. In addition, the high relative 
shares of apparel, luggage, handbags and footwear, 
tanning and articles of fur, and similar products in 
Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece indicate comparative 
advantages with regard to labour costs. On the other 
hand, specific demand conditions can e.g. account for 
Beyond these descriptive observations, two key 
questions lie at the heart of the analysis. Firstly, do the 
observable specialisation patterns provide clues as to 
the underlying strengths and weaknesses of economic 
performance, such as the ability to innovate and adapt 
to fast changing environments? Secondly, do they 
make a difference in terms of long term prospects for 
growth, employment and general welfare in an 
economy? In other words, does it matter that the EU 
is particularly specialised in industries such as 
mineral products or textiles and clothing whereas the 
USA is specialised in air- and spacecraft or medical 
equipment, and Japan in a number of electronic 
industries? 
Peiiedei'. M.. Creating a Coherent Design for Cluster 
Analysis and Related Policies. WIFO. 1997 (forthcoming 
in OECD proceedings). 42 I CHAPTER 4 
Fig 4.2: Specialisation within the EU, 1996 
Sawmilling,planing, impregnation of wood 
Pulp, paper and paperboard 
Weapons and ammunition 
TV. radio transmitters, telephony 
First processing of iron and steel 
Agro- chemical products 
Aircraft and spacecraft 
Grain mill products 
Processed fruits and vegetables 
Ships and boats 
IRL 
Recorded media 
Jewellery, related articles 
Medical eguipment 
Other chemical products 
Office machinery, computers 
B+L 
Jewellery and related articles 
Other textiles 
Made-up textile articles 
First processing of iron and steel 
Glass and glass products 
Steam generators 
Watches and clocks 
Wooden containers 
Sports goods 
Detergents, cleaning and polishing, perfumes 
Articles of wood, cork ' 
Footwear 
Knitted, crocheted fabrics 
Other wearing apparel 
Tanning, dressing of leather 
GR 
Cement, lime and plaster 
Textile fibres 
Tanning, dressing of leather 
Other wearing apparel 
Knitted, crocheted fabrics 
SP 
Fur, articles of fur 
Cutting, shaping, stone 
Ceramic tiles and flags 
Vegetable, animal oils and fats 
Cement, lime and plaster 
t?
1**» 
Industries are ranked according to their shares in manufacturing value added relative to the total of the EU: 
ln[(VA¡¡/ VAmj) / (VAfrj/ VA^jj}; ¡...industries; m...total manufacturing; ¡...countries 
Source: DEBA; WIFO calculations. 
These questions are inherently related to the notion of 
competitiveness. The term competitiveness essentially 
deals with the performance of individual firms, while 
at the level of aggregate economies, the broader 
concept of competitive performance is more 
appropriate. 
The first part of the report has singled out growth, job 
creation and rising productivity as the three core 
elements that influence an economy's prospects of 
increasing its standard of living. 
The clear target is to optimise the overall standard of 
living, consistent with sustainable development. This 
is what is meant by an economy's "ability to produce 
goods and services that meet the test of international 
markets while our citizens enjoy a standard of living 
that is both rising and sustainable . 
As the preceding figures illustrate, distinct economic 
areas differ with regard to the sectoral distribution of 
production. Moreover, industries themselves may also 
differ with regard to their potential contributions to 
the achievement of a society's desired macroeconomic 
goals. Industries may exhibit different prospects for 
overall growth in demand, income, employment and 
productivity, for example. They may also differ with 
regard to their ability to generate positive externalities 
Tyson, L., Who's bashing whom? Trade conflict in high-
technology industries, Institute for International Economics. 
Washington D.C., 1993. A similar definition is provided in 
Aiginger, K., 'A framework for evaluating the dynamic 
competitiveness of countries', Structural Change and 
Economic Dynamics, No 9, 1998, pp. 159-188. CHAPTER 4 I 43 
to other industries via flows of tacit knowledge, 
common pools of specific labour and vertical supply 
relationships. Finally, their exposure to pure price 
competition and the global pressure on factor incomes 
and wage levels in particular may differ according to 
distinct degrees of homogeneity in product markets. 
The combination of (i) differences in the sectoral 
composition of output, and (ii) differences across 
industries in their potential contribution to economic 
welfare builds the link between sectoral analysis on 
the one hand and competitive performance on the 
other. It is also the motivation for the kind of 
structural analysis carried out here. Empirical 
observations across industries help to map the major 
sources of strength and weakness across European 
manufacturing industries. They also help to 
demonstrate that the economy is an interlocking 
system in which policy must be customised according 
to specific needs, reflecting current structures as well 
as desired directions of future development. 
4. Factors determining industrial 
structure 
Economic theory currently does not provide a 
uniform framework for assessing which kind of 
industrial structure is most suitable for generating 
sustainable high incomes and employment. However, 
for the purpose of the analysis, three broad analytical 
criteria are identified. In short, industrial structures 
are presumed to be beneficial to overall economic 
performance the more they 
• support the accumulation of knowledge and create 
positive externalities, 
• correspond to the distribution of comparative 
advantage and dynamic economies of scale, and 
• allow for product differentiation and investment in 
firm specific assets like innovation and marketing. 
Spillovers and the accumulation of knowledge 
Growth theory investigates which factors determine 
the growth path of nations and why growth rates 
differ. Although aggregate models are by definition 
not designed to provide predictions for structural 
developments, many underlying assumptions have found 
their way into sectoral analysis and shaped the way of 
thinking about factors of growth and structural change. 
A particularly important aspect in the context of this 
report concerns the accumulation of knowledge and 
the extent of positive externalities
4: In the absence of 
continuous technological progress, the mere 
accumulation of physical capital is assumed to exhibit 
diminishing returns. This generates the pessimistic 
prediction that the mere investment of physical capital 
in mature economies eventually causes per capita 
growth to cease. However, this is not the case when 
inputs are invested in knowledge, since no general 
assumption of diminishing returns applies to 
knowledge creation. On the contrary, the specific 
characteristics of knowledge accumulation and 
accordingly of moves upward on the learning curve 
even suggest increasing returns, allowing endogenous, 
sustainable growth in per capita income. In addition, 
knowledge usually is not perfectly appropriable and 
non-rival in its use. Thus, being close to public goods, 
knowledge spillovers to other producers work against 
the general tendency of diminishing returns in physical 
capital as well. 
The main implication for structural analysis is that 
industries investing more in knowledge creation can 
also be expected to contribute more than others to the 
overall prospects for sustainable growth in the 
economy. From this perspective, the share of 
technically sophisticated industries can be monitored 
as an important indicator of economic growth 
potential. However, no clear prediction on the growth 
enhancing effects of the creation of knowledge 
spillovers emerges, since the acceleration of 
knowledge diffusion also reduces the to invest in R&D. 
Comparative advantages and dynamic economies 
of scale 
Trade theory explains the causes and the direction of 
trade, forecasting how countries specialise under 
equilibrium conditions. Equilibrium implies that all 
factors are fully utilised, trade balances are zero and 
product prices are equalised. The most fundamental 
prediction for the analysis of structural development 
is that the specialisation pattern in trade follows the 
distribution of comparative cost advantages. This is 
determined by differences in available technologies 
(Ricardo) or by the endowment with general 
(Heckscher-Ohlin) and sector specific (Ricardo-Viner) 
production factors. 
However, traditional trade theory can only explain 
inter-industry trade between differently endowed or 
productive economic areas. A large proportion of 
international trade flows originates from sources other 
Aghion. P.. Howitt. P.. Endogenous Growth Theory. MIT 
Press. Cambridge. MA. 1998. 44 I CHAPTER 4 
than comparative advantage, especially those between 
similar trading partners. This intra-industry trade also 
shapes industrial structures. 
In markets characterised by product differentiation, 
each country limits itself to the production and export 
of a limited number of varieties or certain quality 
segments. Within these segments, firms are able to 
produce at sufficiently high volumes and exploit 
internal and external economies of scale. In a 
dynamic perspective, economies of scale additionally 
generate self-reinforcing feedback mechanisms, path 
dependency and - like a "river that digs its own bed 
deeper"
5- first mover advantages come into existence. 
Lead-time then enables fast moving firms to top the 
learning curve and reinforce the productivity 
advantage. Cluster effects based on external 
economies of scale within a certain location then 
broaden and foster such specialisation. 
The most direct implication for structural analysis 
would be the ineffectiveness of policy interventions, 
designed in negligence of the actual distribution of 
comparative advantages and inherited specialisation 
based on dynamic economies of scale. 
Product differentiation 
Industrial organisation describes the optimising 
behaviour of firms, taking into account strategic 
interactions within specific markets. Equilibrium is 
assumed insofar as demand equals supply, and a 
firm's decision proves optimal given the available 
information about the actions of other firms. Research 
in this area focuses mainly on the performance of 
firms and of markets (prices are related to marginal 
costs). Many factors are important: the variables to be 
set (available strategies), the mode of conduct, the 
time horizon of strategic interaction, the information 
structure and specific institutional settings like the 
severity of antitrust legislation. 
Perhaps the most fundamental distinction in models 
of industrial organisation concerns the degree of product 
differentiation: in homogenous markets, competition 
drives down profits and prices to a uniform level, and 
production shifts to the competitor with the lowest 
unit costs. In contrast, heterogeneous markets allow 
firms to create the surplus necessary for covering the 
fixed costs of investments in e.g. innovation, vertical 
product differentiation, marketing and design. Firms 
in high wage countries can continue to survive by 
upgrading quality and introducing new process and 
product innovations. In such an environment, firms 
are able to supply products, which are less sensitive to 
prices, and thereby create a basis for maintaining high 
factor incomes. 
The degree of product differentiation in a market does 
not necessarily arise from a 'natural' exogenously 
predetermined magnitude. In the first place, profit 
maximising firms locate themselves in the most 
profitable market niches and try to differentiate their 
products as much as possible from their competitors. 
Secondly, as Sutton (1991)
6 has pointed out, in 
advertising- and research-intensive industries, such 
investments are best interpreted as an endogenous 
variable within the strategic interaction of firms. In 
these industries, investment in response to newly 
entering firms shapes the structure of markets. In a 
particular market, endogenous sunk costs determine 
the amount of fixed capital expenditures spent on 
research and advertising and thus define the height of 
the entry barriers in a particular market. 
Beyond the strict model focusing on the explanation 
of market structure, the inherent dynamic economies 
of scale in these industries suggest that the firm 
specific advantages thus created can foster and deepen 
industrial specialisation patterns over time. 
Firm specific assets and multinational enterprises 
Multinational investment is a key driving force in the 
international relocation of production and thus an 
important determinant of European industrial 
structure. In addition to location specific comparative 
advantages, multinational investment is motivated by 
the exploitation of firm specific assets. Individual 
enterprises develop their competitive strengths by 
accumulating technological and organisational 
knowledge, or by brand creation and reputation. Often, 
they are able to exploit these assets more efficiently 
within their organisation, rather than through arms 
length trade, such as selling licences or franchise 
agreements. For successful firms, constraints on growth 
in the home market additionally create important push 
factors for the expansion of activities into foreign 
markets. 
Krugman, P., Rethinking International Trade, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, MA, 1991. 
Sutton, J., Sunk Costs and Market Structure, MIT Press. 
Cambridge, MA, 1991. Sutton shows that in markets with 
exogenous sunk costs (entry costs or costs defined by 
minimum efficient scale) increasing the market size leads 
to fragmentation, in markets in which goodwill, 
advertising or research and development are important, the 
number of firms will not increase with market size. CHAPTER 4 I 45 
Firm specific assets generate multi-plant economies 
of scale, which tend to make suchinvestments more 
profitable than in single plant firms. 
It can therefore be expected that MNEs not only shape 
industrial structure by relocating production, but also 
generate additional productivity advantages as firms 
grow and endogenously invest in these firm specific 
assets. 
The relationship between exports and FDI is a 
significant determinant of the contribution of foreign 
direct investment to employment, structural 
development and growth. Based on the 
proximity/plant size trade-off, a substitution-type 
relationship implies the delocation of production. A 
complementary relationship on the other hand 
strengthens the performance of industries and may 
even create new jobs in both the home and the host 
countries. The general pattern is expected to differ 
according to industry characteristics, form (vertical 
vs. horizontal FDI) and motives (cost efficiency, 
market access, strategy) for FDI. Firms also invest 
abroad for strategic reasons and engage in merger and 
acquisition activities. Although no additional 
production capacity is created, the impact on market 
structure and intensity of competition may be 
significant. 
Finally, multinational activity is also motivated by 
specialisation within the organisation of firms. Within 
their own organisations, multinationals increasingly 
spread production stages across countries, according 
to the comparative advantages of the host countries. 
This new division of labour within multinational firms 
intensifies the competition among locations for the 
most attractive parts in the value-added chain. 
The common theme 
The overall focus of the analysis is on structural 
development and competitive performance, i.e. the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of European 
manufacturing across industries. Obviously, the 
selected economic theories mentioned above are not 
intended to form the basis for strict econometric 
testing of particular hypotheses. Instead, they provide 
the broad analytical framework, which shapes the 
different perspectives, angles of perception and 
deliberate choices in the analysis that follows. 
Drawing together some major threads of and insights 
from economic theory on growth, trade, international 
investment and industrial organisations, an important 
distinction between the different sources of 
competitive advantage and structural development 
emerges. On the one hand, the sectoral distribution of 
industrial production is shaped by current or historic 
differences in 'natural' advantages, in the sense of 
exogenously given factors. On the other hand, 
advantages may be 'strategic' in the sense of being 
endogenously raised by targeted investment. 
'Strategic' advantages deserve special attention, since 
such forms of puiposeful investment are sensitive to 
public policy. In the subsequent chapters, therefore, 
the structural analysis is intended to raise awareness 
of two different poles in the spectrum of policy 
instruments. Policy can either emphasise low costs 
and low factor prices or concentrate on the capability 
to produce at the higher ends of a differentiated band-
width of perceived quality. While both aspects must 
be pursued simultaneously, the option that ultimately 
receives greatest emphasis can be decisive in 
determining the dynamic prospects of an economy. CHAPTER 5 I 47 
Chapter 5 
Sectoral growth, employment and productivity 
The empirical assessment of structural development 
has been split into the two dimensions of internal and 
external performance. While the latter deals directly 
with external exchange relationships via trade or 
foreign direct investment (both are investigated in 
subsequent chapters), internal performance is 
understood as the ability of an economic area to 
achieve the macroeconomic goals of growth in 
income, employment and consumption. Certainly, both 
dimensions are interlinked, since external relationships 
also contribute to income and employment. 
This chapter is organised as follows: First of all, the 
size of manufacturing and the major trends in demand, 
industrial production and employment are investigated 
at the sectoral level. Secondly, panel regression tests 
the relationship between economic growth and 
employment at the industry level, with respect to 
significant differences between the EU, Japan and the 
USA. Finally, decomposition techniques are used to 
investigate the impact of structural change on labour 
productivity. 
1. Overall trends 
In general, the analysis focuses on differences in size 
and dynamics across industries within manufacturing. 
However, a few remarks on the development of total 
manufacturing are provided in order to put the results 
into a broader perspective. 
Manufacturing produces about one fifth of the 
European gross domestic product. Over time, the 
share decreases slightly, mainly as a result of two 
occurrences: First of all, higher productivity leads to 
lower prices, notably in high tech areas such as new 
information and communication technologies. 
Secondly, as the degree of outsourcing increases, 
manufacturing becomes the source of booming 
industry-related services. Business services are among 
the few areas in which employment is increasing over 
time. Many of these jobs are inherently related to 
innovation, marketing, product differentiation and 
restructuring in manufacturing. 
The share of manufacturing value added in GDP is 
larger in Europe (20.6%) than in the USA (18.0%), 
but lower than in Japan (24.7%)'. Comparing absolute 
size, the USA has the largest industrial sector, 
producing 41.5% of the common manufacturing value 
added, while the EU follows in second place with 
32.8%, and Japan supplies slightly more than one 
quarter. 
Taking the EU, Japan and the USA together, demand
2 
for manufacturing grew by an average of 2.5% p.a. 
between 1989 and 1996 (see Table 5.1). The two most 
rapidly growing sectors are both related to information 
and communication technologies, namely radio, TV 
and communication equipment and office machinery. 
Demand has also grown rapidly in rubber and plastic 
products, motor vehicles, and publishing and printing. 
Food and beverages and chemicals contributed 
substantially to overall demand growth in absolute 
terms. Low growth rates or almost stagnant demand 
have been experienced in clothing, leather products, 
and precision instruments. The demand for products 
from the textile, other transport and basic metals 
sectors has been in absolute decline. 
Comparing the dynamics of apparent consumption, 
the most significant differences are in office 
machinery, where the USA (7.7%) exhibits 
particularly strong and rising demand for information 
technology, outperforming Japan (6.6%) and far ahead 
of the EU (2.3%). At the same time, the US market 
shows a decline in the apparent consumption of other 
transport (-3.8%), as well as refined petroleum (-3.0%). 
With regard to the basic metals industry, the fastest 
decline in demand was in the EU (-1.7%). 
The numbers are from OECD {National Accounts. Vol. II, 
1997, p. 67). Data for the EU and Japan are for 1995. those 
for the USA for 1994. 
Market demand is measured by apparent consumption 
(production plus imports minus exports). Demand growth 
has been lower in the USA and highest in Japan, but the 
data are derived indirectly via information on production 
and trade, which may not be fully comparable. 48  CHAPTER 5 
Table 5.1: Sectoral growth 1989 to 1996 
Food & Beverages 
Tobacco 
Textiles 
Clothing 
Leather Products 
Wood & Products 
Pulp, Paper & Products 
Publishing, Printing 
Refined Petroleum 
Chemicals 
Ruber & Plastic Products 
Non-metalic Mineral Products 
Basic Metals 
Fabricated Metal 
Machinery, Other Fab. Metal 
Office Machinery 
Electrical Machinery 
Radio, TV & Communication 
Precision Instruments 
Motor Vehicles 
Other Transport 
Other Manufacturing 
Total Manufacturing 
Market 
demand 
3.0 
2.8 
-0.5 
2.4 
1.7 
1.8 
1.2 
3.2 
6.1 
2.3 
3.8 
1.9 
-1.7 
3.0 
1.6 
2.3 
2.9 
3.7 
1.9 
3.4 
0.3 
3.6 
2.4 
EU 
Value 
added 
3.9 
14.1 
-0.3 
0.4 
0.6 
1.7 
2.1 
3.1 
15.1 
2.6 
4.3 
1.7 
-2.4 
3.2 
2.8 
-1.3 
2.5 
4.1 
2.7 
2.9 
1.0 
2.7 
2.7 
Employ-
ment 
-0.5 
-3.8 
-4.5 
-3.3 
-3.4 
-1.9 
-2.4 
-0.9 
-0.8 
-1.8 
-0.4 
-2.5 
-4.8 
-1.1 
-1.9 
-3.3 
-2.4 
-2.1 
-2.7 
-1.7 
-3.0 
-0.2 
-1.9 
Market 
demand 
4.4 
5.6 
-0.7 
3.0 
2.5 
3.6 
4.5 
6.6 
6.1 
5.0 
5.8 
4.4 
-0.2 
4.3 
3.9 
6.6 
3.8 
6.1 
1.7 
5.6 
4.3 
2.0 
4.3 
Radio, TV & communication: WIFO estimates for EU 1989 to 1992; Japar 
Japan 
Value 
added 
2.7 
9.2 
-2.1 
-1.4 
-2.0 
1.3 
2.6 
4.2 
14.7 
3.3 
4.4 
2.0 
-1.9 
2.3 
2.7 
0.0 
3.8 
5.1 
-0.1 
2.6 
3.7 
-0.8 
2.5 
Employ-
ment 
Market 
demand 
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-4.7 
-4.5 
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USA 
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added 
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2.4 
i, USA: data for 1996 WIFO estimates. 
Employ-
ment 
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-5.6 
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3.0 
2.8 
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1.1 
3.5 
-0.6 
2.3 
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Total 
Value 
added 
3.3 
5.6 
-0.4 
-0.4 
-0.9 
2.4 
1.1 
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3.0 
4.4 
1.7 
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2.7 
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2.7 
6.3 
1.4 
2.8 
-1.1 
1.5 
2.5 
Employ-
ment 
0.0 
-3.8 
-3.3 
-3.7 
-4.1 
-0.8 
-1.3 
-0.3 
-1.1 
-1.3 
0.4 
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-2.6 
-1.9 
-1.0 
-2.7 
-0.5 
-4.1 
-0.4 
-1.4 
Source: DEBA; WIFO calculations. 
The dominant trends in demand are also mirrored by 
the patterns of growth in value added since 1989. 
although the global distribution of competitive 
advantage leads to more marked differences between 
the three economic areas. 
Overall value added increased by 2.5% p.a., in line 
with market demand with growth in Europe slightly 
exceeding that in Japan and the USA. The fastest 
growing sectors in Europe were in traditional 
industries, such as petroleum products and tobacco, 
which increased production at double-digit rates. 
Both industries gained shares in common value added 
at the expense of the USA. Rubber and plastics 
followed in third place, but growth was fairly even 
across the three economic areas. Radio, TV and 
communication equipment was the only 'high tech' 
sector within Europe's five fastest growing industries. 
higher than in the USA
- and one percentage point 
higher than growth in total manufacturing. 
Consequently, the share of value added and the share 
in consumption increased between 1989 and 1996. 
The fact that growth was highest in the heterogeneous 
subgroup 'other products' indicates the positive effect 
of product differentiation and innovation, since this 
category typically includes new and upcoming 
articles (among these are ready-to-eat foods, frozen 
foods, low calorie foods and foods for special diets). 
This heterogeneous subgroup created 2 665 additional 
jobs, contributing to an industry total of 910 456. Of 
all individual industries, the food industry therefore 
provides the second highest number of jobs. Together 
with meat products, which added 15 114 new jobs, 
these two industries were among the only nine in 
Europe, in which employment did not decline. 
The European food industry is an illustrative example 
of how the introduction of new product variations, 
marketing, and the focus on specific tastes and needs 
can change the dynamics and structure of a rather 
mature market. In the process, the food industry has 
also contradicted Engel's famous law, which predicts 
a decreasing share of food consumption in high-
income countries. Experiencing the fifth highest 
growth in value added among EU sectors, growth was 
Growth in the foods sector was 3.2% in the USA in 
nominal and real terms. In Europe, nominal growth in 
value added was higher (3.9%), although prices increased 
by 1.3%. In Japan, nominal growth of 2.7% is reduced to 
0.6% when price increases are taken inlo account. CHAPTER 5 I 49 
Fig 5.1 Average annual change in apparent 
consumption, ECU million, 1989-1996 
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For radio, TV and communication in the EU: 1993 to 1996 only. 
Source: DEBA; WIFO calculations. 
Petroleum, tobacco, plastic products, communication 
equipment, and other transport (particularly shipping) 
are high-growth industries in both Japan and Europe. 
Radio, TV and communication equipment and office 
machinery are the two fastest growing industries in 
the USA. 
With regard to employment, the overall pattern again 
reflects developments in value added. However, in 
most sectors productivity growth is higher than 
growth of output, resulting in decreasing employment. 
The USA outperformed the EU, as well as Japan: 
between 1989 and 1996, employment grew in seven 
out of 22 sectors. Growth was also evident in two 
Japanese sectors, but no sector in the EU achieved 
growth in employment. 
Fig 5.2: Average annual change in value added, 
ECU million, 1989-1996 
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For radio, TV and communication in the EU: 1993 to 1996 only. 
Source: DEBA; WIFO calculations. 
In absolute terms, the EU lost most jobs in machinery, 
basic metals, and textiles. At the industry level, 
pharmaceuticals and medical equipment were able to 
increase employment slightly, both benefiting from 
the general trend of rising expenditures on health and 
medical care. 50  CHAPTER 5 
Fig 5.3: Average annual change in employment 
in persons 1989-1996 
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Source: DEBA; WIFO calculations. 
Industries producing textiles, clothing, machinery and 
electrical machinery were the biggest job cutters in 
Japan, while new jobs were created in the foods sector 
and, to a lesser extent, in plastic products. In the USA, 
major losses in employment were registered in the 
manufacture of other transport, clothing as well as 
medical, precision and optical instruments, while net 
gains in employment were achieved in radio, TV and 
communication, plastic products, motor vehicles, 
food processing, and machinery. 
The case of the USA and its competitive strength in 
the field of new ICTs illustrates the potentially 
powerful leverage exerted on aggregate employment 
when the combination of high growth in demand and 
competitive advantage successfully match each other. 
The manufacture of radio, TV and communication 
equipment exhibited the highest rate of annual growth 
in demand throughout the 1990s. While growth was 
very high and value added did rise accordingly in all 
three areas, the USA was the only country with a 
sufficiently strong competitive position to enable 
benefits in terms of job creation to be secured also. 
The overall share of the US ICT industries in the 
common value added was 42%, which was 
significantly larger than the European (23%) and 
Japanese (35%) shares. Following successful 
restructuring during the early 1990s, about 97 000 new 
manufacturing jobs were created in the USA between 
1993 and 1996 alone. In 1996, this amounted to a net 
gain in employment relative to 1989, of 63 000 jobs. 
In contrast, during the years following 1993, both the 
EU and Japan experienced job cuts in the magnitude 
of 16 000 and 62 000 persons, respectively. 
Demand conditions exert decisive influences, for 
example by supporting economies of scale and thereby 
creating dynamic first mover advantages. Similar to 
Japan, but in contrast to the EU, growth in the USA 
was driven by domestic demand, not by trade. This 
demand surge in the USA was presumably due to early 
liberalisation, product innovation and efficient service 
providers, but also reflects the highly absorbent 
capacity of end-users. According to a recent report by 
the European Information Technology Observatory, 
Europe lags considerably with regard to its investment 
in information and communication technology. In 
1996, the EU invested 2.26% of gross domestic 
product in information technology hardware. In 
contrast, the equivalent figures are 2.51 % for Japan 
and an impressive 4.08% for the USA.
4 
2. Growth and the creation of jobs 
The relationship between growth in value added and 
the development of jobs across industries is still 
strong. The correlation is significant for each area. 
However, in the past years growth has not been strong 
enough to stabilise or even increase manufacturing 
employment. 
The numbers are from EITO (European Information 
Technology Observatory) 1998, Frankfurt/Main, 1998, p. 
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Between 1989 and 1996, productivity measured at 
current prices increased fastest in Europe (4.7%), 
followed by Japan (3.8%) and the USA (3.0%). 
Overall employment in manufacturing declined by 
0.5% in the USA, 1.3% in Japan and 2.0% in Europe. 
During the same period, no single sector was strong 
enough to increase employment in the EU. 
The fundamental ambiguity between the macro-
economic goals of high income and employment on 
the one hand, and high productivity as an important 
measure of competitiveness on the other, deserves 
special attention. Since labour productivity is defined 
as the ratio of value added to employment, its rise can 
be based on an increase in value added and/or on a 
decline in employment. As the data illustrate, the high 
rates of productivity growth observed in the 
manufacturing sector actually result from the 
simultaneous interplay of both effects. For the EU, 
Japan and the USA combined, between 1989 and 
1996, employment decreased in all but three of the 22 
sectors, although at the same time all but four 
experienced increases in total value added. 
It is tempting to question whether economic growth is 
still positively linked to changes in employment, or 
whether any changes in the technological or economic 
regime may have disrupted that relationship. The 
scatter diagram in Figure 5.4 shows that the 
correlation between growth in value added and 
changes in employment is still impressively strong. 
The correlation coefficient ranges between 0.669 for 
Japan, 0.711 for the USA and 6.750 for the EU, with 
all three being significant at the 0.01 level. In other 
words, roughly 50% of the total variation in average 
annual changes in employment are related to average 
annual growth in value added. Although in most 
manufacturing industries growth may not suffice to 
create new jobs, it nevertheless remains the essential 
prerequisite for the maintenance of employment. 
A closer inspection of Figure 5.4 indicates another 
interesting story behind the data. Although the 
correlation between employment and growth is 
similar in all three areas, the USA seems to perform 
particularly well in the field of job creation. Many US 
industries are located in the upper tail of the scatter 
distribution, whereas many European industries fall 
near the lower bound. 
Okun's law summarises the empirical relationship 
between employment growth and output growth, 
indicating the amount of output growth, which is 
necessary to stabilise employment. Okun's law is 
usually applied in the context of macroeconomic 
analysis. Making use of the available disaggregated 
data, a panel regression is applied to investigate the 
analogous relationship at the level of a typical 
manufacturing industry. The estimations are not based 
on a strict economic model, but rather aim only at 
evaluating the stylised empirical relationship. 
Nevertheless, two striking results emerge. 
Fig 5.4: Growth and employment across 
industries: 1989 to 1996 
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av. annual change of value added (const.prices) in % 
Source: DEBA; WIFO calculations. 
• Firstly, in the EU, the labour intensity of 
employment growth as measured by the elasticity 
with respect to growth in real value added is 0.37. 
This parameter is highly significant and implies 
that 1% growth in value added, ceteris paribus, (i.e. 
without any changes in labour productivity) 
generates 0.37% growth in employment. Relative 
to the EU, output growth in the USA is 
significantly more labour intensive (0.48), whereas 
for Japan no significant difference relative to the 
EU can be found. No easy explanation of this 
finding is available, but the data seem to suggest 
that relative factor prices favour employment 
growth more in the USA than in the EU and Japan. 
• Secondly, for a typical manufacturing industry, 
intercepts are significantly less negative in the 
USA and Japan relative to the EU. This reflects 
mainly differences in the growth of labour 
productivity, implying for the typical European 
industry a process of catching up to US and 
Japanese levels. 
As a consequence of both - higher productivity 
growth and lower labour intensity of growth in value 
added - output growth in the EU has to be 
significantly higher to stabilise employment. 52 I CHAPTER 5 
According to the estimations of the model, this 
requires approximately 7.3% growth in the value 
added of European manufacturing, compared to 4.4% 
in Japan and 3.3% in the USA. Figure 5.5 illustrates 
this point by plotting the relationship between 
employment growth and output growth as estimated 
by the panel regression for a typical industry. 
Detailed technical information on the data, the results 
of the estimation, as well as an extension of the basic 
specifications to include a differentiation across 
industry types are provided in Chapter 7. 
Fig 5.5: Okun's law at the industry level 
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production and thus the technological and 
organisational knowledge employed and the second is 
the willingness to pay for that output, thus reflecting 
quality as perceived by consumers and dependent on 
product development, design and marketing skills. 
Nevertheless the empirical assessment of productivity 
exhibits some shortcomings, which require that it be 
analysed as a complement to and not in place of other 
indicators such as market shares in foreign trade or 
flows in foreign direct investment. The first reason is 
that lack of a reliable database on factor inputs other 
than labour means that the analysis is usually 
restricted to labour productivity. The second concern 
deals with underlying assumptions on market 
structure: although the value of output is 
systematically distorted by the type of competitive 
process dominating the market place, any direct 
comparison between countries inevitably neglects 
differences in the market structures of distinct 
economic areas. In addition, it must be remembered 
that productivity growth is highly variable when 
measured over short periods of time because of its 
sensitivity to the business cycle. During periods of 
high growth in value added, for example at the 
beginning of an upward movement, high rates of 
productivity growth are typical concomitants. 
The empirical observation of catching up in labour 
productivity without significantly higher growth in 
output adds an important perspective on Europe's 
unemployment problem. It implies that on average, 
European manufacturing necessarily loses more jobs 
per year than Japan or the USA. This loss increases 
the pressure to create new jobs in the service sector. 
Furthermore, the evidence suggests that European 
industries are more eager to rationalise production 
and substitute capital for labour. This hypothesis 
should, however, be more deeply investigated in 
further research. 
3. Sectoral development and productivity 
Relative to the USA, European manufacturing is 
catching up in productivity, although productivity 
levels are still much higher in the USA than in 
Europe. The following section will analyse to what 
extent structural developments contribute to aggregate 
growth in labour productivity. 
Productivity is a particularly important measure of 
competitiveness. When calculated as the ratio of 
factor inputs to the value of economic output, its 
attractiveness arises from the fact that it 
simultaneously reflects two important dimensions of 
economic performance. The first is the efficiency of 
Keeping in mind the limitations mentioned above, 
two questions will be addressed in the following 
analysis: Whether and to what extent does the sectoral 
composition of manufacturing output affect (i) 
differences in overall productivity between countries, 
or (ii) changes in total productivity over time? 
Decomposition techniques, as recently demonstrated 
by Davies-Lyons (1991, 1996)
5 and Dollar-Wolff 
(1995)
6, offer a particularly instructive approach. The 
basic idea is to compare actual productivity levels of 
total manufacturing in individual countries with a 
hypothetical benchmark of aggregate productivity 
under the assumption of uniform or at least constant 
size of all industries. Eliminating structural effects, 
this benchmark isolates the general trends, which 
apply equally across industries. Contrasting this 
benchmark to actual labour productivity allows the 
inference of information about the impact of the 
structural component. 
Davies, S., Lyons, Β., 'Characterising relative performance: 
the productivity advantage of foreign owned firms in the 
UK', Oxford Economic Papers, No 43, 1991, pp. 584-595. 
Davies, S., Lyons, Β., et al., 'Industrial Organisation in the 
European Union', Structure, Strategy, and the Competitive 
Mechanism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996. 
Dollar, D., Wolff, E.N., Competitiveness, Convergence, 
and International Specialisation, MIT Press, Cambridge, 
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Structural effects on productivity differentials 
The impact of sectoral composition on existing gaps 
in productivity levels between the individual Member 
States of the EU, as well as between the EU, Japan 
and the USA, is identified via the application of a 
decomposition analysis developed by Davies-Lyons 
(1991). 
Looking at the distinct effects of locational and 
structural components on differences in productivity 
levels relative to Japan and the USA in 1995 (see 
Box 5.1), the EU does not appear to suffer from 
structural deficits in the sense of being less 
specialised in high productivity industries. The 
difference in aggregate labour productivity
7 is entirely 
due to general locational components, irrespective of 
the sectoral composition of production (see Table 
5.2). The purely locational component, reflecting 
differences in productivity and assuming uniform 
distribution of industries of equal size across the EU, 
Japan and the USA, would even be higher. This 
implies that the structural component alone would 
even speak somewhat in favour of European 
productivity. 
Comparing the locational and structural components 
of the gaps in labour productivity between individual 
Member States of the EU illustrates that sectoral 
composition may nevertheless matter. The impact of 
the structural component differs across Member States. 
It is strongest in Ireland, Finland. Sweden, and the 
Netherlands, and also exerts a positive influence in 
France and to a lesser extent in Germany.
8 In all of 
these countries, the sectoral composition of production 
favours a higher level of labour productivity relative to 
the EU. The current patterns of sectoral specialisation 
have a slightly negative effect on relative productivity 
performance in Greece, Denmark, the UK, and Italy, 
whereas in Spain and Portugal the impact of the 
structural component is substantial. 
Both Japan and the USA achieved considerably higher 
labour productivity in manufacturing measured at current 
prices than the EU total. Yet the absolute size of this gap 
must be interpreted with care. The comparison of absolute 
levels of labour productivity suffers from severe 
shortcomings stemming e.g. from exchange rate regimes, 
the influence of PPPs, as well as the lack of information on 
actual working hours per employee. 
For both Germany and France, the structural component is 
more pronounced when measured at the sectoral level. 
Box 5.1: Decomposition of productivity 
differentials 
Following a decomposition technique developed by 
Davies-Lyons (1991), the ratios of aggregate index 
numbers are decomposed into two components 
reflecting relative differences (i) in the distribution 
of industries and (ii) in performance within 
individual industries. Multiplication of the two 
components again gives the true value of the 
aggregate index. 
For the current research, this method is applied to 
aggregate gaps in labour productivity between 
pairs of countries or different economic areas. 
Calculations are restricted to first-tier 
decomposition, omitting further decomposition of 
the resulting two components, which are 
considerably more complex. 
The formula for decomposition emerges after 
rearranging the correlation coefficient (r) between 
the two variables a and b. The total productivity 
gap (R) can then be expressed as dependent of the 
respective arithmetic means of labour productivity 
(avpa, avpb), the correlation coefficients between 
employment shares and labour productivity 
(r
epa, r
epb), and the coefficients of variation (vc
ea, 
vc
eb; vc
pa, vc
pa): R = Τ χ S = (avpa/avpb) χ (1+ r
pa 
vc% vca)/(l+ r
e\ vc\ vc
pb) 
The general within industries component Τ is the 
ratio of the unweighted means of labour 
productivity in locations A and B, respectively. The 
structural component S reveals the impact of 
differences between A and Β on the distribution of 
industries with lower or higher productivity. The 
total productivity gap R is the product of both 
effects. 
To give a hypothetical example, if R = Τ χ S = 
150.00 = 130.00 χ 115.38, then these numbers 
reveal the following three facts: 
i) Total labour productivity in location A is 50% 
higher than in location B. 
ii) If in both locations employment were 
identically and uniformly distributed across 
industries, the aggregate differential would fall 
to 30%. 
iii) Even if average productivity across industries 
were identical in both locations, the larger 
shares of high productivity industries in 
location A would be capable of generating a 
productivity lead of approximately 15% on their 
own. 54 I CHAPTER 5 
Table 5.2: Decomposition of productivity 
differentials 1996 (EU = 100) 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
United Kingdi 
Japan 
USA 
Total productivity 
gap 
1.21 
1.32 
1.08 
1.15 
044 
1.54 
1.13 
1.27 
0.34 
075 
1 26 
3m 0.82 
1.98 
1 63 
3-digits 
Locational Structural 
component component 
1.24 
1.20 
1.08 
1.09 
0.45 
1.25 
1.20 
1.17 
0.47 
0.84 
1.16 
0.86 
2.26 
1 71 
0.98 
1.10 
1.01 
1.05 
0.99 
1.23 
0.94 
1.08 
0.72 
0.89 
1.08 
0.95 
0.88 
095 
Total productivity 
gap 
1.17 
1 26 
1.06 
1.12 
0.42 
1.49 
1.12 
1.25 
0.34 
0.72 
1.21 
0.80 
1.96 
1.61 
2-digits 
Locational Structural 
component component 
0.99 
1.01 
085 
0.92 
0.39 
1 45 
1.56 
1.04 
0.80 
0.71 
1.05 
0.80 
2.07 
1.54 
1.18 
1.25 
1.25 
1.21 
1 08 
1 03 
0.72 
1.21 
0.43 
1.02 
1.14 
0.99 
096 
1.03 
Total productivity gap = location component χ structural component. 
Labour productivity calculated at current prices
9 
Source: DEBA; WIFO calculations. 
Structural effects on productivity dynamics 
Complementing the comparison of labour productivity 
levels between countries, similar decomposition 
techniques (see for example Dollar-Wolff, 1995) can 
be used to investigate the impact of shifts in the 
sectoral composition of employment on productivity 
growth in individual countries. This time, the actual 
development of labour productivity in the 
manufacturing sector of a country will be contrasted 
to a benchmark of presumed productivity growth, 
assuming each industry's share in total employment 
remained constant (in other words, as if there were no 
shifts in the sectoral composition of total employment). 
This sub-component represents aggregate growth in 
labour productivity within industries. The difference 
between the two index numbers is taken to represent 
the structural effect, i.e. the contribution of shifts in 
industrial specialisation to aggregate productivity 
growth in the manufacturing sector. 
There are many sources of influence on aggregate 
productivity growth. Structural transition from low- to 
high-productivity sectors, is only one of them. Other 
underlying sources, which can apply either uniformly 
Nominal labour productivity at current prices is chosen 
because the available data are more complete. To investigate 
the robustness of the results, the same calculations were 
made with labour productivity at constant 1990 prices. 
Relative to the locational component, the structural effect 
tends to become smaller at the industry level and bigger at 
the sectoral level, where the data set is again nearly 
complete. The difference between nominal and real values 
is most pronounced for Japan, where the total productivity 
gap relative to the EU shrinks to 1.50. (industries: total 
productivity gap of 1.50 = 1.75 locational component χ 0.86 
structural component; sectors: 1.48 = 1.54 χ 0.96). In 
contrast, the calculations for the USA are hardly affected 
(industries: 1.48=1.73 χ 0.91; sectors: 1.61=1.78 χ 0.90). 
or differentially across sectors, are the accumulation 
of physical and human capital, technological progress, 
or the exploitation of economies of scale. 
Within industry, productivity growth comprises all the 
distinct sources that work equally across industries 
and apply to the economy as a whole. This measure 
points primarily towards differences in general 
framework conditions, such as the incentive effects of 
particular government regulations on business 
practices. In contrast, the structural effect simply 
measures the impact of shifts in employment from 
low- to high-productivity industries. A positive 
contribution of structural effects on aggregate 
productivity growth implies either that industries with 
low levels of productivity reduced or industries with 
high levels of productivity expanded their shares in 
total employment. If the contribution is negative, the 
interpretation is simply reversed analogously. 
The observation period is very short and every 
interpretation should therefore be cautious. What can 
again be seen is that within the EU, the sign of the 
structural effects differs significantly across Member 
States (see Table 5.3). Between 1993 and 1996, total 
labour productivity profited from structural shifts to 
higher productivity industries in Germany, Italy, 
Portugal, Austria, and Greece. At the same time, the 
UK, France and Spain remained largely unaffected. 
However, in the Netherlands, Ireland, Finland and 
Sweden the negative impact of shifts in the sectoral 
composition indicated either that industries with low 
levels of productivity expanded faster or that high 
productivity sectors lost a significant amount of jobs. 
Aggregate productivity in the EU as a whole has 
profited from structural change. This also applies to 
Japan, while productivity growth in US manufacturing 
remained unaffected by shifts in sectoral composition. 
Structural change currently accounts for one third of 
productivity growth in the EU and for one half in 
Japan (see Fig.5.6). Between 1993 and 1996, labour 
productivity increased fastest in Japan, followed by the 
EU and the USA. Without structural shifts, the order 
would have been reversed, although differences in 
productivity growth within industries are rather small. 
The striking feature is that the observable differences 
in aggregate productivity growth across the three 
economic areas actually were due to structural change. CHAPTER 5 I 55 
Fig 5.6: Structural effects on productivity growth  Table 5.3: Decomposition of productivity growth 
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Source: DEBA; WIFO calculations. 
This structural change towards higher productivity 
industries was caused by the simultaneous decline in 
the employment shares of low productivity industries 
(for example in the clothing sector) and growth in the 
shares of high productivity industries, such as 
pharmaceuticals. 
4. Summary and conclusions 
Summing up these findings on structural change and 
productivity, two important policy implications 
emerge. Firstly, structural change currently enhances 
aggregate productivity growth in the EU by about one 
third. However, the European productivity 
disadvantage relative to the USA does not stem from 
a structural component in the sense of less 
specialisation in high productivity industries. Thus, 
the sectoral analysis supports horizontal policy 
measures to improve the general economic 
environment for European business. The challenge is 
to raise both productivity and growth. In contrast, 
there is no indication of a general structural weakness 
influencing aggregate productivity, which would call 
for vertical targeting of individual industries. 
Secondly, the data reveal enormous differences within 
the EU, both in the levels and in the growth dynamics 
of labour productivity. Technically, there is huge 
potential for countries such as Portugal, Greece or 
Spain to catch up. Such an upward convergence 
within the EU would automatically reduce the overall 
gap relative to Japan and the USA. Expanding the 
diffusion of best business and policy practices within 
the EU is therefore an important policy target. 
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Chapter 6 
European industries in world markets 
In this chapter, stylised facts will be used to illustrate 
how European industries have performed on world 
markets compared to their counterparts in Japan and 
the USA, and how their performance has changed over 
time. The analysis focuses on external performance, 
taking into account the results on internal performance 
from the preceding chapter. Specifically, the analysis 
investigates the EU's strategy for coping with the 
competition of low wage countries by shifting to 
higher quality and more sophisticated segments in 
markets with differentiated products. 
Competitiveness has been defined as the ability of an 
economy to increase its standard of living and to 
create employment, while maintaining a sustainable 
external balance. Internal and external performance 
are strongly linked: in open economies, growth in 
output and the creation of jobs requires industries to 
be competitive on an international scale. Otherwise, 
imports would increase, thereby dampening the 
prospects for job creation in domestic firms. High and 
increasing productivity is therefore the precondition 
for exports and domestic production. 
There are at least three reasons for a specific focus on 
external performance. Firstly, trade balances and 
international market shares are very sensitive 
indicators of changes in competitive position. 
Compared to domestic production, which is often 
distorted by local demand conditions, trade data 
provide relatively early signals of shifts in the balance 
of competitive strengths and weaknesses. Secondly, 
the external analysis profits from the fact that trade 
statistics are less blurred by national conventions and 
accounting systems, and are available at a very 
disaggregated level. Finally, trade statistics permit 
concentration on the qualitative element of 
competitiveness, revealing for example whether low 
prices or high quality determines the competitive 
edge, or whether a country is specialising in the high 
or low quality segment of a market. Additionally, 
economic theories differ to some extent in their 
forecasts on specialisation and performance. 
1. Market shares and trade balances 
Favourable European trade performance 
The overall assessment of external trade performance 
for the EU appears rather favourable: European 
manufacturing exports are greater than those of Japan 
and the USA, even when intra-European trade is 
excluded. Market shares are stable; the trade balance 
is positive and increasing. 
While shares in the world market decreased both in 
Japan (from 19.2% to 14.5%) and the USA (from 
20.2% to 18.8%), the EU market share remained stable 
at approximately 27% (see Table 6.1). At the same 
time, increasing market shares were achieved by 
dynamic Asian economies (from 15.1% to 21.0%) and 
by countries in transition. In absolute numbers, the 
EU increased its trade surplus from ECU 28 billion in 
1989 to ECU 130 billion in 1996, while Japan's 
surplus fell below the EU level (ECU 107 billion) and 
the USA accrued a deficit of ECU 146 billion. 
Table 6.1: Trade in total manufacturing 
EU 
Japan 
USA 
'Other countries' 
Among them: DYNAS 
Market shares 
1989 1996 
27.0 
19.2 
20.2 
35.4 
15.1 
26.9 
14.5 
18.8 
42.0 
21.0 
Trade balance 
1989 1996 
1000 mill. ECU 
28.1 
121.7 
-125.1 
■1.9 
22.0 
130.2 
107.4 
■146.4 
-123.3 
-100.4 
Exports Imports 
Annual growth 
in % 
7.9 
3.7 
6.8 
9.2 
13.1 
5.3 
7.8 
5.5 
11.3 
18.4 
Shares in world market: Exports as a percentage of world imports. 
DYNAS is a subcategory of "Other Countries": Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Philippines, China, South-Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong. 
The sum of market shares is more than 100%, due to differences in the 
reporting behaviour of countries. In some cases the countries of origin 
report their exports, but the destination countries do not report all their 
imports for example, for confidentiality reasons. One illustrative 
example is arms and ammunition. 
Source: COMPET; WIFO calculations. 58 I CHAPTER 6 
Table 6.2: Top performing sectors and industries according to their share In world market 
Top market shares 1996  Top winners: increase In market share 
EU 
Top 3 sectors 
Other transport equipment 
Machinery and equipment n. e. c. 
Other non-metallic mineral products 
Top 5 industries 
Steam generators 
Ceramic tiles and flags 
"Dairy products; ice cream" 
Beverages 
Tanks, reservoirs, central heating radiators, boilers 
Japan 
Top 3 sectors 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
Machinery and equipment n. e. c. 
Radio, TV and communication equipment 
Top 5 industries 
Ships and boats 
Motorcycles and bicycles 
Accumulators, primary cells, primary batteries 
Optical instruments, photographic equipment 
Motor vehicles 
USA 
Top 3 sectors 
Tobacco products 
Other transport equipment 
Publishing, printing, reproduction 
Top 5 industries 
Weapons and ammunition 
Tobacco products 
Aircraft and spacecraft 
Grain mill products and starches 
Medical equipment 
Share 
1996 
in% 
49.1 
45.5 
43.4 
111.3 
95.4 
89.6 
73.6 
71.2 
31.1 
22.2 
21.6 
73.4 
46.9 
33.0 
31.9 
31.6 
71.2 
43.0 
35.6 
144.5 
71.2 
58.0 
44.4 
41.7 
Market share: Exports as a percentage of world imports. They do 
EU 
Top 3 sectors 
Other transport equipment 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel 
Top 5 industries 
Steam generators 
and ammunition 
Ships and boats 
Aircraft and spacecraft 
TV, radio transmitters, apparatus for line telephony 
Japan 
Top 3 sectors 
Other transport equipment 
Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel 
Tobacco products 
Top 5 industries 
Ships and boats 
Cement, lime and plaster 
Parts and accessories for motor vehicles 
Refined petroleum products 
Bricks, tiles and construction products 
USA 
Top 3 sectors 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
Fabricated metal products 
Rubber and plastic products 
Top 5 industries 
Weapons and ammunition 
Meat products 
Parts, accessories for motor vehicles 
TV, radio transmitters, apparatus for line telephony 
Other fabricated metal products 
not add up e.g. due to divergent methods of reporting. 
Change 
1996/89 
in 
14.5 
5.9 
4.4 
47.2 
38.0 
32.0 
16.0 
10.5 
4.3 
1.7 
0.4 
33.1 
3.8 
3.1 
2.1 
1.2 
4.2 
3.4 
2.8 
9.7 
7.9 
7.4 
6.2 
6.1 
Share 
1996 
% 
49.1 
29.8 
19.0 
111.3 
55.0 
67.1 
53.0 
34.4 
17.7 
2.5 
3.3 
73.4 
18.3 
31.3 
2.3 
5.3 
22.5 
18.9 
21.4 
144.4 
32.9 
40.1 
23.1 
19.4 
Source: COMPET, WIFO calculations 
Europe's highest export market shares appear in 
sectors with medium technical sophistication. Three 
metal-based sectors (other transport, machinery, and 
fabricated metal) are complemented by mineral 
products and the chemical sector in the top five, 
ranked according to market shares in 1996 (see Table 
6.2). The machinery, transport and metal sector 
includes 8 of the 10 industries with the highest gains in 
market shares. The large increases achieved by aircraft 
and spacecraft and TV and radio transmitters as well 
as by steam generators and weapons and ammunitions 
hint at some EU inroads in technically more 
sophisticated industries. As far as the trade balance is 
concerned, machinery plus motor vehicles together 
create a surplus of ECU 100 billion, and the chemical 
industry adds another ECU 32 billion. 
Fig 6.1a: The top sectors with the largest trade 
surplus in the EU 
■ 1989 
D 1996 
JBO. 
Machinery Motor Chemicals Other Metal 
vehicles transport products 
Source: COMPET; WIFO calculations. CHAPTER 6 I 59 
Fig 6.1b: The top sectors with the largest trade 
surplus in Japan 
Vehicles Machinery Radio, TV Elect. Computer 
Machinery 
Source: COMPET; WIFO calculations. 
Fig 6.1c: The top sectors with the largest trade 
surplus in the USA 
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Source: COMPET; WIFO calculations. 
The USA quickly goes multinational 
By far the greatest market share held by the USA is in 
the tobacco industry, followed by other transport 
equipment (for example aircraft and spacecraft). The 
USA also enjoys a strong position in printing, paper 
products and precision instruments. Disaggregation to 
industry level reveals a two-tiered picture: some of the 
leading industries are resource based, partly linked to 
the food sector (tobacco, mill products, meat), while 
others are primarily technology based (aircraft and 
spacecraft, medical equipment, precision instruments). 
The largest gains in market shares have been achieved 
in the vehicles industry (without decreasing the 
absolute deficit of ECU 46 billion), in metal products 
and rubber and plastics. In all of these sectors, gains 
were made at the expense of Japan and not of'Europe. 
In nine of the ten sectors in which the USA gained 
large market shares, Japan's share was reduced. 
Box 6.1: Three European success stories in fast 
growing industries 
The pharmaceutical industry is a high tech industry 
with fast growth, high research and great emphasis 
on quality and goodwill. At 56%, Europe's world 
market share in manufacturing is much larger than 
that of the USA or Japan. Both are suffering from 
decreasing market shares and negative trade 
balances. However, in absolute size of value added, 
US production is the largest. In both the USA and 
Japan, the share of pharmaceuticals in total 
manufacturing value added is larger than in the 
EU. Market growth for the total of the three 
economic areas is 7% p.a.. European 
manufacturing increased nominal value added by 
7.5%; prices increased by roughly 1%. 
Employment increased by 14100 and today 
amounts to 440 000 persons. 
Medical equipment increased its value added in 
Europe by 7.6%, p.a., while market growth in the 
combined area EU-Japan-USA was 5.3%. The 
USA has the highest market share, and produces 
two thirds of the value added of this market. This 
indicates further growth potential for Europe. 
Europe's trade balance is slightly positive, but 
below the US level. Employment increased in 
Europe by 11400 (+1% p.a.) and is now 173 000. 
The production of railway vehicles is growing by 
7.4% p.a. in Europe. This rate is much higher than 
in the USA and Japan, as is this industry's share 
in value added. Europe's world market share is 
approaching 50%, the trade balance is positive, 
although trade is not considerable. Employment is 
decreasing slightly, but less than in total 
manufacturing. Additionally, there is a large 
potential for complementary service jobs, 
especially in the planning of systems, the supply of 
components and the maintenance of tracks. 
The data indicate that the USA does not attempt to 
exploit comparative advantages to the same extent as 
Europe or Japan via the trade of products. The three 
largest contributors to the trade balance at the sectoral 
level add up to ECU 38 billion only for the USA, 
ECU 132 billion for Europe and ECU 122 billion for 
Japan (see Fig. 6.1). At the industry level, the same 
tendency holds: no large surpluses are accrued, and 
existing ones tend to evaporate, rather than 
accumulate over time. One probable explanation is 
that US firms exploit advantages earlier via direct 
investment abroad, while European and Japanese 60  CHAPTER 6 
firms prefer to exploit competitive advantages 
(longer) through trade. This may partly be due to a 
stronger emphasis in the USA on firm specific 
advantages (for example by innovation and marketing) 
Box 6.2: The data 
The DEBA database is used for internal 
performance. This database provides consistent 
data for value added, employment, as well as other 
main indicators for EU countries, Japan and the 
USA. Data are fairly complete from 1989 to 1996. 
In some 3-digit industries, estimates for missing 
data primarily up to 1993 and for 1996 are 
provided. Nominal value added at factor costs has 
been selected as the main activity indicator. 
The analysis of external performance is based on 
the COMPET database, which consists of exports 
and imports for each of 59 reporting countries. The 
'world market' is defined according to world 
imports, taken from the sum of all imports of the 
available reporting countries. These comprise more 
than 90% of total world trade. Intra-European trade 
is excluded throughout the report. Missing are 
mainly developing countries and some countries in 
transition. The 'market share' is defined as the 
ratio of an economy's exports to the 'world market'. 
This 'export of a country to the import of the 
world' market share concept is chosen since it is 
closest to the economic concept of a firm's share 
in the total sales of a market. 
The following acronyms are used: CEEC (transition 
economies, including the Czech Republic, 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia); DYNAS 
(dynamic Asian economies including China: 
Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Philippines, China, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong). 
Additionally, information on qualitative 
performance is based on the COMEXT database, 
which provides disaggregated data for up to 6-digit 
product groups and allows for more detailed 
information on the EU trade structure. Trade data 
from COMEXT are linked to the NACE industry 
classification by a correspondence table for 1996. 
Throughout the study, 2-digit data are referred to 
as sectors and 3-digit data as industries (officially, 
EUROSTAT labels them 'divisions' and 'groups'). 
in contrast to the general comparative advantages of a 
particular location (for example factor prices, market 
access or available skills). This question will be 
further investigated in the following chapter. In any 
case, going multinational rapidly implies limits on the 
extent of trade surpluses in sectors with firm specific 
assets. Income in production and for blue-collar 
workers is reduced, whereas income from capital and 
financial assets increases. 
Japan focuses on comparative advantages 
Japanese exports are heavily concentrated, notably in 
engineering skills. Indeed, all sectors in which Japan 
has high market shares are skill-intensive industries. 
Motor vehicles and machinery lead the sector 
ranking, radio, TV and communication equipment, 
electrical machinery, precision instruments and other 
transport equipment follow. At industry level, all but 
one of the top ten are engineering industries 
encompassing ships and boats, motorcycles and 
motor vehicles, as well as accumulators and optical 
instruments. The top 4 sectors cover 60% of overall 
Japanese exports, compared with 48% in Europe and 
47% in the USA (see Table 6.3). Switching to the 
industry level, 62% of Japanese exports stem from the 
10 largest exporting industries, again compared to 
51% in the USA and only 42% in Europe. With 
respect to imports, there is no significant difference in 
these quasi-concentration rates across the three areas, 
which indicates that specialisation and not differences 
in demand are the driving force. 
Table 6.3: Concentration of exports In the EU, 
Japan and the USA 1996 
Share of 4 largest sectors 
Exports 
Imports 
Share of 10 largest industries 
Exports 
Imports 
EU 
47.6 
39.4 
42.4 
32.1 
Japan 
60.3 
34.0 
62.2 
39.5 
USA 
46.6 
41.6 
51.0 
42.0 
1.825 
•5.395 
89.9 
0.8 
-26.6 
1.002 
-2.225 
276.1 
26.3 
-35.8 
Trade surplus of 4 largest sectors 141,409 134,393 42,756 
10 industries with largest disadvantage 
Standard deviation of RCA across industries 0.557 
Import/export relation (RCA) -1.576 
Import/value added share 177.9 
Export/value added share 66.1 
Trade deficit -49.3 
RCA: Revealed comparative advantage ln((Xi/Mi)/(X7M)) 
Source: DEBA, COMEXT, COMPET; WIFO calculations. 
The high negative specialisation ratios exhibited by 
Japan as soon as comparative disadvantages are 
revealed in any particular industry are unrivalled. CHAPTER 6 I 61 
The average of the industries with the greatest de-
specialisation (measured by the lowest ten RCA 
values) is - 5.4 in Japan, compared to -1.6 in Europe 
and -2.2 in the USA (see Fig. 6.2). Exports as a share 
of value added in these industries is 66% in Europe, 
26% in the USA, but only 1 % in Japan. This indicates 
that Japan gives up exports completely, while in 
Europe and in the USA some firms continue 
supplying in niches. However, imports do not rise so 
much in Japan, amounting to ECU 27 billion (ECU 78 
billion in the EU and ECU 40 billion in the USA). The 
relation between imports and domestic value added is 
178% in Europe, 276% in the USA, and only 90% in 
Japan. This implies that production for the home 
market continues to a certain extent, indicating either 
consumer preferences for domestic varieties or some 
sort of import barrier. 
The extremely favourable starting point in 1989 
explains why in Japan almost no sector has been able 
to expand its share in the world market. Increases in 
individual industries were moderate; some of them 
were in construction materials and in the chemical 
sector and only two in sophisticated industries. In the 
ten industries in which Japan gained market shares, 
the USA was confronted with losses in eight, Europe 
in seven. 
Large inroads for emerging economies 
The highest amount of other market shares of 
countries outside EU-Japan-USA is in textiles and 
wood processing, clothing apparel and tobacco. Their 
market shares in world exports increased from 35.4% 
to 42.0% - mainly driven by the dynamics of emerging 
Asian countries, which for example managed to raise 
their shares in office machinery (20.3% in 1989 to 
35.2% in 1996). 
The significant inroads of countries outside EU-Japan-
USA in market shares have to be put into perspective 
by also examining the dynamics of imports. In trade 
with the EU, these countries have a deficit of ECU 
135 billion. This implies that the success of new 
competitors may reduce employment opportunities in 
some European industries, but Europe is increasing its 
exports even faster, so that globalisation cannot easily 
be scorned as a source of net losses in employment. 
The only country group - disregarding Japan - that 
enjoys a surplus in trade with the EU, are the dynamic 
Asian countries, with which the EU's deficit in 1996 
amounted to ECU 7 billion. 
Fig 6.2: Abandoning markets with comparative 
disadvantages (ten industries with lowest RCA values) 
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Source: COMPET, DEBA; WIFO calculations. 
2. Competition in quality 
Rationale and measurement 
The more an economy is able to produce goods which 
are appreciated for their quality and for fulfilling 
specific needs, the larger the potential for further 
increases in living standards, and the smaller the 
overall exposure to low cost producers. A high wage 
area facing new competitors has to differentiate 
products and shift into higher priced segments or into 
less price sensitive industries. 62  CHAPTER 6 
The unit values of exports and imports will be 
compared to reveal whether the EU successfully 
specialises in higher valued market segments. Further 
disaggregation indicates for which exports the price or 
the quality defines the prime competitive edge. Finally, 
industries are classified according to their respective 
price elasticities and the importance of quality 
competition. Producing higher quality and increasing 
productivity may be alternative or complementary 
strategies. Both strategies imply creating more value 
for a given quantity. Productivity is usually thought of 
as the relation of a physical output to a measure of 
labour input (labour productivity) or to a weighted 
input of several quantitatively measured inputs (total 
factor productivity). One way to measure quality is to 
estimate the value created for the consumer by the 
consumption of one unit of a good. Thus productivity 
stresses the relation between a physical output and a 
Box 6.3: Unit values and their use 
The unit value is defined as nominal value divided into physical volume. Increasing unit values may either 
be due to rising demand or rising costs. But unit values also reflect changes in quality, shifts to higher 
product segments and to more specific value enhancing features. Therefore, unit value is often applied 
as an indicator in attempts to measure quality and vertical product differentiation. 
However, its use has been limited by the fact that high quality and high costs caused by less efficient 
techniques are difficult to disentangle. Aiginger (1997)
a shows that the unit value is near to a productivity 
measure, if the product is homogenous and the number of workers needed to produce one unit of output 
is relatively constant. But the unit value approaches a pure price or consumer valuation if the product or 
service is differentiated and the value is related to the input unit (counselling fee per hour, construction 
fee per square meter or per kilo cement). 
The hierarchy of unit values across industries also reflects the number of stages in processing. In some 
cases, it is of limited value, since there are industries in which the unit values are intrinsically higher than 
in others, while neither high tech, nor skilled labour, nor physical capital is involved. This holds for 
example for textile and apparel industries in which the unit values are high, since the weight in tons is 
low. The same holds for precious metals, where supply is scarce relative to demand. Therefore, jewellery, 
leather, furs, footwear and apparel are among the top Industries as far as the absolute unit value is 
concerned, without indicating for example the use of skilled labour or research. High tech or high skill 
industries - like aircraft and spacecraft, watches and clocks, TV and radio transmitters and instruments -
are also among the industries with the highest export unit values. In all these industries, unit values are 
much higher for processed goods and those made with large inputs of research and human capital, than 
for semi-finished goods, structural metals etc. At the bottom of a list ranking industries according to their 
unit values are industries at the early stages of processing, producing inputs for other industries, such 
as cement, bricks, coke oven products, petroleum, saw milling, or planing and impregnation of wood. At 
sectoral level, the ranking of unit values fits reasonably well into the notion of competition in product 
quality: the four sectors at the top of absolute unit values in the EU are four technically sophisticated 
industries: precision instruments, office machinery, TV and communication equipment and other 
transport equipment. The four sectors with the lowest export unit values are basic goods industries 
(refined petroleum, construction materials, basic metals, pulp and paper). 
Additionally, it has been shown that at national level, countries with higher incomes tend to export goods 
with high unit values and import those with low unit values. 
Comparing the hierarchy of industries according to both unit values and labour productivity reveals 
similarities and differences between the two concepts. The main coincidence lies in the high tech 
industries mentioned above, which enjoy high unit values and high labour productivity. Among the 
exceptions is the evaluation of medical instruments and other transport as industries with low labour 
productivity but high unit values. The second difference lies in the evaluation of capital- and energy-
intensive basic goods industries. Petroleum, paper and basic metals are highly ranked by labour 
productivity, but have low unit values. The third group consists of textiles and clothing industries, which 
have low labour productivity but intrinsically high unit values. 
a Aiginger, K., 'The use of unit values to discriminate between price and quality competition', Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 21, 1997, pp. 571-592. CHAPTER 6 I 63 
Table 6.4: Quality premium of EU exports over imports 1996 
Exports Imports Export unit Import unit Relative unit Higher export unit value 
value value value of EU 
1000 mill. ECU  ECU/kg  Number of 
Sectors Industries 
Total trade of EU 
EU trade vs. USA 
EU trade vs. Japan 
EU trade vs. "Other Countries" 
EU trade vs. DYNAS 
575.6 
104.1 
33.3 
438.3 
85.4 
452.0 
96.2 
51.4 
304.4 
91.5 
2.070 
2.736 
6.177 
1.869 
3.246 
1.492 
2.616 
12.245 
1.162 
3.820 
1.387 
1.046 
0.504 
1.609 
0.850 
17 
11 
11 
20 
17 
71 
49 
42 
77 
70 
Relative unit value = Unit value export/unit value import (=Quality premium) 
DYNAS: Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, China, South-Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong. 
Total number of sectors n=22; total number of industries n=95. 
Source: COMPET; WIFO calculations. 
physical input, while quality emphasises value per 
output. An increase in value added per employee, 
however, is a measure that should ideally include 
changes in values as well as productivity increases, in 
the sense defined above. It is interesting to see which 
component prevails: that of physical output to physical 
inputs or that of shifting to higher valued goods. 
Quality premium in total trade 
The export unit value of European manufacturing is 
40% higher than that of imports (see Table 6.4). 
Roughly half of this 'quality mark up' in European 
trade comes from specialisation in high unit value 
industries, and roughly half from higher unit values 
within the same industries. If exports had the same 
(quantitative) composition as imports, the unit values 
would still be 20% higher than that of aggregate 
imports. This 'within industry' premium of higher 
unit values in exports than imports applies to 18 sectors 
out of 22, and 71 industries out of 95. 
The industries in which Europe has higher unit values 
in exports than in imports can be broadly split into two 
groups. 
• Firstly, industries in which the EU is a net importer 
and low cost countries have positive specialisation. 
Consequently, the export unit values are much 
higher for the EU, since it concentrates only on the 
highest valued market segments. This group 
comprises leather clothes, textile weaving, as well 
as sports goods and furniture. 
• Secondly, technically sophisticated industries with 
differentiated products, in which Europe faces 
tough competition from suppliers in Japan and the 
USA. In most of these industries, the unit values of 
exports are higher than of imports, but due to 
competition within the industrialised counties, the 
ratio is lower than in the industries mentioned 
above. Examples are audio-visual apparatus, office 
machinery, and optical instruments. 
Unit values of European exports are lower than for 
imports in 24 industries. The largest are non-ferrous 
metals, saw milling, certain industries in the food 
sector, and also some electrical industries. Basic 
metals is the only sector in which import unit values 
are significantly higher. In the industries labelled 
other transports, a large negative margin between the 
export unit value and the import unit value declined 
considerably. 
Quality premium in trade with Japan and the USA 
Unit values are not available for Japanese and US 
exports, since some industries do not report quantities 
consistent with European data. The following analysis 
is therefore restricted to bilateral trade flows, taking 
the EU as the reporting country. 
European trade with the USA is approximately 
balanced. European exports to the USA are 7% higher 
than imports and the unit value of European exports is 
5% higher than that of the imports from the USA. 
These margins apply relatively evenly across industries 
and sectors. Significantly higher unit values, which 
are to the advantage of the EU, are given for the food 
sector, in which European exports exceed imports by 
57% and cover higher priced segments within 7 out of 
9 industries. Similar specialisation is revealed in the 64 I CHAPTER 6 
leather industries and in wood processing. Within the 
larger industries, the unit value is 46% higher in the 
vehicles industry. It is somewhat higher in the 
chemical sector and lower in the machinery sector. In 
several sophisticated industries, such as office 
machinery, electronic components and special purpose 
machinery, the EU exports goods at a lower unit value 
to the USA than it imports. Pharmaceuticals, aircraft 
and spacecraft are examples in which Europe has 
higher unit values. 
European exports to Japan cover only 65% of imports. 
The total trade deficit in manufacturing can be 
explained by the lower unit values of European 
exports. While the unit value of European imports is 
12.2 ECU/kg, its exports are priced at only 6.2 
ECU/kg. This significant effect does not stem from 
differences within industries - the numbers of sectors 
and industries with higher and lower unit values are 
roughly equal - but rather from Japan's concentration 
on higher valued goods (engineering and electronic 
industries), while the exports of labour and resource 
intensive industries are largely abandoned. In the 
vehicle industry, European exports are valued 70% 
higher in bilateral trade. In office machinery, the 
European unit value of exports is nearly four times 
higher than that of imports. Similar relations are 
evident in the apparel industry and TV and radio 
equipment. In resource based industries, Japan's trade 
is balanced, but focuses on higher priced segments. 
Surplus and quality versus other areas 
Europe's trade surplus stems from trade with countries 
outside the EU-Japan-USA-area: exports of ECU 440 
billion compared with imports of only ECU 300 
billion, resulting in a surplus larger than the total 
surplus. The unit values are lower than those for total 
trade on both sides, the export unit value is 1.9 
ECU/kg and the import value is only 1.2 ECU/kg. The 
quality premium amounts to 60%, and reflects 
differences both in endowments and in vertical product 
differentiation. Large differences are exhibited within 
the 'other countries'. While the unit values of exports 
in the EU's trade with Central and Eastern European 
transition countries are much higher than for imports, 
they are slightly lower in trade with dynamic Asian 
economies. As with trade with Japan, this stems 
mainly from the high specialisation of the dynamic 
Asian countries in the engineering and electronic 
industries. However, there is a difference between 
Japan and the other dynamic Asian countries insofar 
as the latter produce at lower prices (two thirds of the 
exports from these countries are lower valued than 
European exports). This pattern reflects the strategic 
focus of domestic as well as multinational enterprises 
(partly Japanese and European) on labour intensive 
production processes within technically sophisticated 
and dynamically growing industries. This strategy 
permits the dynamic Asian countries to benefit 
simultaneously from a powerful combination of 
general locational advantages (low wages) on the one 
hand, and firm specific advantages (based on 
technological knowledge) on the other. 
The major findings may be summarised as follows: the 
total European trade surplus originates in a general 
quality mark up and this quality mark up stems from 
trade with countries other than Japan and the USA. 
Competition within the industrialised countries is an 
important benchmark, specifically for the high valued 
segment of the market, which may provide a valuable 
early indication of future developments in quality 
competition. But in quantitative terms, the largest part 
of total European trade flows stems from the exchange 
of goods with countries other than Japan and the USA. 
To give a few examples: of the total exports from the 
EU, only 18% go to the USA and 6% to Japan. 10.1% 
of the EU's exports go to the Central and Eastern 
European transition economies and 14.5% to the 
dynamic Asian countries. The respective shares as 
source of the EU's imports are 8.2% and 16.9%. Two 
western European countries, which are not members of 
the Union (Switzerland and Norway), account for a 
larger part of the EU's total trade than Japan. 
However, these figures should not downplay the 
importance of the competitive performance between 
the EU, Japan and the USA, especially since all of 
them also compete for export shares in other markets. 
Four segments of competition according to 
quality and price 
Information regarding relative prices and physical 
quantities traded is used to reveal whether the EU 
trades more in industries with a high price elasticity or 
in industries in which competition in quality 
dominates. Other things being equal, demand is 
negatively related to price. Consequently, this implies 
that if an economy is able to sell products at higher 
unit values and, nevertheless, enjoys an export surplus, 
there is a supply of higher quality within the same 
industry. In the following analysis, this rationale is used 
to assess the quality position of the EU and to rank 
industries according to their respective price elasticities. 
• Successful quality competition: In 36 industries, the 
EU is a net exporter in quantity, despite higher unit 
values. This sector contains mainly technically CHAPTER 6 I 65 
demanding engineering industries. The largest 
surplus occurs in other special purpose machinery 
and in motor vehicles; considerable surpluses also 
occur in pharmaceuticals, machinery for 
producing mechanical power as well as air- and 
spacecraft. The total surplus generated in this 
market segment is ECU 161 billion. 51% of total 
European exports originate in this segment. The 
common surplus is larger than in total trade. 
• Structural problem area: Another segment, in 
which prices and net quantities have the same sign, 
is labelled 'structural problem area', since the EU 
exhibits both a deficit in trade and lower unit 
values. This group contains only 7 industries. 
Other apparel is creating the largest deficit, 
followed by basic precious and non-ferrous metals. 
Electronic components, fish and fish products, saw 
milling, planing and impregnation of wood, man-
made fibres and the processing of nuclear fuel are 
the other industries in which unit values are high, 
but quantities exported are smaller than those 
imported. Imports are worth ECU 83 billion (18% 
of total imports), and the trade deficit amounts to 
ECU 46 billion. 
• Gap in price competitiveness: The EU suffers a 
trade deficit in terms of physical quantities in 35 
industries, while its unit values are higher in 
exports than in imports. Basic chemicals, 
petroleum products, pulp and paper, textile 
weaving and furniture belong to this segment. The 
single largest deficit occurs in the office machinery 
and computer industry, where the EU has a deficit 
in the low and medium ranged quality segments. 
The EU exports only in the higher valued niches of 
the market. As a consequence, the unit value of 
exports is 50% above that of imports, although in 
physical quantities exports are low. The total group 
of industries in which unit values are higher in 
European exports than in imports, but the 
quantities sold are lower, comprises imports of 
ECU 174 billion. Taken together, the overall trade 
deficit only amounts to ECU 27 billion. 
• Successful price competition: In this group, the EU 
has lower prices (in terms of the ratio of unit values 
in export to imports) and simultaneously enjoys a 
trade surplus when measured in physical 
quantities. This segment comprises 17 rather small 
industries, ranging from other chemicals or 
machine tools to detergents. The exports of all 
industries together generate ECU 98 billion or 
17% of total exports. The trade surplus is ECU 35 
billion, which is considerably below the ECU 161 
billion in the segment of successful quality 
competition. 
Fig 6.3: Trade balances by quality segments 
(ECU billion, 1996) 
EU vs. world 
200 
150 
100 
50 
0 
35 
EU vs. Japan 
4.4 
EU vs. USA 
competition 
-1Ί.7 
Structural 
problem area 
Source: COMEXT; WIFO calculations. 
Table 6.5: Trade balance in different market 
segments 1996 
EU vs. Successful quality Successful price Deficit in price Structural 
competition competition competition problem area 
Quantity surplus, Quantity surplus, Quantity deficit Quantity deficit 
higher export price lower export price higher export price lower export price 
World 
Japan 
USA 
36 industries, e.g. 
Motor vehicles 
Machinery 
Air-, spacecraft 
17 industries, e.g. 
Apparel 
Luggage, bags 
Textile weaving 
14 industries, e.g. 
Vehicles 
Beverages 
17 industries, e.g. 
Other chemical 
products 
40 industries, e.g. 
Basic chemicals 
Beverages 
Meat 
35 industries, e.g. 
Special machinery 
35 industries, e.g. 
Basic chemicals 
Petroleum products 
25 industries, e.g. 
Motor vehicles 
Pharma 
Computer 
35 industries, e.g. 
Air-, spacecraft 
Basic chemicals 
7 industries, e.g. 
Electronic components 
Wearing apparel 
Non-ferrous metals 
13 industries, e.g. 
Special machinery 
Machinery 
Optical instruments 
J / industries, e.g. 
Computer 
Source: COMEXT; WIFO calculations. 
To sum up the results in a nutshell: The industries in 
which total EU trade is revealed to be price elastic on 
the one hand, and those in which it depends more on 
quality on the other, arc approximately equal. In 52 
industries, relative prices have the opposite sign to the 
physical quantities traded and can be labelled as the 
price elastic segment. 66  CHAPTER 6 
In 43 industries they have the same sign, revealing a 
considerable degree of quality competition. Total 
trade flow is larger in the quality dominated group 
(exports: ECU 330 billion; imports: ECU 215 billion), 
where the European trade surplus is generated. In the 
particularly price elastic industries, exports of ECU 
245 billion were only slightly above the imports of 
ECU 237 billion in 1996. 
This disaggregation reveals a rather favourable story 
on European external performance: the EU enjoys a 
trade surplus. This is largely generated by industries 
in which it enjoys a quantity surplus despite higher 
unit values, providing a rather clear indication that 
superior quality is the most important instrument for 
creating a competitive advantage. Lower prices 
generate a small additional surplus. A gap in price 
competitiveness occurs in several industries, but does 
not result in a large trade deficit. The structural 
problem area is very low. 
Bilateral trade with Japan and the USA 
European trade with Japan is dominated by cost 
advantages in Japan: in 40 industries, unit values are 
lower, and quantities exported are higher, generating a 
Japanese trade surplus of ECU 22 billion. There are 
also 25 industries in which Europe produces cheaper 
goods, but the resulting surplus is low. The same 
applies to the 17 industries with successful quality 
competition (some of them in the textiles sector). 
Taken with the earlier results on the high degree of 
specialisation in Japanese exports, the following 
picture emerges: Japan concentrates on high unit value 
industries, and uses rather low prices (or placement in 
the middle quality segments) to gain large surpluses 
in trade. However, imports remain low even when 
price advantages are missing or Europe offers 
superior quality as measured by unit values. 
Bilateral trade with the USA indicates that price 
competition is neither creating the large surpluses, nor 
is it the source of major sectoral deficits. Europe has 
a gap in price competitiveness in 35 industries, 
resulting in a total deficit of only ECU 3.5 billion. 
Revealed price advantage in another 35 industries 
provides a surplus of ECU 9 billion. Larger trade 
imbalances in particular industries result from 
specialisation and non-price determinants. The 
segment in which Europe provides higher quality and 
enjoys a surplus in quantities comprises 14 industries 
resulting in a surplus of ECU 17 billion. Motor 
vehicles and beverages are the main industries in this 
segment. The segment in which European goods have 
lower unit values, but in which the trade balance is 
nevertheless negative, contributes a deficit of ECU 15 
billion. Office machinery and computers are the major 
source. The overall results indicate that technological 
advantages and successful placement in quality 
segments tend to be more important determinants of 
trade between the USA and the EU than prices and 
costs. 
Quality as a general industry characteristic 
So far, exports from the EU to the world, and then the 
bilateral flows in trade with Japan and the USA, have 
been classified according to the relation between 
prices and net quantities. The four segments classified 
modes of competition, allowing an industry to be 
divided into different segments for different countries 
or trade flows. 
In this section, the positive or negative signs revealed 
by the trade flows of many countries are used to 
classify industries as typically price elastic or quality 
dependent, respectively. The larger the number of 
opposite signs in all observed trade relations is, the 
greater the price elasticity should be. The higher the 
number of identical signs in trade flows (higher prices 
coinciding with higher quantities and vice versa), the 
higher the probability of quality as a dominant 
determinant of performance. This ranking of the 
revealed importance of quality as an industry 
characteristic complements the more direct 
quantitative estimation of price elasticities (see Box 
6.4) i. 
This exercise can be performed in many variations, of 
which three have been chosen. For all three, the shares 
of bilateral trade flows in which relative prices and net 
quantities had the opposite sign (price elastic flows) 
and in which they had the same sign (non price elastic 
flows) were calculated. Finally, the industries were 
ranked according to the number of identical signs, 
obtaining, in this way, an indicator of the importance 
of non price elements. 
The method was developed in Aiginger, K., 'The use of unit 
values to discriminate between price and quality 
competition', Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 21, 
1997, pp. 571-592. CHAPTER 6 I 67 
Box 6.4: Measuring price elasticities according to the Cambridge E3ME model
3 
Measuring the response of demand to price changes is a topic which is as important as it is complex. If 
demand changes dramatically in reaction to even minor price changes, goods are labelled as price elastic 
and firms use price as their main instrument to gain a competitive advantage. Costs become the crucial 
constraint for management since low costs are needed to undercut prices and no firm can produce at 
average cost higher than price in the long run. 
If the product is horizontally or vertically differentiated, different specifications, locations, qualities 
become important and price elasticity is reduced. Specifically high wage countries have to shift to 
industries in which they either have a technological advantage or produce superior quality. We used unit 
values and the resulting quantity response to discriminate between segments in which prices and quality 
are the decisive determinant of success. 
An alternative approach is to measure the price responsiveness with time series on prices and quantities. 
This approach yields a quantitative measure of the price elasticity, if the data sets are reliable and if the 
data include information about all the other determinants of supply and those of demand. If these are 
available an economic model can be estimated, which provides information about the price elasticity. If 
the model is sufficiently disaggregated, the price elasticity of imports and exports for different sectors 
and specific regions can be estimated. 
The econometric model of Cambridge Econometrics includes 13 sectors within manufacturing, which 
roughly coincide with the NACE unrevised classification. Exports and imports are available for all EL) 
countries with the exception of Sweden, so that a regional breakdown is possible allowing estimated 
elasticities for trade flows to differ across more or less developed areas. Demand is assumed to depend on 
technology and price and the relation is log-linear, giving elasticities which can be easily interpreted. 
Limits of the analysis using trade equations alone come from the fact that partial analysis is used, that 
price and output data may not reflect pure changes in quantities and prices properly and that there may 
be omitted variables and structural breaks in the time series. Techniques available in econometrics are 
applied to minimise the danger of mis-specification and errors in data. 
The study shows that: 
• All price elasticities are relatively low, the largest export elasticities amount to 0.6, meaning that a 1% 
change in prices results in a 0.6% change of quantity. Average elasticities are around 0.4. 
•  Import price elasticities tend to be higher than export price elasticities. This fits with the finding that 
EU exports are sold to a larger extent on markets in which quality is more important, but imports are 
of lower quality-type goods and therefore to a higher degree price dependent. 
Export price elasticities are lower for the North than for the South, for the core than for the periphery 
and for members of the European Monetary Union than for the non-Member Countries. Import 
elasticities on the other hand are approximately equal across the regions. As regards individual 
countries, import elasticities are relatively high for Greece and the UK, implying a greater threat of 
competition from low cost countries. 
At industry level, the computer industry and transport equipment are price elastic while chemicals and 
plastics are not. While the latter finding is in line with the information from the qualitative method using 
unit values, the assessment for office machinery and transport is not in line with the findings by the 
calculation of price elasticities. This hints at the possibility that in heterogeneous industries with rapid 
technological change, the influence of prices and quality is particularly difficult to disentangle and 
econometrics and methods to detect vertical product differentiation are complementary. 
The study was commissioned by WIFO and performed by Cambridge Econometrics: Gardiner, B., Analysis of 
EU trade-price elasticities by sector and country, Cambridge, 1998 68 I CHAPTER 6 
• Quality indicator 1 : Using the EU as the reporting 
country, the flows vis-à-vis individual countries 
for all 6-digit industries (n * k flows, if n is the 
number of trading partners and k the number of 6-
digits within an industry) were calculated. This 
indicator mirrors the assumption that the EU is one 
entity and supplies different geographical and 
product markets (double differentiation). 
• Quality indicator 2: Using the individual member 
countries as reporters and total exports in each of 
the other 6-digit industries provides a second 
indicator. This indicator assumes that each country 
is one entity that exports to one geographical 
market (all partners), but in different product 
markets (r * k, with r as the number of EU 
countries) (product differentiation). 
• Quality indicator 3: Using the individual member 
countries as reporters and all other countries as 
different markets, but confining the analysis to the 
3-digit level, provides a third indicator. This 
indicator assumes that each country is an entity 
exporting to different geographical markets, but 
without product heterogeneity within the industry 
(geographical differentiation). 
Many more possible choices exist, and none of them 
is an exact replica of the industrial organisation model 
with firms supplying well defined markets in 
geographical as well as product space. However, each 
of the chosen indicators contributes some valuable 
information about specific market characteristics. 
Together with other indicators of product 
differentiation and expenditures on advertising, they 
help us to understand the structure of markets and the 
respective importance of prices versus quality as 
determinants of the competitive process. 
The ranking according to relative shares of positive 
signs in the quality indicators 1, 2 and 3 has been used 
to sort industries into three distinct groups, namely 
quality competition, medium price elastic industries 
and highly price elastic industries (allocating one 
third of the industries to each group). Overall, the 
rankings produced rather similar results. 
The EU has its highest market shares in industries 
characterised by quality competition according to all 
indicators (see Table 6.6). The market shares of the 
price elastic industries are especially low for quality 
indicator 1. Under the assumption that each member 
country is one individual entity, it is revealed that 
several European countries compete as well in price 
elastic industries. 
US market shares are above average in medium price 
elastic goods, while Japan has a split between 
industries with high emphasis on quality and those 
with high price elasticity. 
3. Further disaggregations 
Inter- vs. intra-industry trade 
Rising economic development is expected to shift the 
predominant sources of industrial specialisation from 
inter-industry trade based on general factor 
endowments (for example in labour, physical capital or 
natural resources) to more differentiated intra-industry 
trade based on knowledge appropriation, marketing or 
other firm specific entrepreneurial skills. 
Table 6.6 : Shares in the world market according to 
revealed quality competition 
Quality indicator 1 
Quality indicator 2 
Quality indicator 3 
High 
Medium 
Low 
High 
Medium 
Low 
High 
Medium 
Low 
I 
1989 
32.78 
2334 
21.88 
30.06 
23.48 
28.21 
30.92 
24.71 
2321 
Variables are ranked in declining order of the criteria: 
High: one third of industries with highest ranks 
Medium: one third of industries with medium ranks 
Low one third of industries with lowest ranks 
Market share: Exports as a  percentage of world imports. 
ill 
1996 
33.62 
24.06 
19.03 
31.84 
22.66 
25.18 
30.34 
24.54 
2322 
Japan 
1989 
24.36 
10 67 
2271 
24.14 
16.81 
11.52 
24.68 
1932 
10.84 
1996 
16.93 
10 01 
1609 
17.20 
13.79 
895 
16.34 
15 69 
9.74 
1989 
22.93 
18 44 
17.73 
23 31 
1951 
1277 
1944 
24.18 
1756 
Quality indicator - Number of identical signs 
value and quantity 
01: EU vs. ι 
02: country 
03: country 
¡ountries, 6-digil level 
vs. world. 6-digit level 
vs. country, 3-digit level 
USA 
1996 
20.77 
19.07 
14.99 
21.33 
18.49 
12.76 
18 51 
21.41 
16 48 
in uni! 
Source: COMEXT, DEBA; WIFO calculations. 
Inter-industry trade amounts to 43%, intra-industry 
trade to 57% of the EU's trade with the world. This 
implies that, at the level of product groups, more than 
half of trade occurs within the same industry. Breaking 
down intra-industry trade further into the predominant 
mode of differentiation
2, 75% appears to be vertically 
differentiated, while only one quarter is categorised as 
horizontally differentiated. Within the vertically 
differentiated industries, the EU lies primarily in the 
higher valued market segments (34% of total trade is 
in the higher valued segment, 13% in the lower). 
In line with trade theory, more technically 
sophisticated industries are well represented among 
the industries with high intra-industry trade. Four of the 
ten industries with the greatest shares are engineering 
It has become a convention to use the criteria that the unit 
values of exports and imports do not differ by more than 
15% to indicate horizontal product differentiation, whereas 
larger differences reveal vertical product differentiation. CHAPTER 6  69 
industries; the largest are aircraft and spacecraft, 
precision instruments and medical equipment. 
Interestingly, horizontal differentiation dominates in 
each of these industries, against the general trend. 
Furthermore, within the vertically segmented markets, 
the EU is also present in the lower priced segments. 
The cement industry and basic chemicals are among 
the industries with large shares in intra-industry trade. 
Both are low growth and high energy-intensive 
industries, and cross border trade may occur. 
Among the industries with low intra-industry trade, 
food and beverages are represented more than 
proportionally; steam generators is the only 
engineering industry in which vertical product 
differentiation dominates, but even here the level is 
low in absolute terms. In comparison with Japan and 
the USA, the EU concentrates its exports in industries 
with relatively low shares of intra-industry trade. 
Applying the same split of industries (based on EU 
trade data), the USA and Japan have larger market 
shares in industries with high intra-industry trade and 
high degrees of product differentiation. 
Europe is not specialised in industries that typically 
have high intra-industry trade. Its market share is 
28.1% in this group and 29.6% in those industries in 
which inter-industry trade dominates (see Table 6.7). 
Japan has slightly higher shares in the first group, the 
USA have much higher market shares in the industries 
in which data show high intra-industry trade. 
Product differentiation 
In homogenous markets, all products are sold at a 
unique price. However, each statistical unit 
(specifically those on a 3-digit industry level) 
comprises a large number of products, some 
homogenous, some of them differentiated. The 
variance of unit values of exports summarises the 
variation of prices for the same product group, as well 
as the variation, which arises from mixing different 
products in one industry. In the following, three 
different measures of'heterogeneity are calculated: the 
standard deviation of the export unit value across EU 
countries (SDÌ); across the six-digit industries for EU 
exports (SD2); and finally the standard deviation over 
countries and products (SD3). The three indicators 
reflect different assumptions regarding the relevant 
markets. The first concept assumes implicitly that 
each European country is one economic unit, serving 
different regional markets. The second assumes that 
the EU is one firm serving different product markets, 
while the third implies separated products and 
geographical markets. The resulting indicators are 
positively correlated, but are far from identical. 
The first indicator stresses differences in price across 
regions. Jewellery and nuclear fuel have large 
standard deviations, according to all calculations, 
which across regions are less than their mean, while 
those across products are ten times larger. Other high 
standard deviations across markets occur in the 
electronic components industry, and for audio-visual 
apparatus. In the pharmaceuticals, aircraft and 
spacecraft, ships and boats, precision instruments and 
optical instruments industries, standard deviation 
across products is much higher than across markets. 
In the petroleum products, pulp and paper, iron and 
steel, bricks, and mineral products industries, all 
standard deviations are very low, even compared to 
the low unit values in these industries. Splitting 
exports according to product differentiation (SD3 in 
Table 6.6) shows that Europe and Japan enjoy the 
highest market shares in industries with medium 
product differentiation, while the USA is specialised 
in industries with high product differentiation. 
Table 6.7: Shares in the world market according to 
market characteristics 
Globalisation 
Market growth 
Productivity 
Wage level 
/nfraindustry 
trade 
Product 
differentiation 
High 
Medium 
Low 
High 
Medium 
Low 
High 
Medium 
Low 
High 
Medium 
Low 
High 
Medium 
Low 
High 
Medium 
Low 
1989 
25.3 
26.9 
36.2 
26.0 
27.7 
27.1 
29.6 
26.9 
21.2 
28.9 
28.1 
21.4 
29.0 
24.8 
27.0 
22.9 
31.7 
28.9 
EU 
1996 
24.7 
28.1 
36.5 
25.2 
27.5 
28.5 
31.2 
24.9 
20.4 
30.6 
25.2 
20.0 
28.1 
24.0 
28.6 
23.1 
32.0 
28.1 
Japan 
1989 
22.6 
17.7 
4.4 
23.7 
20.8 
11.7 
21.8 
22.2 
8.1 
21.0 
22.9 
9.7 
18.2 
21.6 
17.9 
19.1 
24.1 
8.4 
1996 
16.4 
14.1 
4.4 
17.1 
14.2 
10.8 
16.4 
17.6 
5.2 
16.9 
17.5 
4.7 
14.8 
15.2 
13.1 
14.8 
17.1 
6.2 
1989 
20.5 
19.0 
21.3 
23.7 
17.2 
20.9 
23.8 
20.3 
8.9 
24.1 
20.1 
8.9 
25.7 
19.0 
15.0 
23.3 
17.6 
16.2 
USA 
1996 
18.1 
19.3 
21.4 
20.9 
16.9 
18.6 
21.4 
20.5 
8.3 
22.4 
18.7 
8.9 
21.9 
17.7 
15.5 
19.8 
18.6 
15.3 
Industries are ranked ¡n declining order: high-medium-low (one third with highest, 
medium, lowest ranks) 
Globalisation: (imports + exports)/apparent consumption in the EU, Japan and the 
USA: extra-EU trade only. 
Market growth: growth of apparent consumption in the EU, Japan and the USA. 
Productivity, wage level: value added resp. wages per worker in the EU. 
/nrraindustry trade: share of intra industry trade (EU-world) 
Product differentiation: standard deviation across markets and products of EU 
export unit values. 
Source: COMEXT.DEBA; WIFO calculations. 
Performance in globalised industries 
By ranking of industries according to their exposure 
to international competition (calculated by the ratio of 
imports plus exports to apparent consumption) the 
following results, the following results emerse. 70 I CHAPTER 6 
Office machinery, watches, and medical equipment 
belong to the highest globalised industries, with ratios 
over 75%, whereas beverages and cement are 
examples of low levels of global competition, with 
ratios of less than 25%. In contrast to Japan and the 
USA, the EU is characterised by high shares in world 
markets in industries with low globalisation. In the 
USA, market shares are more evenly distributed, 
while Japanese manufacturing is concentrated intensely 
in highly and moderately globalised industries, with 
market shares three times those of industries with low 
levels of globalisation. 
Market growth, wage levels and productivity 
When market growth is defined as the annual growth 
of apparent consumption in the three areas EU-Japan-
USA, Japan and the USA enjoy their largest shares in 
the world market in high growth industries, the EU in 
low growth industries. Europe, as well as Japan, 
enjoys the largest surplus in medium growth industries, 
where the USA has its largest deficit. Taken together, 
the EU, Japan, and the USA are specialised in high 
growth industries, where annual growth of value 
added amounts to 4.3% and employment is relatively 
stable. 
4. Summary 
Overall, the analysis of unit values in trade proves to 
be a valuable complement to the measurement of 
productivity. Unit values highlight the role of quality 
within industries and downgrade distortions in the 
measurement of labour productivity. This applies for 
example with regard to capital intensive industries, 
where high productivity is usually measured because 
of data restrictions with regard to only one input 
factor. 
The EU specialises in more traditional industries, 
supplying high quality goods based on skilled and 
well-trained people. In many industries, the EU is a 
net exporter, despite higher prices. 
Three sectors - machinery, motor vehicles, and 
chemicals - contribute more than proportionally to the 
large and increasing trade surplus, but inroads are also 
being made in more traditional industries like food, or 
in high tech industries, such as aircraft and spacecraft 
and radio, TV and communication equipment. Europe 
creates its trade surplus by trading with countries 
other than Japan and the USA, where it enjoys a 
quality premium of about 60%. 
The EU enjoys its highest market share and largest 
trade surplus in medium wage industries. In high 
wage industries, the EU increased its share and has 
generated a considerable trade surplus. In contrast, 
the market shares in low wage industries are 
decreasing and the trade balance is marginally 
negative. The USA, as well as Japan, has much 
smaller market shares and larger trade deficits in the 
low wage industries. The US market share is 
decreasing in the high wage industries, and is stable in 
low wage industries. 
A final disaggregation according to productivity 
levels reveals that the EU increased slightly its 
specialisation in high productivity industries and has 
achieved a high and increasing trade surplus. The 
level of specialisation of the USA in this segment 
decreased, resulting in a larger trade deficit. Japan has 
the lowest market share in the low productivity 
segment and a trade deficit. 
The deficit in trade with Japan stems from the 
concentration of Japanese exports in products that 
exhibit high unit values. Japan has abandoned exports 
in low productivity industries, but maintains a large 
share of the domestic market. Japan keeps a large part 
of its competitive advantage through lower prices, but 
in high value industries. 
Trade with the USA is balanced both in value and in 
quantity. The USA seems to exploit competitive 
advantages to a lesser degree by trade, but shifts 
production earlier to other locations via foreign direct 
investment. Europe's trade with the USA does not 
rely on lower prices, but on mutual specialisation and 
competitive advantages in specific segments. 
Taken as one single entity, the EU enjoys its highest 
market shares in industries characterised by quality 
competition. However, individual Member States still 
hold large market shares in price elastic industries. CHAPTER 7 I 71 
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Industrial specialisation and performance 
The two preceding chapters explored the structural 
features of internal and external performance. In this 
chapter, both dimensions will be re-examined with a 
special focus on analytical criteria considered relevant 
to the strategic options of firms in the creation of 
specific competitive advantages. A particular purpose 
of this chapter is to apply a new and comprehensive 
typology of manufacturing industries based upon 
their typical patterns of factor input combinations and 
strategic investment. 
The economic rationale for the new typology is based 
upon the recent emphasis on irreversible investments 
or so called 'sunk costs' as a means of increasing 
differentiation and thereby moving away from pure 
cost competition. Sunk costs can either be 
exogenously determined by technology (involving 
investment in physical capital) or endogenously by 
the strategic decisions of firms to invest in intangible 
assets such as technological expertise or the creation 
of brands and goodwill'. The purpose of irreversible 
investment for example in advertising and research is 
to raise perceived quality and thus enhance the 
consumer's willingness to pay for a particular product, 
thereby also reducing its substitutability. 
The new typology categorises industries according to 
the traditional factor intensities of labour and capital 
and additionally takes into account the inputs spent on 
research and development as well as advertising. By 
the means of statistical cluster techniques applied to 
US input data, a complete and mutually exclusive 
classification covering all manufacturing industries 
was created. Analytically, the novel feature of this 
typology is the particular choice of variables, i.e. the 
combination of the traditional factors of labour and 
capital inputs, largely reflecting exogenously given 
technology, to the endogenous strategic investment in 
advertising and innovation. Technically, the use of 
statistical cluster analysis provides a number of 
advantages relative to traditional cut-off procedures, 
since it represents the statistical technique specifically 
designed for this purpose. 
1. Firm's strategies 
Discriminating industries according to the broad 
strategic options available to firms for creating 
competitive advantages, a new typology categorises 
them according to the traditional factor intensities of 
labour and capital, as well as the inputs spent on 
research and advertising. A residual fifth category, 
labelled mainstream, uses factor inputs in similar 
proportions to total manufacturing (see Box 7.1 ). 
In principle, objections could be raised to the 
classification into the four chosen dimensions. 
Industries always exhibit combinations of some or all 
these variables. In particular, the combination of high 
expenditures on research as well as advertising came 
to prominence in a similar typology by Davies-Lyons 
(1996)
2. One rationale is that advertising is often 
modelled as a complementary activity to research and 
development in order to provide consumers with 
information when a new product is introduced to the 
market. This story applies easily to industries such as 
pharmaceuticals and optical instruments, which fall 
under the heading of research intensive industries as 
well as to detergents, games and toys or publishing, 
which are classified here as advertising intensive 
industries. 
Nevertheless, the reliance on two or more distinct 
inputs is not unique to advertising and research but 
also applies equally well to the other factor inputs. For 
example research intensive industries repeatedly go 
along with high capital investment. Many of the 
advertising intensive industries simultaneously rely 
strongly on labour inputs. Actually, the cluster 
algorithm showed the latter two combinations of 
industries to be closer than advertising and research 
intensive industries are. Finally, no pronounced 
Sutton, J.. Sunk Costs and Market Structure. MIT Press, 
Cambridce. MA. 1991. 
Davies. S.. Lyons, Β., et al.. 'Industrial Organisation in the 
European Union'. Structure. Strategy, and the Competitive 
Mechanism, Oxford University Press. Oxford. 1996. 72  CHAPTER 7 
combination of input factors emerged in the clustering 
process, supporting the view that each input variable 
spans a linearly independent dimension of its own. 
The following section briefly characterises the types 
of industries. 
Particularly labour intensive industries 
One quarter of manufacturing industries has been 
labelled as particularly labour intensive. Their share in 
total employment of the EU, Japan and the USA 
amounts to 22.1 %, contrasted by a much lower share 
in total value added of 14.6% (see Table 7.1). Only 
10.2% of the common manufacturing exports originate 
in this group, compared to 15.6% of total imports. 
Typical examples include textiles and clothing, 
construction materials, wood-, and metal processing. 
Production techniques typically show low degrees of 
complexity and can rather easily be adopted in 
locations less endowed with manufacturing skills. 
Low wage countries may therefore enjoy substantial 
comparative advantages based on labour costs. The 
modest technological and organisational requirements 
limit the opportunities for individual enterprises to 
create specific competitive advantages. In economic 
areas characterised by high wages, substitution of 
labour is the logical consequence. Increasing degrees 
of mechanisation are typical for example in industries 
such as textiles, wood and metal processing. 
A second means of restructuring, which is particularly 
important in, for example, the clothing industries, is 
outward processing. While parts of production 
migrate into low wage areas, corporate control and 
higher valued activities can be maintained in the 
home location. 
Finally, suppliers of construction material, for 
example, build specific advantages around local 
user-supplier relationships, benefiting from high 
transportation costs, which arise from the high 
physical weight of their products relative to economic 
value. 
Particularly capital intensive industries 
In this subgroup only 9.9% of total manufacturing 
employment in the three economic areas produces 
13.4% of its value added. Economies of scale support 
specialisation and enhance trade flows, such that this 
group accounts for about 17% of both total exports 
and imports. Typical examples are pulp and paper, 
refined petroleum, basic chemicals and iron and steel. 
These capital-intensive industries produce basic 
intermediate goods, which are supplied to other 
downstream industries. Products are typically highly 
homogeneous and of a commodity-like nature. 
Dependent on the demand of downstream 
manufacturing, these industries are highly exposed to 
fluctuations in the business cycle. As a consequence 
of large scale and the substantial element of sunk 
investment in physical capital, fluctuations in 
commodity prices and profits are further aggravated 
by sticky capacities. 
Lacking opportunities for product differentiation, 
strategic options for individual firms most commonly 
include (i) a continuous process of reengineering and 
cost cutting, (ii) forward integration into related 
business activities or (iii) participation in joint 
ventures, mergers and take-overs, to create economies 
of scale and enhance strategic position as major 
player in the market place. 
Mainstream manufacturing 
Mainstream manufacturing is a residual category of 
25 industries, in which input combinations did not 
show a pronounced reliance on any particular factor. 
This group accounts for about one quarter of 
manufacturing value added, employment and exports, 
but only for 15.8% of imports, when the EU, Japan 
and the USA are taken together. Typical examples are 
paper articles, plastic products, electronic equipment, 
motorcycles and machinery. 
Although in the typical mainstream manufacturing 
industry production is more complex than in simple 
labour intensive industries, the processes involved are 
usually based on traditional technological regimes, 
mostly founded in electro-mechanical engineering. 
A typical example is the machinery sector, which falls 
almost entirely into this group. Firm specific 
advantages are primarily based on bespoke 
developments for specific customer needs. The 
importance of complementary services such as 
planning, maintenance and training is increasing. A 
technically skilled workforce and the innovative 
upgrading of traditional technology with applications 
of, for example, new ICTs is essential. Close ties to 
downstream industries are of great importance. Thus, 
together with the demand for skilled labour, 
geographic proximity and cluster formation 
contribute to specific locational advantages. CHAPTER 7 I 73 
Box 7.1: Factor inputs and strategic investment: the WIFO typology 
The new WIFO classification groups individual industries according to their typical combinations of factor inputs, 
in order to reveal information about differences across industries with regard to the dominant modes of creating 
competitive advantage in specific marketplaces. In particular, the typology is directed towards distinction 
between (i) exogenously given competitive advantages based on factor endowments and (ii) endogenously created 
advantages based on strategic investment in intangible assets such as marketing and innovation. The new 
classification is based on EUROSTAT's revised NACE classification at the 3-digit level. For more details see 
Peneder (1998)
a. 
Data and the choice of variables 
The clustering process is based on the following four variables, which are designed to span four orthogonal 
dimensions of how to spend available units of productive inputs: 
• wages and salaries 
• physical capital 
• advertising 
• research and development 
Ratios to total value added have been calculated for wages and physical capital. Expenditures on advertising 
and R&D are represented by their ratios to total sales. The latter are derived directly from balance sheet data. 
All four variables have been used in their standardised form, i.e. transformed by calculating the difference to 
the mean divided by the standard deviation of the variables. Data sources are DEBA (labour and capital inputs) 
and COMPUSTAT (advertising and R&D). Since all four dimensions of input data were available only for the USA, the 
clustering process is exclusively based on US-data. Correlations between the four variables are low or non-existent. 
Statistical clustering 
Cluster analysis classifies individual observations, depending on their relative similarity or nearness to an array 
of different variables. The basic idea is one of dividing a specific data profile into segments by creating 
maximum homogeneity within and maximum distance between groups. For the current analysis one hundred 
NACE 3-digit manufacturing industries are taken as observations, while the four factor inputs given above 
determined the discriminating variables. 
A two step procedure was applied. In the first step, a non-hierarchical optimisation cluster technique, based 
on the iterative minimisation of within group dispersion, was used to provide a more aggregate picture of typical 
input combinations. For the necessary choice of a predetermined number of clusters, the following self-binding 
rule of thumb was used: "Choose the lowest number g that maximises the quantity of individual clusters which 
include more than 5% of the observed cases." (Peneder, 1995, p. 297)b. The outcome was g = 32 clusters, 
of which 9 comprise more than 5% of total observations. 
In a second step, the 32 clusters from the first partition were taken as individual observations on which a 
hierarchical clustering algorithm was applied. This implies that no predefined number of clusters is required. 
Relative distances are measured, specifically focusing on similarities in patterns instead of size. In the 
following iterative process, clusters are formed according to the average linkage between groups, which 
aggregates the distances of all single pairs between an observation outside and each observation inside the 
cluster. 
The final solution of the hierarchical clustering algorithm groups all observations into four categories, each one 
related to particularly high values in one of the four dimensions. After applying several variations on both (i) 
the measures for distance/similarity and (ii) the clustering algorithm itself no successful alternative partition 
to this solution emerged. Finally, a number of Industries which had no particularly pronounced reliance on any 
of the input variables were placed in a residual category called 'mainstream' manufacturing. This more or less 
represents the input combination of a 'typical' 3-digit manufacturing industry. 
The typology 
Finally, precisely 100 NACE 3-digit manufacturing industries have been completely categorised under the 
following five mutually exclusive groupings of mainstream manufacturing, particularly labour-, capital-, 
advertising- and research intensive industries. 
Like any broad classification, this new typology must be interpreted with care, since industries within these five 
categories are still heterogeneous and exhibit combinations of some or all these variables. 
a Peneder, M., Mapping Structural Development: A New Typology of Industries Based on Labour, Capital, Advertising and 
R&D Inputs, WIFO, 1998, mimeo. 
Peneder, M., 'Cluster Techniques as a Method to Analyse Industrial Competitiveness', lAER-lnternational Advances in 
Economic Research, Vol. I, No 3, August 1995, pp. 295-303. 74 I CHAPTER 7 
Table 7.1: Shares in manufacturing: EU-Japan-USA 
1996 In % 
Labour intensive 
Capita! intensive 
Advertising intensive 
Research intensive 
Mainstream manufacturing 
Tota! manufacturing 
Value added 
14.6 
13.4 
22.2 
25.3 
24.5 
100.0 
Employment 
22.1 
9.9 
22.1 
18.6 
27.3 
100.0 
Exports 
10.2 
16.9 
10.0 
38.8 
24.1 
100.0 
Imports 
15.6 
17.5 
14.1 
37.0 
15.8 
100.0 
Source: DEBA, COMPET; WIFO calculations. 
Particularly advertising intensive industries 
This group comprises 23 industries, which together 
account for about 22% of total employment and value 
added in the three areas. This is in sharp contrast to 
the low shares in trade, where only 10.0% of total 
exports and 14.1% of total imports are generated. The 
low share of traded goods indicates the high importance 
of both local production on the one hand, and 
multinational investment on the other. 
The most typical example is the food sector, which 
belongs entirely to this category. In addition, 
detergents and perfumes, as well as sports goods, 
musical instruments and games and toys, largely 
associated with leisure time and entertainment, fall 
into this category of fast moving consumer markets. 
Industries are often dualistic, with high quality brands 
on the one hand, and lower-priced, unbranded 
products on the other. 
Strikingly characteristic of many of these industries 
are the easy shifts in consumer tastes. New products 
and temporary fashions often induce changes in 
preferences. Brand creation is a strategic means of 
differentiating products and thus reducing their 
substitutability. This leads to a reduction in a firm's 
exposure to pure cost competition. In addition, 
advertising stabilises the preferences of consumers. 
One particular strategy is to build up integrated 
product lines under common brands, generating 
economies of scope between related products from 
the sharing of advertising outlays. Thus, successful 
brand names provide specific advantages to firms and 
consequently support growth strategies based on 
diversification as well as multinational activity. 
Besides the aspect of differentiation, strategic 
interdependence between producers and distributors 
is one of the most important competitive challenges, 
increasingly requiring professional distribution 
management. Rising concentration in distribution 
channels is being experienced in many of these areas. 
The creation of brands and their support through 
continuous advertising is one way of reducing the 
producer's dependence on the retail sector. This is 
particularly applicable to large, primarily multinational 
enterprises, which are able to raise the necessary 
financial resources. In contrast, for small and medium 
sized 'no name' producers, or even for firms 
successfully marketing local brands, the strategic 
disadvantage tends to encourage joint ventures, 
mergers and take-overs, as efforts to counterbalance 
high concentration rates in the distribution networks. 
Particularly research intensive industries 
This grouping comprises 14 industries, which together 
account for 25.3% of total value added and 18.6% of 
total employment in the three areas. Reflecting high 
economies of scale, product differentiation and 
specialisation, research intensive goods are more 
highly traded than any other category. Their share in 
total exports and imports amounts to an outstanding 
38.8% and 37.0%, respectively. Industries typically 
belong to one of three distinct technology fields: (i) 
chemicals and biotechnology; (ii) information and 
communication and (iii) transportation vehicles. 
The nature of technological competition is highly 
complex and R&D efforts are a particularly risky sort 
of investment. Even when inventions are successfully 
managed in terms of technology, economic benefits 
are uncertain, due to their extreme dependence upon 
the speed and timeliness of their introduction to the 
market. Compensating for the higher risks, the 
possibility to top vertically differentiated markets 
induces investment in R&D through the bright 
prospects for higher profits. Similar to brand creation, 
successful innovation is a strong motivation for 
multinational investment. 
A wide range of market failures surrounds the 
production and dissemination of knowledge. Probably 
the most serious problem concerns appropriability, 
since the knowledge created by innovators is exposed 
to imitation and diffusion by its competitors. Basically, 
"a public good like knowledge remains in circulation 
no matter how many people consume it, and this 
undermines any attempt to create an artificial market" 
(Geroski, 1995, p.92)
3. The consequences threaten to 
undermine the proper incentives to invest in R&D. 
Geroski, P., 'Markets for technology: knowledge, 
innovation and appropriability', in Stoneman, P. (ed.), 
Handbook of the economics of innovation and 
technological change, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1995. CHAPTER 7 I 75 
With regard to specific strategic challenges, two 
major themes arise: Firstly, the management of 
knowledge creation is a highly demanding 
organisational task, requiring a balance between 
efficient and speedy processes, while simultaneously 
providing room for the creative interplay of 
unexpected ideas. Secondly, the management of 
knowledge appropriation involves a number of 
instruments, including legal protection through 
patents or secrecy. Given imperfect knowledge 
foreclosure, it is essential that the strategy strives for 
lead-time and generates benefits from cumulative 
learning processes. For this purpose, the successful 
marketing of new products is an important 
complement to R&D. 
2. Contributions to overall economic 
performance 
In the preceding section, some major qualitative 
characteristics of the new industry groupings were 
singled out according to different strategic options for 
the creation of firm specific advantages. This section 
offers a quantitative investigation of apparent 
differences in terms of productivity, wage levels, unit 
values and growth across industry types. 
Productivity and wages 
The productivity of any single input factor strongly 
depends on the amount of complementary inputs to 
production. Thus, for example, high amounts of 
physical capital, installed to support pure labour in 
production, necessarily implies higher value added 
per employee. The same rationale extends to other 
(intangible) inputs as well. The underlying hypothesis 
therefore states that labour productivity is higher in 
industries where pure labour is complemented by 
other inputs such as physical capital, research, 
advertising or skills. 
Fig 7.1: Average labour productivity: EU-Japan-
USA, 1996 In 1000 ECU 
Labour intensive 
Mainstream 
Total manufacturing 
Advertising intensive 
Capital intensive 
Research intensive 
20  40  60  80  100 
Source: DEBA; WIFO calculations. 
Based on a cumulative ranking of the EU, Japan and 
the USA according to the level of labour productivity, 
research- and capital intensive industries emerge 
highest, followed by advertising intensive industries 
(see Fig. 7.1). In all of them, the value of pure labour 
is augmented by the respective complementary inputs. 
Reflecting the high skills of trained workers, labour 
productivity in mainstream manufacturing is still 
higher than in labour intensive industries. 
Wage levels are assumed to correspond with labour 
productivity. With the exception of advertising 
industries, where the overall wage level is lower than 
in the mainstream manufacturing industries, the same 
ranking applies as above (see Fig. 7.2). 
Fig 7.2: Average wages and salaries: EU-Japan-
USA, 1996 In 1000 ECU 
- Labour intensive 
• 
advertising intensive 
Mainstream 
Total manufacturing 
■ 
Research intensive 
• 
Capital intensive 
1 
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Source: DEBA; WIFO calculations. 
Unit values and vertical differentiation 
As with productivity (measured in nominal terms), 
unit values reflect the valuation of goods and services 
by consumers and are therefore directly linked to the 
potential for quality competition and vertical 
differentiation. Again as with productivity, unit values 
are not a pure and undistorted measure. The more 76  CHAPTER 7 
processing stages are' involved, the more value is 
added relative to the pure volume of the initial 
physical material inputs. Therefore, the number of 
processing stages involved in production blurs the 
interpretation. 
Looking at aggregated unit values across the five 
industry types in European trade, exports and imports 
are ranked identically (see Fig. 7.3). Thanks to ample 
opportunities for vertical differentiation, research 
intensive industries show by far the highest unit 
values. Mainstream manufacturing with its large share 
in the skill-dependent and development-oriented 
machinery sector comes in second, followed by 
labour-, advertising- and finally capital intensive 
industries. The latter clearly reflects an early stage in 
the production chain and its accordingly high weight 
of raw materials. 
Fig 7.3: Unit values in EU trade, 1996 
In ECU per kg 
Capital intensive 
Advertising 
intensive 
Total 
manufacturing 
Labour intensive 
Mainstream 
Research intensive 
ï 
E
3 
1 
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1 
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1 
10  15  20  25 
Source: COMPET; WIFO calculations. 
Since advertising entered the analysis precisely 
because of its presumed ability to raise perceived 
quality, the low ranking of advertising intensive 
industries may come as a surprise. Although mostly 
directed towards final consumers, the explanation is 
in part analogous to the case of capital intensive 
industries, due to lacking depth in the value added 
chain and the relatively high importance of initial 
material inputs, for example in the food sector. 
Another explanation is linked to the presumed 
horizontal nature of product differentiation within this 
group of advertising industries. 
Fig 7.4: Standard deviation of unit values in the 
EU, 1996 
Capital intensive 
Mainstream 
Advertising 
intensive 
Labour intensive 
Total 
manufacturing 
Research intensive 
] 
—J 
1 
1 
ι 
1 1 1 1 1 ι 1 
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Source: COMEXT; WIFO calculations. 
The puzzling feature is that individual consumers may 
experience a sort of vertical differentiation, since 
advertising tends to raise consumer willingness to pay 
via perceived quality. Nevertheless, the same does not 
apply to aggregate markets, in which different 
consumers have distinct valuations for the 
differentiated attributes. Thus, at the industry level, 
competing brands within this group are best 
interpreted as varieties, for which quality is not strictly 
comparable on a single vertical scale and therefore 
goods are horizontally differentiated. Finally, average 
unit values may be dampened by the dualistic nature 
of advertising intensive industries, where high quality 
brands often coexist with low priced unbranded 
products. 
A number of different methods can be used to 
measure the degree of vertical product differentiation. 
Comparing standard deviations of unit values in 
European trade, vertical differentiation is almost 
entirely absorbed by the group of research intensive 
industries, for which the dispersion of unit values is 
consistently high and far above the four other 
groupings (see Fig. 7.4). This result also corresponds 
to the calculations of Grubel-Lloyd indices applied at 
the 6-digit level, which measure the extent of 
differentiated intra-industry trade versus inter-industry 
trade. CHAPTER ,1  77 
Fig 7.5: Share of total trade to production: 
EU-Japan-USA, 1996 In % 
Advertising intensive 
Labour intensive 
Mainstream 
Total manufacturing 
Capital intensive 
Research intensive 
10  20  30  40  50 
Source: DEBA; WIFO calculations. 
Fig 7.7: Annual growth of value added: 
EU-Japan-USA, 1989 to 1996 in % 
Capital intensive 
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Mainstream 
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Source: DEBA; WIFO calculations. 
Growth, employment, productivity 
Turning to the dynamic characteristics across industry 
types, growth in market demand for the total of the 
EU, Japan and the USA shows some substantial 
variations. In particular, demand for capital intensive 
industries lags behind total manufacturing (see Fig. 
7.6). As a consequence of low demand, capital 
intensive industries also experience the lowest growth 
in value added and the highest decreases in 
employment. 
Despite average growth in market demand, growth in 
the value added of labour intensive industries lags 
behind total manufacturing because of increasing 
competition from low wage economies (see Fig. 7.7). 
Since growth in productivity matches total 
manufacturing (see Fig. 7.8). employment is 
decreasing faster (see Fig. 7.9). 
Fig 7.6: Annual growth of market demand: 
EU-Japan-USA, 1989 to 1996 In % 
Capital intensive 
Labour intensive 
Total manufacturing 
Mainstream 
Advertising intensive 
Research intensive 
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Source: DEBA; WIFO calculations. 
Fig 7.8: Annual growth of productivity: 
EU-Japan-USA, 1989 to 1996 In % 
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Source: DEBA; WIFO calculations. 
Fig 7.9: Annual decrease of employment: 
EU-Japan-USA, 1989 to 1996 in % 
Capital intensive 
Research intensive 
Labour intensive 
Total manufacturing 
Mainstream 
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Source: DEBA; WIFO calculations. 
For the advertising industries, both growth in market 
demand and growth in labour productivity largely 
correspond to total manufacturing. Nevertheless, the 
decrease in employment is the lowest of all five 
industry types, as a result of benefits from the high, 
above average growth in value added. Partly reflecting 
specific local demand conditions, partly reflecting the 
great importance of multinational production, the ratio 78  CHAPTER 7 
Box 7.2: Okun's law in a panel regression 
The relationship between employment growth and 
output growth is investigated in a panel of 
industries by regressing employment growth on 
growth in real value added. Fixed industry and time 
effects control for unobserved variables which are 
constant over time or over industries. The panel 
consists of 3-digit industries in the EU, Japan, and 
the USA from the DEBA database provided by 
EUROSTAT. The estimation of fixed effects 
regressions produces within-group estimates. 
Therefore, the estimated parameter for value added 
growth refers to a typical industry (which emerges 
after correction for industry and time means). The 
estimated intercepts as well as the dummies for the 
three economic areas reflect different trends in 
labour productivity and/or in the capital/labour 
ratio. Time effects capture evenly the impact of the 
business cycle, to which all industries are exposed. 
The estimation results are summarised in Table 7.2 
below. 
With regard to outliers, the estimation takes a 
careful and restrictive approach. It includes only 
industries in the panel for which observations have 
proved valid in all three areas. Four dummies are 
used to control for outlying values. Additionally, ten 
obvious outliers have been removed. Although the 
panel is prone to extreme values, the estimation 
results are remarkably robust. 
Three distinct specifications are estimated: 
Specification I represents the standard fixed effects 
model, with value added growth as well as dummies 
for the EU, Japan and the USA as independent 
variables. Specification II adds dummies for industry 
groups in Japan and the USA. Specification III 
replaces the fixed industry effects with the industry 
groups. The formulation of the econometric model 
uses the EU as a baseline, so that all coefficients 
referring to Japan and the USA have to be 
interpreted as the difference to the EU. Note that 
specifications II and III differ only in their definitions 
of the baseline: the typical EU industry is the 
baseline in the former, whereas the respective 
industry group is used as the basis for comparison 
in the latter case. 
of total trade to production is again the lowest across 
all types of industry. 
In research intensive industries, market demand 
moves ahead faster than in any other category and 
growth in value added is second only to that in the 
advertising intensive industries. Also exhibiting the 
highest rates of productivity growth and the greatest 
exposure to international trade, employment 
nevertheless decreased at a faster rate than in total 
manufacturing. 
To sum up, the following broad generalisations can be 
made across the five types of industry: 
• Lacking alternative options for creating 
competitive advantages, labour intensive 
industries, which produce tradable goods, are 
highly exposed to foreign competition on low 
labour costs. Despite paying the lowest wages per 
employee, prospects for growth in production are 
therefore modest. 
• Capital intensive industries can afford to pay high 
wages because of high labour productivity. 
However, they are most exposed to stagnating 
demand and, accordingly, to large job losses across 
all three major economic areas. 
• Exhibiting average growth dynamics, the high 
wages paid to skilled labour enables mainstream 
manufacturing to make attractive contributions to 
overall income creation. 
• In the fast-moving consumer markets made up of 
advertising intensive industries, the overall 
economic impact has been characterised by high 
growth dynamics paired with outstandingly low 
decreases in employment during the past years. 
• Finally, research intensive industries present 
themselves as most attractive, because of their high 
levels of productivity, wages and growth 
dynamics. In addition they are assumed to produce 
the most positive external effects in terms of 
knowledge spill-oversee to other industries and in 
terms of demand for sophisticated industry 
services. 
3. Okun's law by type of industry 
With respect to the analysis of the relationship 
between employment growth and output growth in 
Chapter 5, the new typology is integrated into the 
panel regression on Okun's law. As before, the 
estimated specifications are not based on a strict 
economic model, but rather aim only at exploring the 
stylised empirical relationship concerning the amount 
of output growth, which is necessary for stabilising 
employment. CHAPTER 7 I 79 
The assessment of internal performance in Chapter 5 
has already revealed some substantial differences in 
the employment intensity of value added growth 
between the EU, Japan and the USA (Specification I 
in Table 7.2). At this stage, however, the investigation 
can be carried one step further by introducing the 
differentiation across industry types into the panel 
regression (Specification II and III). Technical details 
are given in Box 7.2. 
The new question under consideration is, whether or 
not the observed differences in the employment 
intensity of value added growth apply equally to all the 
industry types. The panel regression reveals significant 
differences in the employment stabilising rates of 
output growth between the three economic areas 
according to the type of industry (see Table 7.2). 
Relative to a typical European industry, growth of 
output needed to stabilise employment is particularly 
low in the USA for mainstream manufacturing, labour-
and capital intensive industries. In Japan, capital- and 
advertising intensive industries exhibit a significantly 
lower employment stabilising rate of output growth. 
The most striking result is that research intensive 
industries exhibit no significant differences across the 
three economic areas. 
This outcome is also reflected in the aggregated 
growth rates of labour productivity (see Table 7.3). In 
line with the process of catching up, growth in labour 
productivity has been higher in the EU than in the 
USA in all but the research-intensive industries. In 
contrast to the other four industry types, the USA 
managed to increase productivity at the same rate as 
the EU and even faster than Japan. 
Table 7.2: Estimation results of the employment 
growth - output growth relationship 
Growth in value added 
Base=EU 
USA 
Japan 
Intercept - base = EU 
(average of industry effects) 
Intercept - USA 
Mainstream industries 
Labour intensive 
Capital intensive 
Advertising 
R&D intensive 
Intercept - Japan 
Mainstream industries 
Labour intensive 
Capital intensive 
Advertising 
R&D intensive 
N=66, NT=1371 
R2 
Standard error of the estimate 
Likelihood ratio tests for:
a) 
Fixed industry effects 
Fixed group effects 
Interactions: industry-type'US 
Interactions: industry-type'JP 
Fixed time effects 
Specification I 
lì 
0.37 
0.11 
0.02 
1.12 
0.99 
-
■ 
-
-
0.57 
2.98 
t 
14.42") 
2.94") 
0.52 
5.44") 
5.34") 
167.48(65)") 
103.25  (6)") 
Specification II 
β 
0.37 
0.10 
0.03 
1.87 
1.32 
1.45 
0.18 
0.46 
0.84 
0.41 
1.86 
1.56 
0..42 
0.58 
2.96 
t 
14.20") 
2.78") 
0.69 
-
5.50") 
3.22") 
2.58") 
0.48 
0.68 
2.55") 
1.20 
3.12") 
4.61") 
0.64 
173.72(65)") 
44.48 
33.40 
103.18 
(5)") 
(5)") 
(6)") 
Specification III 
β 
0.39 
0.12 
0.00 
-
1.75 
1.26 
1.37 
0.26 
0.44 
0.87 
0.43 
1.88 
1.72 
0.47 
0.53 
3.07 
6.75 
44.47 
34.00 
103.18 
t 
16.86") 
3.87") 
0.13 
4.31") 
3.39") 
2.36") 
0.63 
0.60 
2.16·) 
1.15 
2.24") 
4.10") 
0.64 
(5) 
(5)") 
(5)") 
(δ)") 
Note: Time dummies and four dummies for particular high or low productivity shocks are not 
reported. 
Estimates are corrected tor heteroscedasticity. 
a) degrees of freedom in paranthesis 
"**)significant at 1%; *) significant at 5%* 
Source: DEBA; WIFO calculations. 
Table 7.3: Average annual growth in labour 
productivity, 1989 to 1996 
Labour intensive 
Capital intensive 
Advertising intensive 
Research intensive 
Mainstream manufacturing 
Total manufacturing 
EU 
4.1 
3.1 
4.9 
5.0 
4.7 
4.7 
Japan 
4.2 
3.0 
3.1 
4.1 
3.9 
3.8 
USA 
2.6 
1.7 
2.5 
5.0 
2.4 
3.0 
EU 
+Japan 
+USA 
3.6 
3.0 
3.5 
4.8 
3.8 
3.8 
Source: DEBA; WIFO calculations. 
The general implication of this finding is not 
immediately clear. However, this result illustrates that 
catching up in labour productivity is not a mechanical 
certainty, irrespective of the particular industry 
characteristics. The fact that the USA has maintained 
its considerable lead in research intensive industries 
indicates that this phenomenon is linked to the 
particulars of creating and appropriating technological 
knowledge. One thought-provoking interpretation 
might be that despite rapidly changing environments in 80 I CHAPTER 7 
dynamic markets, leads can be maintained over time 
and actually support the steady increase of sustainable 
competitive advantages. This suggests an increase in 
the obstacles to catching up, the more complex 
production technologies are. Certainly, further research 
into the general patterns, directions and speed of 
catching up processes across industries is needed, in 
order to draw more firm and robust conclusions on 
this observation. 
4. Competitive performance 
The purpose of the new typology is to compare 
performance across the three major economic areas by 
reference to analytical benchmarks of the underlying 
forces of the competitive market process. Accordingly, 
the strategic options available to enterprises for 
strengthening specific advantages are highlighted. In 
order to provide a comprehensive assessment of the 
relative strengths and weaknesses, both the relative 
shares of industry types in total production, as well as 
the export shares of each economic area in world 
imports, will be examined. 
Table 7.4: Competitive performance by type of 
industry 
Share in world market Value added shares in EU+Japan-t-USA 
EU Japan USA EU Japan USA 
1989 1996 1989 1996 1989 1996 1989 1996 1989 1996 1989 1996 
Labour 
intensive  28.0 25.6 11.5 9.4 10.4 9.8 35.0 35.4 28.3 28.1 36.7 36.5 
Capital 
intensive 21.7 22.7 11.5 11.7 19.3 19.3 34.9 31.8 28.0 29.6 37.1 38.6 
Advertising 
intensive 28.6 26.3 5.8 3.6 16.4 15.4 30.1 32.1 22.8 22.7 47.1 45.2 
Research 
intensive 22.8 24.3 31.7 20.5 25.7 22.1 29.7 29.8 24.0 23.2 46.3 46.9 
Mainstream 
manufacturing 40.0 37.4 23.1 17.6 21.3 21.0 34.0 34.1 27.6 27.6 38.3 38.4 
Total 
manufacturing 27.0 26.9 19.2 14.5 20.2 18.8 32.5 32.9 25.7 25.6 41.9 41.6 
Market share: Exports as a percentage of world imports. 
Source: COMPET, DEBA; WIFO calculations. 
With regard to overall shares in the world market, as 
well as in domestic production, the EU is strongest in 
mainstream industries (see Table 7.4), partly focusing 
on skill intensive sub-segments. In labour intensive 
industries, Europe consistently holds above average 
shares in value added, but below average shares in 
export markets. Capital and advertising intensive 
industries hold average shares in value added. 
In the case of Japan, shares in domestic value added 
and world trade do not easily match. The former are 
much more evenly distributed, whereas the market 
shares of Japan's exports in world imports are highest 
in research intensive industries, followed by other 
mainstream technologies. In both cases, between 
1989 and 1996, competition from emerging 
economies outside these three areas caused a sharp 
decline in market shares. Japan kept a low profile as 
an exporter of products from labour intensive and 
above all from advertising intensive industries. 
In contrast to the EU, the USA is characterised by a 
strong - albeit in trade figures slightly eroding -
position in research intensive industries, and low 
shares in labour intensive industries. Shares in capital 
intensive and other mainstream industries are broadly 
in line with the overall size of the economy. 
Advertising intensive industries exhibit high shares in 
domestic production, but low shares in foreign trade, 
indicating the particular importance of multinational 
activities, presumably substituting exports with foreign 
direct investment. 
Table 7.5: Competitive performance in 
research intensive Industries 
Industry 
■-;..:_-.:. ι '.._'...:■_, 
Ptwmaceirbcate 
Other cfiem<cals 
CK*ice machinery 
Electricity apparatus 
Electronic components 
Telecom equipment 
Auöw visual apparatus 
MectcaJ eqwpment 
Precision instruments 
Optical instruments 
Motor vehicles 
Air- and spacecraft 
Market share: Exports as 
Share in world market 
EU 
1989 
74.1 
565 
29.9 
11.5 
35 9 
88 
23 9 
77 
38 4 
32 8 
207 
24.4 
37.1 
1996 
67.2 
56 1 
32¿ 
10.4 
37.3 
8.9 
344 
10 5 
36 1 
305 
IB 9 
309 
53 0 
J.ip.in 
1989 
125 
7.1 
24.3 
29 3 
31 1 
31 9 
54 1 
42 0 
196 
187 
46 3 
45 9 
1 2 
1996 
5.9 
5.4 
22.2 
17.7 
257 
24.3 
19.4 
17.1 
128 
18 5 
31 9 
31.5 
20 
a percentage of world imports 
USA 
1999 
51 8 
21 8 
26.8 
29 0 
22.3 
228 
168 
98 
41.7 
36 2 
16.7 
129 
68 9 
1996 
31.7 
17 4 
30.0 
200 
21 0 
17 4 
23.1 
10.1 
41.7 
33.2 
132 
158 
58 0 
Value added shares 
EU 
t<J89 
27.1 
29.7 
29.4 
27.3 
47 9 
89 
34 7 
30 7 
20 8 
21 6 
17 1 
44.2 
21 3 
1996 
30 3 
31.3 
299 
21 8 
45 8 
86 
2B9 
27.3 
24 0 
26.2 
23.6 
47.6 
26.5 
in r 11 .J.![-.si- -1 is.*. 
J.ipnn 
19Θ9 
130 
29.2 
18 1 
32 1 
232 
48 4 
19.0 
62.0 
134 
13 1 
26.6 
19.4 
2.3 
1996 
11.9 
25.9 
21.5 
28.2 
25.3 
36 0 
30.7 
65.6 
9.2 
15 0 
20 7 
14.9 
38 
USA 
1969 
59.9 
41.1 
52 2 
40 Γ 
28 9 
42.7 
46.3 
73 
65.6 
65 2 
56 3 
36.4 
76.3 
v-y>j 
57 8 
42 8 
46.5 
49.9 
26.8 
55 4 
40.4 
7.1 
66.8 
58 Β 
55.7 
37 5 
69 6 
Source: COMPET, DEBA; WIFO calculations. 
Focusing on research intensive industries, the EU has 
maintained its strong position within the research 
intensive branches of the chemicals sector, particularly 
in the fast-growing pharmaceuticals industry (see 
Table 7.5). At the same time, the EU gained market 
shares in both value added and world trade in 
innovative industries related to transport. In air and 
spacecraft, the EU considerably narrowed the gap in 
foreign trade, and also caught up in value added 
relative to the USA. In contrast, within the automobile 
industry, the EU won shares mainly at the expense of 
Japan. The EU also defended its strong position in the 
manufacturing of electrical machinery and control 
apparatus. 
Partly reflecting stronger demand on world markets 
than on domestic markets, the EU's trade balance for 
the group of research intensive industries turned from CHAPTER 7 I 81 
a deficit of ECU 12 billion in 1989 to a surplus of 
ECU 27 billion in 1996. This was mainly due to 
improving balances in motor vehicles, pharmaceuticals 
and other chemicals, as well as in telecommunication 
equipment. The only research-intensive industries in 
which the trade balance deteriorated were office 
machinery and electronic components. The share of 
research intensive industries in value added remained 
constant. 
Isolating those industries related to the information 
and communication technologies, the other 'non-ICT' 
research intensive industries show quite a favourable 
performance in the EU. Production in this sub-
segment is growing faster in Europe than in either the 
USA or Japan, and trade is creating a higher surplus 
than in Japan, while the USA is suffering a deficit. 
European shares in exports are growing, and shares in 
value added correspond to the average of total 
manufacturing. 
On the other hand, this split pins down the actual area 
of concern, namely information and communication 
technologies (ICTs), such as office machinery, 
electronic components, audio-visual apparatus, and 
sophisticated applications in medical equipment and 
precision instruments. All of these have remained 
either US or Japanese strongholds. It is only in the 
manufacturing of telecommunication equipment that 
the EU has shown some strength. However, in that 
field US leadership benefits largely from the added 
stimulus of rapid growth in domestic demand. 
Table 7.6: Share in manufacturing exports, 1996 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Portugal 
Finland 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
Labour 
intensive 
12.17 
14.78 
9.77 
23.82 
10.96 
8.66 
3.99 
20.18 
6.15 
16.13 
30.23 
15.01 
11.49 
8.73 
Capital 
intensive 
26.43 
9.64 
19.11 
29.30 
21.50 
17.06 
13.98 
13.89 
24.87 
18.43 
13.17 
35.90 
25.91 
16.08 
Advertising 
intensive 
13.81 
30.07 
9.64 
28.59 
17.29 
17.13 
21.76 
15.58 
22.34 
11.70 
17.01 
5.33 
5.34 
12.08 
Research 
intensive 
27.81 
18.36 
33.60 
4.92 
31.96 
36.88 
51.61 
16.14 
30.09 
22.76 
22.56 
20.34 
33.98 
42.17 
Mainstream 
manufacturing 
19.77 
27.16 
27.88 
13.36 
18.29 
20.28 
8.66 
34.21 
16.55 
30.98 
17.03 
23.42 
23.28 
20.93 
Sectoral structures within the EU exhibit a high degree 
of disparity (see Table 7.6). Labour- intensive 
industries are most prominent in the exports of 
Portugal, Greece and Italy. Capital intensive industries 
account for particularly high shares in Finland and 
Sweden, Belgium/Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
Greece. Of all EU Member States, Italy has the highest 
share in mainstream manufacturing, followed by 
Austria, Germany and Denmark. Advertising 
industries contribute most to total manufacturing 
exports in Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands and 
Ireland. Research intensive industries exhibit the 
highest shares in Ireland, the UK, France, and to a 
lesser extent in Germany. However, as the data only 
reveal the share of research- intensive products, but 
not the share of a country's own innovative effort, 
interpretation must be careful. For example in the case 
of Ireland, the importance of large and recent inflows 
of multinational investment is particularly striking, 
whereas for example the more modest share in 
Germany may be more closely associated with new 
research effort. 
5. Summary 
To sum up, the analysis of underlying forces of 
competitive performance has produced the following 
broad picture of the EU's structural strengths and 
weaknesses. 
Relative to Japan and the USA, industrial production 
in the EU exhibits the highest degree of specialisation 
in more traditional industries, which are still based to 
a large extent on labour inputs and physical capital. 
The EU proves its considerable technological 
competence and skills in mainstream manufacturing 
and the research-intensive industries outside the ICT 
sector. 
Nevertheless, performance is poor compared to that of 
the USA and Japan in the fastest moving markets, 
characterised either by recent technological upturns, 
as in the case of ICTs, or by easily shifting consumer 
tastes in the advertising industries. The data suggest 
that the EU has missed opportunities to benefit more 
from the high growth dynamics in these industries, 
particularly when compared with the USA. 
Source: COMEXT; WIFO calculations. CHAPTER 8 I 83 
Chapter 8 
Global investment and multinational firms 
In the preceding chapter, the underlying forces of 
structural development were investigated with a 
strong focus on competitive advantages generated by 
investments in innovation and marketing. It is 
precisely the exploitation of these firm-specific 
advantages, which is commonly viewed as a major 
motivation for multinational activity. Alongside 
increasing trade volumes, multinational activity 
apparently is the main driving force of the 
globalisation process, with far-reaching influences on 
both the performance and structure of the economy. 
Following an introductory discussion of theoretical 
perspectives in Section 8.1, this chapter looks at two 
aspects of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in the 
European context. In Section 8.2, a novel data set is 
used to describe the changing structure of European 
manufacturing industry between 1987 and 1993 and 
the role of MNEs therein. This is a micro database 
containing detailed information on turnover, market 
shares and diversification across industries, as well as 
on the multinationality, of the EU's leading 
manufacturing firms. The database is used here mainly 
to explore the structural implications of intra-EU 
multinationality. Subsequently in Section 8.3, statistics 
on foreign direct investment (FDI) are explored at a 
more aggregate level. This section investigates the 
inter-relationship between extra-EU multinationality 
and trade performance from 1989 to 1995. It 
compares the 5 largest EU Member States with Japan 
and the USA, using both descriptive statistics and an 
econometric model. 
1. Determinants and structural impact 
of multinational activity 
At the level of individual enterprises, the exploitation 
of firm specific assets (knowledge-based or derived 
from special organisational know-how, brands or 
reputation) is the most common explanation of 
multinational activity. In addition, constraints on 
growth in the firm's primary/home market often 
provide important push factors. The decision to set up 
plants abroad and become multinational is also 
influenced by tariff and non-tariff impediments, as 
well as transport costs which may render exportation 
a sub-optimal means of servicing foreign markets. In 
broad terms, this reflects proximity advantages such 
as easier market access and the supply of additional 
services, more efficient distribution systems, 
transportation costs proper, tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers to trade. On the other hand, economies of 
scale at plant level tend to favour exporting over 
multinational activities. 
However, whilst the proximity/plant size trade-off is 
often the driving force behind the export versus 
foreign production decision, it does not capture the 
whole story. Many firms invest abroad for strategic 
reasons. In particular, mergers and acquisitions based 
on strategic motives now form an important part of 
FDI. Another important aspect of multinational activity 
lies in the specialisation within the organisation of 
firms. Increasingly, parts of the production process are 
being spread across countries within the organisation 
of multinational enterprises, according to the 
comparative advantages of home and host countries. 
In particular for firms located in high wage 
economies, this is an important strategy for remaining 
competitive in world markets. 
The costs and benefits of multinational activity in the 
European context depend crucially on its motivation 
and on industry characteristics, as well as its impact 
on structural development. On the one hand, by 
supplementing trade, FDI might create stronger links 
between economies. Intra-EU FDI, in particular, may 
foster the European integration process. Moreover, to 
the extent that FDI facilitates the exploitation of 
comparative advantage, this should increase 
specialisation within the EU, resulting in pronounced 
structural effects on employment, productivity and 
growth. On the other hand, high costs, over-regulation 
and insufficient dynamism in the European economy 
might lead investors to set up plants at more 
favourable locations, substitute for exports and choose 
to supply the European market with imports. 84  CHAPTER 8 
Perhaps more importantly, the growing importance of 
MNEs within individual markets may sometimes be a 
cause of concern in competition policy: the very 
specific assets which give the MNEs their cutting 
edge may also result in a dampening of competition -
both between incumbents and from potential entrants. 
If so, the expected benefits from the expansion of the 
European market may be constrained by the increased 
market shares of the leading firms, who are able to 
exploit market power, both at the aggregate European 
level and (where applicable) in national markets. 
2. The multinationality of Europe's 
leading manufacturers
1 
Using a unique database of leading manufacturers 
within the EU, this section assesses the extent of and 
trends in (1987-1993) multinational activity, 
diversification and concentration in the EU (see Box 
8.1). For each of nearly 100 disaggregated 3-digit 
industries, the 5 largest EU-producers were identified. 
The market shares within the EU of all such firms 
were estimated, as well as their production across 
industries and across each of the Member States. The 
resulting database amounts to a three dimensional 
Box 8.1: The leading manufactures in the EU12. 
This database is based on three criteria. First it 
includes all firms which can be defined as 'leading' 
EU manufacturers, in the sense that, measured by 
the scale of their turnover produced within the EU, 
they are amongst the largest 5 firms In at least 
one 3 digit manufacturing industry. Secondly, for 
all firms satisfying the first criterion, data were 
collected on their turnover In all the industries in 
which they operate (not only those industries in 
which they are 'leaders' in the above sense). 
Thirdly, all such estimates were compiled for both 
the EU as an aggregate and for all individual 
Member States in which the firm operates. It 
should be noted that (i) some firms will have non-
EU parents, (ii) estimates are confined only to 
manufacturing operations in the EU. 
The sources of the data are mainly company 
reports, supplemented by business directories, 
financial databases etc. Throughout, size is 
measured by the value of turnover produced in the 
EU. A detailed statement of the underlying data 
methodology can be found in Davies-Lyons, et al. 
(1996, Chapter 3.) 
matrix, in which firms' EU turnovers are 
disaggregated across industries, and then, within 
industries, across the Member States. This provides a 
rich source of information on the structure of individual 
markets, and the market shares, multinationality and 
diversification of individual firms. The database is 
available for two years, 1987 and 1993, and the 
sample includes about 300 firms and 96 industries in 
both years. During 1987 and 1993, these firms 
accounted for roughly one third of the entire turnover 
of the manufacturing sector in the EU. However, it 
should be remembered that the data are confined 
exclusively to manufacturing within the EU 12. 
Intra-EU multinationality 
Two-thirds of these firms originate from the four 
largest Member States, and over 50 of the others are 
subsidiaries of non-EU (mainly US) MNEs (see Table 
8.1). The latter statistic is testament to the 
significance of inward FDI from outside the EU, and 
the former establishes the dominant roles of Germany, 
France, the UK and Italy (although, the Netherlands is 
also an important source of a few very large firms). In 
1987, these firms produced nearly 30% of their EU 
turnover outside of their home countries. Moreover, 
between 1987 and 1993 there was a pronounced 
increase in this intra-EU multinationality (the outside 
home country share rose from 30% to 37%.). 
Table 8.1: Countries of origin of the EU's leading 
firms and their intra-EU multinationality 
Country 
Germany 
United Kingdom 
France 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Other member states 
Non-EU firms 
Number 
of firms 
64 
52 
48 
47 
9 
22 
53 
1987 
Total sales 
214.0 
113.3 
136.5 
72.1 
39.7 
16.9 
98.4 
% outside 
home 
country 
11.5 
20.9 
20.7 
12.1 
51.9 
20.0 
100.0 
1993 
Total sales 
276.5 
110.1 
161.4 
87.0 
45.6 
25.2 
141.6 
% outside 
home 
country 
13.9 
29.2 
31.3 
22.8 
59.5 
25.0 
100.0 
EU  294  689.8  29.9  846.4  37.3 
Two anglo/dutch firms (Unilever and Royal Dutch Shell) and the anglo/french firm 
(GEC/Alsthom) have been allocated 50:50 to UK, Netherlands and France 
respectively. Sales measured in ECU billion. 
Source: Davies-Rondi-Sembenelli, 1998. 
This trend of increasing intra-EU multinationality can 
be found in all the major Member States. From Table 
8.2, it can be seen that Germany, France, the UK, Italy 
and Spain (in that order) are the major host countries, 
whilst France, Germany, the UK, the Netherlands and 
ι 
The results in this section are taken from a recently completed and updated 1993 "EU-market share matrix", produced by Rondi 
and Sembenelli (of CERIS-CNR, Turin) and Davies (University of East Anglia). The authors gratefully acknowledge their debt 
and thank for the permission to draw on this database. For more details see Davies, S.W., Rondi, L., Sembenelli, Α., "Industrial 
Organisation in EU Manufacturing: Dynamics, 1987-93'(forthcoming as a University of East Anglia Discussion Paper, 1998). CHAPTER 8 I 85 
Italy are the major sources. Non-EU based 
multinationals continue to account for nearly half of 
the inward production in manufacturing. 
Multinational operations are highest in differentiated 
product industries, but they have also grown across 
the board. This underlines the importance of firm-
specific assets as the main characteristic of 
multinational firms. 
Industries most sensitive to the Single European 
Market have experienced some of the major increases. 
This confirms that the establishment of the Single 
European Market has led not only to an expansion of 
intra-EU trade volumes, but also that firms have 
responded by setting-up additional plants in other 
member countries. This is not in line with the 
hypothesis that multinationality is influenced by a 
proximity to the market / plant size trade off (since, as 
non-tariff barriers to trade have diminished, one might 
have expected that more firms would switch to 
exports). 
The main reason for this increase in intra-EU 
multinational activity would appear to lie in corporate 
strategy. Firms expand production in foreign member 
countries for strategic reasons, for example as a 
response to the potential entry of new exporting firms. 
Multinational enterprises based outside the EU 
invested directly to circumvent barriers to trade and/or 
to participate in the further integration of the large 
European market. In this case trade is likely to be 
substituted, creating new jobs within the EU.
2
 
Table 8.2: Aggregate inward and outward flows 
of MNEs 
The Top 100 
Comparing the joint turnover of the top 100 firms on 
this database between 1987 and 1993, it does not 
appear that this increase in intra-EU multinationality 
has led to an increased aggregate concentration in 
European manufacturing as a whole. In fact, the share 
of the top 100 has remained more or less constant 
actually, falling marginally) at roughly 30%. 
This has occurred despite an increase in the index of 
multinationality for these firms from 2.4 to 2.87 (i.e. 
about 20%, see Table 8.3). The other row in the table 
shows part of the reason why this has not led to 
increased aggregate concentration: whilst these very 
large firms have increased their multinationality, they 
have also tended to decrease their diversification 
across industries. 
Table 8.3: Concentration, diversification and 
multinationality of the top 100 firms in EU 
manufacturing 
1993  1987 
Aggregate Concentration 
Share of top 100 firms (%) 
Diversification index 
IntraEU multinationality index 
28.60 
3.95 
2.87 
29.60 
4.34 
2.40 
These indices indicate in how many countries and in how many markets 
a firm is typically working. Increasing entropy indices of diversification 
and multinationality reflect both an increasing number of industries and 
countries in which the firms operate, and/or growing scales of 
operations. The index is calculated as number equivalent of the mean 
entropy index, which shows how many equally sized firms would be 
required to produce this concentration. The entropy index is defined as: 
n 
—Is, In s, , where s, measures the country or industry share. 
The figures shown are the arithmetic averages for the top 100. 
Source: Davies-Rondi-Sembenelli, 1998. 
Country 
Inward Outward 
Production by firms Production in other member 
originating from outside states 
1993 share of 1993/1987 1993 share of 1993/1987 
EU total growth (%) EU total growth (%) 
Belgium 7.2 
France 17.2 
Germany 27.3 
Italy 11.2 
Netherlands 5.7 
Spain 10.2 
United Kingdom 17.1 
Other member states 3.9 
Non-EU states 
EU 100.0 
Two anglo/dutch firms (Unilever and 1 
22.0 2.0 
57.3 16.0 
58.0 12.2 
60.9 6.3 
78.1 8.4 
46.2 
48.3 10.2 
58.8 0.2 
44.8 
53.1 100.0 
102.6 
78.8 
56.8 
127.3 
28.7 
36.0 
45.2 
53.1 
^oyal Dutch Shell) and the anglo/french firm 
(GEC/Alsthom) have been allocated 50:50 to UK, Netherlands and France 
respectively. 
Source: Davies-Rondi-Sembenell  i. 1998. 
Belderbos. R., Sleuwaegen. I... 'Tariff Jumping DFI and 
Export Substitution: Japanese Electronics Firms in Europe', 
International Journal of Industrial Organisation, Vol. 
XVI, No 5. 1998. pp. 60I-638. 
Notwithstanding return to the core however, it is clear 
that the top 100 firms remain very large in terms of 
their aggregate sales, and that they are very often the 
leaders in many individual markets (see Table 8.4). 
Table 8.4: The prominence of top 100 firms in 
Individual markets, 1993 
Number of top 100 firms in the top 5 in the average 
industry 
Probability that a top 100 firm will be ranked no. χ ¡n a 
given 3 digit industry: 
no.1 
no.2 
no.3 
no.4 
no.5 
1993 
2.6 
0.59 
0.57 
0.55 
0.45 
0.42 
Source: Davies-Rondi-Sembenelli. 1998. 86  CHAPTER 8 
In the typical industry 2 or 3 of the 5 market leaders 
come from within the top 100 firms. Indeed, in 57 of 
the 96 industries, the largest firm is from the top 100. 
Market concentration 
This leads to the key anti-trust question: has the 
increased multinationality of Europe's very largest 
manufacturers resulted in increasing concentration 
(and potentially market power) within individual 
markets? In fact, market concentration also appears to 
have remained more or less constant on average: in the 
typical industry, the top 5 firms account for 25.7% of 
the market (see Table 8.5). This is a one-percentage 
point increase compared to 1987, but this difference is 
not statistically significant. This is not to say, however, 
there are not distinct differences between types of 
industry - in both the level of, and changes in, 
concentration. 'No change on average' conceals a 
multitude of significant differences and changes 
between individual firms and industries. In particular, 
concentration has tended to arise in two broad types of 
industry: (i) where advertising is prominent, and (ii) 
where the EU anticipated major structural effects of 
the Single European Market Programme. The latter 
suggests that there has been an impact resulting from 
the establishment of the common market, where major 
welfare effects - besides lower prices from increased 
competition - were e-xpected from the removal of 
market imperfections and consequent exploitation of 
scale economies. The former - increasing 
concentration in advertising industries - can be 
interpreted in terms of Sutton's endogenous sunk cost 
explanation of market structure (see Box 8.2). In these 
industries, concentration does not decrease as market 
size increases because incumbent firms invest heavily 
in advertising, with a resulting increase in the height 
of entry barriers for potential entrants. 
Diversification 
Returning to the top 100 firms, nearly all are 
significantly diversified across manufacturing 
industries: the average entropy index is about 4 (see 
table 8.3). This is a 'numbers equivalent index', which 
indicates that, on average, these firms spread their 
turnover across markets with a distribution which is 
arithmetically equivalent to operating on equal scales 
in four different industries. Since this index tends to 
weight small-scale operations only very marginally, a 
numerical equivalent of 4 is indicative of widespread 
diversification - often across up to more than 10 
markets. 
Nevertheless, it is the case that this diversification 
declined between 1987 and 1993 - albeit not 
drastically. Perhaps this is to be expected, bearing in 
mind the widespread anecdotal evidence in recent 
years of a 'return to core business', but it still raises an 
intriguing question. According to the intangible 
specific asset story, both R&D and advertising 
expenditures often form the basis of firms' competitive 
advantages. In many cases, these are not transferable 
via arm's-length trade and are best exploited by 
internalisation within the firm. This should apply to 
both diversification and multinationality, yet we have 
observed that, during this period, the former has 
tended to decrease, whilst the latter has increased 
strongly. Undoubtedly, this divergence deserves 
further analysis. 
3. FDI and trade 
Table 8.5: Change in concentration by industry 
type 
All Manufacturing 
By sensitivity to SEM 
high 
medium 
low 
By type of product 
Homogeneous 
Differentiated 
by advertising only 
by R&D only 
by both advertising and R&D 
Mean C5 
1993  1987 
25.7 
18.0 
Source: Davies-Rondi-Sembenelli, 1998. 
24.5 
16.5 
% change 
93/87 
1.2 
32.4 
23.9 
25.0 
29.0 
24.1 
23.5 
3.4 
-0.2 
1.5 
1.5 
25.1 
33.6 
41.5 
22.1 
34.2 
40.4 
3.0 
-0.6 
1.1 
Due to data constraints, this section must take a more 
aggregated, sectoral approach. It first describes the 
structure and trends of outward and inward FDI
3 of 
the five major EU-Member States, and contrasts them 
with the FDI-activities of Japan and the USA, in order 
to identify particular areas of European competitive 
strength. It then tests the common determinants of 
trade and investment in a panel regression, in order to 
identify whether they are primarily complements or 
substitutes. 
The study uses FDI-data provided by the OECD and 
EUROSTAT at a sectoral level. Although the disaggregation 
is not detailed enough from an industrial economics 
perspective, it is the most comprehensive source covering 
inward as well as outward flows and stocks of FDI for 
most OECD-countries. It is possible to construct a 
common database with structural indicators at the same 
level of aggregation for the 1980s and 1990s. CHAPTER 8 I 87 
Box 8.2: Multinational activity - theoretical perspectives 
Starting with the work of Dunning (1994)
a on ownership advantages, locational advantages and 
internationalisation, economic modelling provides two strands on the role of firm-specific assets in the 
relationship between multinationality and trade. 
General equilibrium models 
First, there is a small body of literature using general equilibrium models (e.g. Brainard, 1993, Markusen-
Venables, 1995 and 1996)
b. In the Helpman-Krugman model
0, firms expand vertically by setting up plants 
in low wage countries and by producing skill-intensive intermediates as well as headquarter services at 
the MNE's home in high wage countries. Since these models do not take transportation costs - or more 
general proximity advantages - into consideration, they are only able to explain one-way FDI according to 
a north-south type pattern. More recent approaches have introduced transportation costs, interpreted in 
the broad sense of advantages from proximity to the market. They can explain the widely found two-way 
pattern of multinational activity and trade between similarly endowed countries, depending on the trade-
off between proximity advantages on the one hand and economies of scale at the enterprise and plant 
level on the other. The key propositions of these models are that (i) MNE activity is more intensive the 
more similar countries are, (ii) high trade costs tend to favour FDI over exporting - and discourage it if 
plant economies of scale are important and (iii) exports and MNE activity may grow complementarily over 
time (Pfaffermayr, 1997)
d. Moreover, Markusen-Venables (1996), conclude that (iv) convergence in 
income levels between the major trading blocks (EU, USA and Japan) may be one cause of growth in 
multinational activities. Their model furthermore suggests that convergence in country size may not be 
associated with growing volumes of intra-industry trade as some of this trade is displaced by 
multinationals, (v) In this model the world, as a whole, benefits from multinationals, but the gains accrue 
disproportionately to countries which would have had more national firms in the absence of 
multinationals. There may also be a welfare loss for a country which would have had a large share of 
world industry in the absence of multinationals. 
Industrial Organisation 
The second strand is the Industrial Organisation literature, which takes a partial equilibrium approach, 
but still remains within a model structure embodying a trade off between proximity advantages and 
economies of scale (e.g. Horstmann-Markusen, 1992)
e. It illustrates the commitment value of FDI in the 
corporate strategies of multinational firms, and, furthermore, shows that setting-up plants abroad, 
instead of exporting, is significantly related to market structure (causation goes both directions). In many 
cases, multinational activity is motivated by first mover advantages and market access, but not 
necessarily by cost motives. Multinational enterprises are expected to be most active in what have 
become known as endogenous sunk-cost industries
1: These industries are characterised by large and 
escalating expenditures on advertising as well as research and development (the scales of which are 
endogenously determined in the oligopoly game). These endogenous sunk costs are precisely those 
employed to exploit the firm specific assets usually associated with MNEs. 
j* Dunning, J.H., Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy, Addison-Wesley, Wokingham, 1994. 
See Brainard, S.L., 'A Simple Theory of Multinational Corporations with a Trade-off between Proximity and 
Concentration', NBER-Workingpaper, No 4269, 1993, Markusen, J.R., Venables, A.J., 'Multinational Firms and the New 
Trade Theory', NBER-Working Paper, No 5036, 1995, Markusen, J.R., Venables, A.J., 'The Theory of Endowment, Intra-
industry and Multinational Trade', Centre for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper, No 5036, February 1995. 
° Helpman, E., Krugman, P., Market Structure and Foreign Trade, MIT - Press, Cambridge, MA, 1985. 
Pfaffermayr, M., Multinational firms, trade and growth: a simple model with a trade off between proximity to the market 
and plant set-up costs under international trade in assets, WIFO Working Paper, No. 90, 1997. 
Horstmann, I.J., Markusen, J.R., 'Endogenous Market Structures in International Trade (natura facit saltum)', Journal of 
International Economics, No 32, 1992, pp. 109-129. 
Sutton, J., Sunk Costs and Market Structure, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1991. 
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The capacity to attract foreign direct investment 
benefits the EU in creating new jobs, in taking 
advantage of the transfer of knowledge and 
technology and in this way assists the ongoing 
structural change in European industry. On the other 
hand, the outward investments of European firms may 
foster their competitive positions and improve or 
initiate their access to foreign markets. Inasmuch as 
outward investment is based on a cost minimising 
strategy to relocate to low cost countries, it may also 
indicate lacking European attractiveness as a location 
of production. 
FDI can take a variety of forms, including greenfield 
investments as well as mergers and acquisitions of 
existing firms. Here, the stock of FDI is measured as 
the book value of tangible and intangible assets held 
by multinational firms in foreign countries.
4
 
From a conceptual point of view, the distinction 
between horizontal and vertical investments is 
particularly important (although, the data provide no 
information in this respect). Horizontal investments 
are presumably determined by the proximity/plant 
size trade-off as well as cost considerations, whereas 
vertical investments either secure supply of 
intermediates and materials or are market orientated 
to provide additional services locally. Vertical 
investments do not lead to a delocation of production, 
but may be viewed as a necessary means of increasing 
export performance. Horizontal foreign direct 
investment may relocate production, and thereby 
reduce employment opportunities depending on the 
height of trade barriers (and more generally the costs 
of lacking proximity to the markets), economies of 
scale in production and the importance of knowledge-
based firm-specific assets. 
Patterns of FDI and trade 
Despite these limitations, FDI-data do reveal some 
clear trends concerning the development of FDI and 
trade.
5 First, in the EU5 FDI is mainly within the EU: 
table 8.6 shows, that in 1995, 56.6% of the FDI 
outflows from the EU5 countries were directed to 
other members of the EU. This figure is even higher 
without the UK, which invests heavily in the USA. 
This is only an imperfect measure of multinational activity 
as it is heavily affected by differences in valuation and 
accounting standards, but, unfortunately, data on better 
measures are unavailable for these purposes. 
For the estimations below, a consistent data set for the 5 
largest EU-countries, Japan, and the USA was established. 
As shown in the previous section, these five Member States 
do account for the overwhelming majority of leading EU 
manufacturing MNEs. 
The inflows to the EU5 show a similar pattern, with 
49.9% originating from EU 15 countries. Again the 
UK, with its strong ties to the USA, is an exception. 
Table 8.6: Flows of FDI: share of total FDI, 1996 
France 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
UK 
EU5 
EU15 
62.7 
55.0 
62.2 
82.1 
34.1 
56.6 
Outflows to 
Japan 
0.3 
4.1 
0.5 
0.0 
0.5 
0.9 
USA 
24.0 
12.5 
16.6 
8.7 
47.1 
23.6 
Inflows frorr 
EU15 
62.4 
53.5 
49.8 
69.7 
19.1 
49.9 
Japan 
2.5 
7.9 
4.9 
2.0 
0.0 
3.2 
■ 
USA 
23.0 
16.4 
16.2 
7.9 
84.0 
32.6 
Source: EUROSTAT, OECD; WIFO calculations. 
Secondly, time series evidence on the relation between 
outward FDI-flows and GDP indicates that US firms 
started multinationalisation earlier than the EU 15 and 
Japan. In the seventies (1970-1983) the average 
outward FDI to GDP ratio of the EU, Japan and the 
USA members
6 amounted to 0.5% in the USA, 0.3% 
in the EU, and 0.1% in Japan (see Fig. 8.1 and Table 
8.7). 
Fig 8.1: Rows of total outward FDI In relation to 
GDP, 1970-1996 
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Table 8.7: Outward FDI in % of GDP 
Average 
1970-83 
1984-91 
1992-96 
EU 
0.03 
1.02 
1.21 
FDI-flows of EU include /niraEU-FDI 
Japan 
0.01 
1.00 
0.42 
USA 
0.05 
0.47 
1.05 
Source: EUROSTAT, OECD; WIFO calculations. 
In the second half of the 1980s, multinationality 
accelerated significantly in the European Member 
Data on aggregate FDI flows are available for the EU 15 
countries. CHAPTER 8 I 89 
States, as well as in Japan, while the USA exhibited 
less dynamic growth and fell behind. During the 
1993-recession, FDI-outward flows from Japan 
decreased significantly, but less so in the EU. The 
USA experienced a steady increase during this period, 
so that now the USA and the EU hold comparable 
positions. 
Thirdly, in total manufacturing, the volume of FDI 
(now measured as inward and outward stock of FDI 
relative to production) and especially the volume of 
trade (measured as exports and imports relative to 
production) is considerably higher in the EU5 than in 
Japan and the USA (see Fig. 8.2 and Fig. 8.3). In 1995, 
the volume of FDI amounted to 19.0% in the EU5, 
compared to 13.1% in the USA and only 5.1% in 
Japan. For the volume of trade (including intra-EU 
trade), the corresponding figures are 73.3% for the 
EU5, 32.4% for the USA and 20.1% for Japan. 
Fig 8.2: Volume of trade as share in 
manufacturing production: 1989-1995 
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Source: EUROSTAT, OECD; WIFO calculations. 
Fig 8.3: Volume of FDI as a share in 
manufacturing production, 1989-1995 
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Source: EUROSTAT, OECD; WIFO calculations. 
This pattern reflects proximity advantages of European 
countries in trade and FDI and - to a lesser extent -
differences in country size. Furthermore, it underlines 
the important role of FDI in the European integration 
process. In the EU5, the outward stock outweighs 
inward FDI. The former increased steadily during the 
most recent years, whilst the latter peaked in 1992, 
when non-EU MNEs invested in the EU in order to 
take advantage of the Single European Market. The 
evidence suggests that the European integration 
process goes hand in hand with an increase in intra-
EU FDI, but has not led to significant 'tariff jumping' 
from outside since the peak in 1992. This can also be 
seen in figures on FDI flows, which can be 
decomposed into an intra- and extra-EU component. 
(European Economy, 1996, p. 89). 
Fourthly, in the period up to 1995, a pronounced 
increase in the volume of trade relative to production 
can be observed in the EU5 (+8.0% points) and the 
USA (7.5% points), whereas Japan's increase 
amounted to just to 1.3 percentage points. In the EU5, 
most of the increase took place in 1994 and 1995, 
perhaps as a late consequence of the Single European 
Market Programme. Between 1989 and 1995, the 
volume of FDI in relation to production grew by 2.4 
percentage points in Japan, 2.4 percentage points the 
EU5 and 2.3 percentage points in the USA. In all 
three areas, this growth in the FDI volume mainly 
came from increased outward FDI. 
For the EU5 and the USA, a simultaneous increase in 
the FDI balance (outward stock over inward stock) 
and the trade balance (exports over imports) was 
observed, suggesting a complementary relationship 
between trade and FDI (see Fig. 8.4 and Fig. 8.5). 
Fig 8.4: FDI vs. trade in EU5 manufacturing: 
balance, 1989=100 
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Source: EUROSTAT, OECD; WIFO calculations. 
There are several reasons to expect complementarity 
between FDI and trade; most prominent are the large 
share of vertical investments, market access as a 
motive for FDI and the exploitation of knowledge-
based firm-specific assets (see Fig. 8.6 and Fig. 8.7). 90  CHAPTER 8 
Fig 8.5: FDI vs. trade in US manufacturing: 
balance, 1989=100 
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Source: EUROSTAT, OECD; WIFO calculations. 
Fig 8.8: FDI vs. trade In Japanese manufacturing: 
volume as share in production, 1989=100 
1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994 
Source: EUROSTAT, OECD; WIFO calculations. 
Fig 8.6: FDI vs. trade in EU5 manufacturing: 
volume as a share in production, 1989=100 
1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995 
Source: EUROSTAT, OECD; WIFO calculations. 
Fig 8.7: FDI vs. trade in US manufacturing: 
volume as share in production, 1989=100 
1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995 
Source: EUROSTAT, OECD; WIFO calculations. 
In Japan inward investment is negligible in size, 
reflecting restrictive policies in the past and domestic 
barriers against foreign direct investment. Outward 
FDI dominates by far. The FDI balance, however, 
does not seem to develop complementarily (see Fig. 
8.8 and Fig. 8.9). 
Fig 8.9: FDI vs. trade in Japanese manufacturing: 
balance, 1989=100 
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Source: EUROSTAT, OECD; WIFO calculations. 
Turning to the broad sectors within manufacturing, a 
complicated pattern of trade and FDI emerges: Table 
8.8 reports on the cross-section of industries in EU5, 
Japan and the USA for 1994 - the year with the most 
comprehensive data coverage. This shows that in the 
EU5 and the USA, the inward and outward FDI 
shares in production tend to match each other, 
suggesting that FDI is mainly mira-industry and 
between similarly endowed countries. 
Furthermore, there is a positive correlation between 
trade and FDI, both between volumes and between 
balances. In the EU5, outward investment is higher 
than inward investment in all 6 sectors, with the 
highest balance in petroleum and chemical products, 
food products, metals and mechanical products. The 
US balance in FDI is particularly high in the vehicles 
and other transport equipment industry, metals and 
mechanical products and food products. Measured as 
shares in production, the EU5 FDI volume is highest 
in textiles and wood processing, office machinery, the 
petroleum industry and chemical products. In the 
USA the highest FDI volumes are in petroleum and 
chemical products, textiles, wood processing and 
office machinery. CHAPTER 8 I 91 
Table 8.8: FDI and trade ratios at sectoral level, 
1994 
Ratio of balance Volume in % of production 
Inward Outward 
FDI Trade FDI FDI FDI Trade 
Food products 
Textiles, wood activities 
Metal and mechanical products 
Petroleum, chemical, rubber, plastics 
Information & communication equipment 
Vehicles, transport equipment 
Total manufacturing 
JAPAN 
Food products 
Metal and mechanical products 
Total manufacturing 
USA 
Food products 
Textiles, wood activities 
Metal and mechanical products 
Petroleum, chemical, rubber, plastics 
Information & communication equipment 
Vehicles, transport equipment 
Total manufacturing 
169.1 
127.1 
141.6 
185.7 
108.8 
131.2 
157.8 
1 311.0 
261.1 
685.4 
138.5 
85.6 
152.2 
108.6 
98.5 
560.5 
117.3 
99.0 
63.5 
138.2 
129.3 
81.5 
109.3 
108.6 
5.0 
295.9 
194.8 
131.8 
52.9 
95.1 
127.3 
72.0 
76.1 
79.1 
20.2 
71.3 
10.9 
45.9 
58.3 
11.6 
18.2 
2.5 
5.9 
5.1 
11.5 
20.1 
11.3 
30.7 
18.4 
7.2 
12.1 
7.5 
31.4 
4.5 
16.1 
27.9 
5.0 
7.1 
0.2 
1.6 
0.6 
4.8 
10.9 
4.5 
14.7 
9.3 
1.1 
5.6 
12.7 
39.9 
6.4 
29.8 
30.4 
6.6 
11.2 
2.4 
4.3 
4.4 
6.7 
9.3 
6.8 
16.0 
9.1 
6.1 
6.5 
42.1 
92.7 
73.9 
81.9 
165.8 
78.7 
69.9 
11.0 
17.4 
20.1 
9.5 
18.0 
30.6 
22.9 
87.6 
43.0 
30.8 
EU5: France, Netherlands, Germany, Italy and UK. For the Netherlands 
and Italy, some industries are missing. Balance; ratio of stock of FDI 
over inward stock of FDI, exports over imports. Volumes: inward plus 
outward FDI stock in relation to production, exports plus imports to 
production. Data for 1994 are used since they were most 
comprehensive in their coverage. 
Source: EUROSTAT, OECD; WIFO calculations. 
The relationship between FDI and trade has been 
estimated in a panel regression combining data on FDI 
as well as on industry structures (see Table 8.9 and 
Box 8.3). Summing up the major results, significant 
complementarity is detected in outward activities with 
respect to R&D intensity, openness, average capital 
intensity and average firm size. However, there are 
also some indications of a substitutional relationship 
with regard to labour unit costs. 
Inward activities show a substitutional relationship 
with respect to average firm size and an insignificant 
relationship with respect to labour unit costs. With 
respect to the proximity/plants size trade-off, there is 
significant substitutability. This must be interpreted 
with care, however, due to a possible endogeneity bias. 
4. Summary 
This chapter provides a number of insights into the 
extent and impact of multinational activities, both 
extra- and intra-EU. The analysis of FDI statistics 
demonstrates the importance of knowledge-based 
assets as an important common determinant of 
outward FDI and trade. Furthermore, FDI seems to be 
motivated by market access and to a lesser extent by 
cost considerations. In the main, FDI and trade appear 
to be complementary. 
The analysis of firm and industry structure confirms 
the magnitude of the increase in intra-EU 
multinationality, and suggests that this is now an 
integral feature in the corporate structure of most 
large firms. Whilst it appears to have had only a minor 
impact, on average, on aggregate and market 
concentration, in some markets concentration has 
increased noticeably over this period. If, as seems 
increasingly likely, multinationality is stimulated by 
strategic motivation, there does exist at least a 
potential anti-trust dimension in some cases. 92 I CHAPTER 8 
Table 8.9: FDI and trade as shares in production, 1989 -1995 
Independent Variable  FDI-out 
ß t 
Exports 
β t 
FDI-in  Imports 
ß t 
Log R&D intensity 
Log average capital intensity 
Log average firm size 
Log unit labour costs 
Log openness 
EU-integration dummy 
Constant 
France 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
UK 
Japan 
Textiles, wood activities 
Petroleum..chemical, rubber.plastics 
Metals and mechanical products 
Information & communication equipment 
Vehicles, transport equipment 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
R2 
standard error of the estimate 
Heteroscedasticity 
RESET 
Normal residuals (Jarque-Bera) 
Note: Outlier dummies are skipped. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity. 
*) significant at 10% 
") significant at 5% 
0.4 
-0.7 
0.9 
0.4 
-0.5 
-0.1 
-5.4 
1.1 
2.9 
0.5 
1.3 
1.7 
0.7 
2.0 
0.7 
0.5 
0.3 
-1.5 
0.1 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.3 
0.3 
0.88 
0.38 
81.24 
0.71 
6.95") 
3.8 ") 
-2.7 ") 
8.6 ") 
1.6 *) 
-4.2 ") 
-0.5 
-9.6 **) 
5.7 **) 
10.1 **) 
1.9 *) 
5.3 **) 
7.5 **) 
2.7 **) 
10.0") 
2.2 ") 
2.5 ") 
0.7 ") 
-4.5 ") 
0.8 
1.3 
2.3 ") 
1.9 *) 
2.0 ") 
2.3") 
(29) 
0.1 
-0.2 
0.2 
-0.6 
0.9 
0.1 
-2.7 
0.1 
0.3 
0.4 
0.0 
0.1 
-1.5 
0.5 
0.3 
0.7 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.99 
0.11 
35.02 
1.93*) 
4.37 
2.7" 
-2.8 " 
8.6" 
-8.9 " 
22.1 " 
1.6 * 
-12.9 " 
2.3" 
3.7" 
5.5" 
0.0 
1.9 * 
-17.3 " 
7.2" 
2.7" 
8.4" 
-0.1 
-0.4 
-0.2 
0.9 
1.0 
0.5 
0.6 
0.1 
(25 
-0.3 
0.7 
0.4 
-0.2 
-1.0 
0.1 
-8.4 
1.2 
3.3 
0.6 
0.7 
2.0 
-1.8 
2.5 
2.2 
1.8 
3.5 
0.8 
0.1 
0.2 
0.2 
0.1 
0.2 
0.2 
0.92 
0.36 
65.44 
-5.94") 
6.29") 
-2.7 ") 
3.0 ") 
2.4 ") 
-0.8 
-8.3 **) 
1.0 
-12.3") 
7.7 ") 
12.5") 
3.1 ") 
4.0 ") 
13.7") 
-4.7 ") 
10.5 ") 
8.7 ") 
7.6 ") 
9.1 ") 
2.6 ") 
0.7 
2.5 ") 
1.4 
0.8 
1.5 
1.6 
(28) 
-0.1 
0.2 
-0.3 
0.5 
1.1 
0.0 
1.3 
-0.2 
-0.5 
-0.4 
-0.1 
-0.2 
0.0 
-0.5 
-0.2 
-0.6 
0.1 
0.1 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
-0.1 
-0.1 
0.0 
0.98 
0.11 
33.28 
0.08 
4.47 
-3.2") 
2.4") 
-9.5") 
7.5") 
27.7") 
0.1 
5.9") 
-2.9") 
-4.7") 
-5.9") 
-1.8") 
-3.0 ") 
-0.3 
-7.0") 
-1.9 *) 
-7.6") 
0.7 
1.2 
0.4") 
-0.5 
-0.7 
-1.4 
-1.6 
-1.0 
(24) 
Source: EUROSTAT, OECD, WIFO calculations. CHAPTER 8 I 93 
Box 8.3: An econometric investigation of the FDI-trade relationship 
Since trade and FDI are endogenously determined by common factors, these two forms of market penetration 
are defined as complements/substitutes with reference to variations in any exogenous variable, if they move 
in the same/opposite direction in the case of an exogenous change (Pfaffermayr, 1997)
a. 
The vector of explanatory variables draws on the theory of FDI and trade described earlier. The share of R&D 
In sales and average firm size are used as rough measures of firm-specific assets. Average firm size, defined 
as industry output divided by the number of enterprises, also gives Information on economies of scale at the 
enterprise level. It is positively correlated with R&D intensity. Both form proxies for knowledge-based ownership 
advantages. Furthermore, capital intensity (average investment relative to production) and trade openness 
(exports + imports relative to production) are intended to capture the proximity/size trade-off. In order to 
represent unit labour costs, cost differences and specialisation are included. 
Data and variables 
Stocks of inward and outward foreign direct investment are only available at a highly aggregated industry level 
(EUROSTAT, OECD; 1997). FDI-data are matched with data on trade and industry structure. A consistent data 
set is available for the EU5 (France, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, UK), Japan and the USA. For the 
Netherlands, Italy and Japan some industries are missing. Thus, consistent data on 6 industries and 7 
countries over the period 1989 to 1995 - in an unbalanced three-way panel - form the basis for the analysis of 
trade and FDI in this section. Since no information on stocks of intra-EU FDI is available, effects of the 
European integration process and the Single Market Programme can only be measured indirectly. 
Econometric estimation and results 
For purposes of econometric estimation, a three-way panel, with fixed country,' industry and time effects is 
used. This gives an indication of the determinants of both FDI and trade. 
Besides the explanatory variables mentioned above, the additional inclusion of industry fixed effects implies 
that the estimated parameters have to be interpreted as effects of within industry variation of the exogenous 
variables. The variation across countries, industries and over time is captured by the corresponding dummies 
as fixed effects. The estimated results should be interpreted as referring to the 'typical industry'. 
The estimated results are largely in line with theoretical expectations: Consistent with the proximity/plant size 
trade-off hypothesis, trade openness, as a proxy for barriers to trade, reduces both the volume of inward and 
outward FDI. In the export and import equations, it is significantly positive, but some bias may remain due to 
endogeneity. 
Both R&D intensity and average firm size are significantly positive determinants of outward FDI and exports. 
Inward FDI is likewise positively determined by R&D intensity, however average firm size is a negative 
determinant. Turning to the volume of imports, both variables have a negative impact. 
Combined with the findings on average investment intensity, the results suggest that outward activities are 
mainly based on knowledge-specific assets and are more prominent in less capital intensive industries, 
whereas inward activities are more concentrated in capital intensive, but not R&D intensive industries. 
The insignificance of labour unit costs as determinants of inward FDI suggests that cost considerations do not 
form an important motive for investment in these countries and that market orientated FDI may dominate. Outward 
FDI is positively related to unit labour costs at the 10% level, supporting the cost motive to some extent. In 
contrast, both exports and imports are heavily affected by labour unit costs exhibiting the expected signs. 
There are also some interesting differences across countries and industries. Compared to the USA, outward 
FDI, inward FDI and export volume are all significantly higher in the EU countries, whereas import volume is 
lower. For outward FDI, the highest country effects are exhibited by the Netherlands, the UK, and Italy. The 
most export orientated countries are Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and France. Inward investment shows 
the highest country effects for the Netherlands, the UK, France, and the USA. The Netherlands and Germany 
exhibit the highest country effects in the import equation. There is also a pronounced pattern of industry 
effects in textiles and wood processing, exhibiting high levels in both inward and outward FDI, especially in the 
EU5, despite their low R&D intensity. 
The evolution of trade and FDI over time is captured by time effects. However, these are only significant in the 
outward FDI-equation, indicating an upward trend, notably during the most recent years. In contrast, the trade 
equations reveal no exogenous trend. 
a Pfaffermayr, M., Multinational firms, trade and growth: a simple model with a trade off between proximity to the market 
and plant set-up costs under international trade in assets, WIFO Working Paper, No. 90, 1997. CHAPTER 9 I 95 
Chapter 9 
The competitive strengths and weaknesses of European 
manufacturing: Summary and conclusions 
The second part of the report has explored many basic 
facts of specialisation, structural development and 
competitive performance at industry level. The overall 
objective has been to screen the data for direct and 
indirect information about the competitive strengths 
and weaknesses of European manufacturing. The term 
competitiveness has been defined as the ability to raise 
standards of living and employment, while maintaining 
a sustainable environment and sustainable external 
balances. 
1. Industry structure and competitive 
performance 
The most important messages can be summarised 
as follows: 
1. Intermediate specialisation of production in 
manufacturing industries: With the share of the 
manufacturing sector in total GDP amounting to 
20.6%, the EU is positioned between Japan 
(24.7%) and the USA (18.0%). This difference in 
the broad patterns of specialisation is consistent 
with the deficit in the trade of manufacturing 
goods for the USA and analogously explains the 
aggregate trade surpluses of the manufacturing 
sector enjoyed in Japan and the EU 
2. Global competition: As a natural consequence of 
faster growth in other areas, notably in the 
dynamic Asian countries, the total market share of 
the EU, Japan and the USA has declined. However, 
their overall trade balance is positive and 
increasing. This implies that the global integration 
of world markets and the increasing competition 
with low wage economies may have reduced 
employment opportunities in specific industries, 
but has not contributed to the overall decline in 
European manufacturing employment. 
3. Favourable external balances: External balances 
are currently not constraining European 
performance. The EU enjoys larger market shares 
for its manufacturing exports in world imports than 
Japan or the USA. Despite increasing competition 
from emerging economies, the European market 
shares remained stable between 1989 and 1996. In 
contrast, both Japanese and US exports lost market 
shares in world imports. The EU's trade balance 
for manufacturing goods is positive and increasing. 
4. European quality mark-up: The European trade 
surplus is generated by a quality premium in the 
sense that exports are more highly valued than 
imports. This quality premium arises primarily 
from trade with countries other than Japan and the 
USA, e.g. in Central and Eastern Europe. As a 
consequence of Japanese specialisation in the 
export of goods from high unit value industries, the 
unit value of European imports from Japan is twice 
as large as that of exports to Japan. Comparing 
bilateral trade flows with the USA, the number of 
industries in which Europe has higher or lower 
export unit values is roughly equal. 
5. Gaps in labour productivity: Labour productivity 
of European manufacturing is significantly lower 
than that of Japan and the USA. The exact 
magnitude at the industry level is blurred by 
measurement problems, which stem in part from 
the interface between manufacturing and industry 
services. For the aggregate economy, European 
GDP per capita in 1997 was 14% lower than in 
Japan and 33% below the US level. Differences in 
industrial structure do not affect the European 
productivity gap in manufacturing, which would 
basically remain unaffected, if all industries were 
of uniform size in all the three areas. 
6. Modest catching up in productivity: Labour 
productivity in the EU is rising faster than in the 
USA. Given the large initial gap. catching up is. 
however, progressing slowly. In past years, about 
one third of European productivity growth was due 
to structural change towards industries with higher 
productivity. This trend was supported by the 
simultaneous decline in employment shares in low 
productivity industries, e.g. in the clothing sector. 96  CHAPTER 9 
as well as by growing shares of high productivity 
industries, such as pharmaceuticals. Although 
productivity growth is, for the most part, still 
affected by general factors that apply equally 
across industries, catching up relative to the USA 
would not have been possible without structural 
change. 
7. Growth and employment: Job creation and growth 
are positively related across industries in all three 
economic areas, but growth in manufacturing has 
not been high enough to stabilise employment. 
Between 1989 and 1996, European manufacturing 
matched both Japan and the USA in terms of 
nominal growth in value added, but performed 
worse in terms of employment. Econometric 
estimates show that the level of output growth 
necessary to stabilise employment is significantly 
lower in the USA than in the EU, which is mainly 
a reflection of differences in productivity growth. 
However, the evidence additionally suggests that 
European industries are more eager to rationalise 
production and substitute labour for capital, 
indicating that relative factor prices favour 
employment growth more in the USA than in the 
EU. 
8. Structural pressures on employment: Relative to 
Japan and the USA, European manufacturing is 
still more specialised in labour- and capital 
intensive industries. Lacking alternative 
opportunities to create competitive advantages 
through product differentiation and investment in 
intangible assets, these industries are highly 
exposed to continuous cost cutting and 
rationalisation with a resulting substitution of 
labour. Thus, besides the general trends in 
productivity and growth, the specific industrial 
structure adds to the overall downward pressure on 
European employment. 
9. Lags in fast-moving markets despite technological 
competence and skills: The EU proves its 
considerable technological competence and skills 
in mainstream manufacturing and the research-
intensive industries outside of the information 
technologies. The EU is most competitive in the 
machinery, vehicles, and chemicals sectors, which 
together create a trade surplus larger than the 
overall surplus of the EU. However, in comparison 
to the USA, the low shares in total value added 
reveal weaknesses in innovation and marketing 
strategies in the most dynamic markets. European 
manufacturing compares poorly in the fastest 
moving markets, characterised either by recent 
technological upturns, as in the case of ICT-
related research intensive industries or by easily 
changing consumer tastes in advertising industries. 
10. European restructuring by multinational activity: 
European manufacturing is characterised by a 
significant increase in intra-EU multinational 
investment. Fostering the integration process and 
reducing regional disparities, this provides an 
important impetus for the ongoing restructuring of 
European manufacturing. This applies especially 
to industries relying largely on intangible firm-
specific assets like innovation and marketing. 
Given the lags of European manufacturing in terms of 
aggregate labour productivity, modest growth 
performance and rapidly declining employment, the 
sectoral analysis neither indicates overspecialisation 
in low productivity industries, nor a lack of 
technological competence and manufacturing skills. 
Compared to the USA, structural differences arise 
primarily from poor performance in creating lead-
time in the fast-moving markets, where competitive 
advantage is based on intangible investment in 
research and marketing. Since first mover advantages 
create substantial benefits in terms of growth and 
employment, the USA seem to have a greater ability 
to benefit from the particularly high growth dynamics 
in these industries. 
2. Economic policy 
Four policy issues arising from the empirical findings 
deserve special attention: 
11. Sectoral analysis does not imply any vertical 
targeting of individual industries by subsidies or 
strategic trade arrangements. In particular, two 
arguments support horizontal as opposed to 
vertical policies: (i) The policy of 'picking 
winners' generates opportunity costs relative to 
private market-based solutions and is subject to 
informational asymmetries with resulting agency 
problems, (ii) In addition, the analysis revealed 
that lower European labour productivity does not 
stem from structural weaknesses in the sense of 
being less specialised in high productivity 
industries than the USA. 
12. Continuous upgrading of European industry: Unit 
labour costs in the EU are higher than in the USA, 
and - by a much wider margin - higher than in 
developing and transition countries. Low wage 
economies may successfully compete on price and 
focus on homogenous, mature products. The EU CHAPTER 9 I 97 
needs to invest continuously in quality and to shift 
to new products at earlier stages of the product 
cycle. Economic policy in the EU has to promote, 
therefore, innovation, adaptability and the 
upgrading of human capital. 
13. Elimination of institutional barriers: Weaknesses 
were identified in some dynamic markets 
characterised by product differentiation, 
marketing and innovation. The fast moving 
environment of these markets requires flexibility 
in entrepreneurial response. A prime policy target 
therefore is the elimination of institutional 
barriers to the creative and flexible management 
of change. Such rigidities are to be found in 
financial, labour and product markets, in particular 
in basic services, as well as in the highly disparate 
nature of European innovation systems. 
14. European convergence and the diffusion of best 
practice: A high degree of disparity within the EU 
was found to exist for example with regard to 
specialisation patterns and labour productivity. An 
upward convergence in performance within the 
EU could provide a major impetus to the reduction 
of weaknesses observed relative to Japan and the 
USA. This underlines the importance of policies 
directed at the diffusion of best practices within 
the EU both in business and policy. European Commission 
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